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"STREET ENCOUNTERS" AND THE
CONSTITUTION: TERRY, SIBRON,
PETERS, AND BEYONDt
Wayne R. LaFave*
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly
rich in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of
pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile confrontations
of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover,
hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a
friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into the conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes,
some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.1

l.

STOP AND FRISK COMES OF AGE

has been only eight years since a leading criminal law scholar
noted with dismay that the issue of "whether the police have the
right to stop and question a suspect, without his consent, in the absence of grounds for an arrest" had been "largely ignored by commentators and dealt with ambiguously by most courts."2 How times
have changed! In the past few years, the police practice commonly
and euphemistically referred to as "stop and £risk" 3 has been a most
popular topic in the law reviews,4 and has been dealt with by a

I

T

t Portions of this article are based upon a paper presented at Ann Arbor, Michigan,
for the Institute of Continuing Legal Education program on "Criminal Law and the
Constitution: The Expanding Revolution," on July 19, 1968.
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965,
University of Wisconsin.-Ed.
I. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 13 (1968) (Chief Justice Warren).
2. Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street'' Detention, Questioning and
Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM.
L.C. 8: P.S. 386, 390 (1960).
3. The terms "stop" and "frisk" are used in this Article as convenient ways of
referring to distinct police practices, and their use is not intended to suggest that the
words themselves aid in resolving the difficult constitutional issues concerning these
practices. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
4. See Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IowA
L. R.Ev. 1093 (1967); Bator 8: Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L.
R.Ev. 62 (1966); Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 597 (1967); Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and
Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. 8: P.S. 32 (1965); LaFave, Improving
Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and
Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. R.Ev. 391, 427-55 (1965); LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WASH. U. L.Q. 331;
Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. 8: P.S. 393,
406-16 (1963); Oberman 8: Finkel, Constitutional Arguments Against "Stop and Frisk",
3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 441 (1967); Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58
[ 40]
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number of courts in a more forthright manner. 5 This development
reached its zenith last term when the Supreme Court for the first
J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 465 (1967); Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75
YALE L.J, 1161 (1966); Reiss &: Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374
ANNALS 47 (1967); Ronayne, The Right To Investigate and New York's "Stop and
Frisk" Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REY. 211 (1964); Schoenfeld, The "Stop and Frisk" Law Is
Unconstitutional, 17 SYRACUSE L. REv. 627 (1966); Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case
Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 433 (1967); Siegel, The
New York "Frisk" and "Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN
L. REY. 274 (1964); Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and Misuse
of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 251 (1966); Stern, Stop and Frisk: An Historical
Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 532 (1967); Tiffany, Field
Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DENVER L.J.
389 (1966); Younger, Stop and Frisk: "Say It Like It Is", 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 293
(1967); Wolbrette, Detention for Questioning In Louisiana, 39 TuL. L. REY. 69 (1964).
See also the student commentary appearing in Recent Decision, Search and Seizure-

Police Officer May Stop, Question and Frisk a Person on Reasonable SuspicionSection 180-a of New York Code of Criminal Procedure Is Constitutional, 31 ALBANY
L. REY. 177 (1967); Recent Decision, Right of Police Officer To Stop and Frisk a
Suspect Held Constitutional-Evidence Obtained Thereby ls Admissible, 33 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 138 (1966); Recent Decision, Common Law "Frisk"-Right Extended, 31
BROOKLYN L. REY. 397 (1964); Recent Decision, Frisk Distinguished From a Constitutional Search, 31 BROOKLYN L. REY. 174 (1964); Recent Case, Inclusion of Briefcase in
"Frisk" Does Not Create a Constitutionally Protected Search, 14 BUFFALO L. REY. 545
(1965); Comment, Police Power To Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 848 (1965); Note, Stop and Frisk: A Perspective, 53 CORNELL L.Q. 899
(1968); Note, Stopping and Frisking a Suspect Without Grounds for Arrest: People
v. Rivera, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 529 (1965); Case Note, New York "Stop and Frisk" LawSeizure of Burglar's Tools and Narcotics Without Probable Cause for Arrest or Search
Held Valid, 35 FORDHAM L. REY. 355 (1966); Recent Statute, New York Authorizes
Police To "Stop-and-Frisk" on Reasonable Suspicion, 78 HARV. L. REY. 473 (1964); Note,
Stop and Frisk in California, 18 HAsrINGS L.J. 623 (1967); Decision, Right of Police To
"Stop and Frisk", IO N.Y.L.F. 410 (1964); Note, Stop and Frisk: Police Protection or Police
State, 21 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REY. 180 (1966); Comment, Probable Cause Held Not Requisite
for Stop and Frisk, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1093 (1964); Comment, The Law of Arrest: Constitutionality of Detention and Frisk Acts, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1964); Note, Police
Officers Have the Right To Stop and Question Individuals in the Absence of Probable
Cause and, as an Incident to the Stopping, May Frisk or Search the Suspect as a
Precautionary Measure, 4 HOUSTON L. REY. 589 (1966); Note, Stop and Frisk: Dilemma
for the Courts, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1967); Recent Decision, New York's "Stop and
Frisk" Law Held Not Violative of the Fourth Amendment Despite Lack of "Probable
Cause" Requirement, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 610 (1967); Legislation, The "No-Knock"
and "Stop and Frisk" Provisions of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, 38 ST.
JOHN'S L. REY. 392 (1964); Recent Decision, Briefcase Within Limits of Permissible
Personal Frisk, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 685 (1965); Note, Selective Detention and the
Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 158 (1966); Comment, Constitutional Limitations
on Pre-Arrest Investigations, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1031 (1968); Recent Decision, The
Power To Stop and Frisk, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 119; Note, "Stop and Frisk" and Its Application in the Law of Pennsylvania, 28 U. PITT. L. REv. 488 (1967); Note, Detention,
Arrest, and Salt Lake City Police Practices, 9 UTAH L. REv. 593 (1965); Recent Decision,
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures-Stop-and-Frisk Statutes, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1031
(1967); Note, Stop and Frisk-Reasonable Suspicion: An Exception to Probable Cause,
13 WAYNE L. REY. 449 (1967).
The subject has also received attention in several recent books; see, e.g., W. LAFAVE,
ARREST! THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 344-47 (1965); W. SCHAEFER,
THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 23-26, 40-43 (1967); L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, &: D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 5-94 (1967) [hereinafter DETECTION OF CRIME].
5. E.g., People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P .2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963);
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time directly confronted6 this issue in Terry v. Ohio,7 Sibron v. New
York, 8 and Peters v. New York. 9
The practice of stop and frisk, of course, is by no means new. It
is a time-honored police procedure for officers to stop suspicious
persons for questioning and, occasionally, to search these persons
for dangerous weapons. This is a distinct law enforcement technique which has characteristics quite different from other police
practices such as arrest or search incident to arrest, and has long
been viewed by the police in this way.10 It is curious, but perhaps
understandable, that it has taken so long for the law and lawyers to
respond to a practice which quite obviously presents "serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious circumstances."11
In part, this long-standing disregard may be attributable to
the fact that stop and frisk is what some commentators would call
a "low-visibility" police procedure.12 Although it has long been a
matter of routine in every major police department in the country,
Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964); State v. Dilley, 49
N.J. 460, 231 A.2d 353 (1967); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964); State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966);
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (1966).
6. The Court avoided this issue on two prior occasions. In Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959), where F.B.I. agents stopped a vehicle in which suspects under
surveillance were riding, the Government conceded that the legality of the stopping
depended upon whether there were then grounds for arrest. The majority accepted
this concession although the Chief Justice and Justice Clark took the position that
there were adequate grounds for stopping the vehicle for investigation even if grounds
for arrest were lacking. In Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), police found
the defendant in possession of narcotics after approaching the taxicab in which he was
riding while it was stopped at a red light. The Court returned the case to the trial
court for a determination of when the arrest was made, without passing on the Government's contention that the question was whether there were reasonable grounds for
inquiry.
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
9. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The Court disposed of Peters and Sibron together, although
it did not attempt to deal with the two cases as a unit except with regard to its
refusal to consider the question of prima facie constitutionality of the New York
statute. Reference will be made herein to the Peters and Sibron cases as if they were
decided in separate opinions, for the two cases have little in common and required
separate analysis by all members of the Court.
10. See, e.g., 2 Los Angeles Police Dept., Daily Training Bull. 126 (1950). See also
NATIONAL CENTER ON POUCE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, FlELD SURVEYS V: A R.El'OR.T
OF A REsEARCH STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JumCE 327-36 (1967).
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
12. It was so characterized by the Court in Sibron (392 U.S. at 52), and has been
frequently referred to in this way by the commentators, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and
Frisk (A. Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CR.IM. L.C. 8c P.S. 433, 463
(1967).
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until recently the police appeared contented with the fact that their
authority to employ the stop-and-frisk tactic was undefined. Few
courts or legislatures had said that the police could stop and frisk;
but neither had they said that the practice was improper, and the
resulting uncertainty did not strike the police as disadvantageous:
Why go looking for trouble? But when the Supreme Court imposed
a fourth amendment exclusionary rule on the states in 1961,13 and
then imposed a fifth amendment exclusionary rule to bar admissions
obtained without certain warnings in 1966,14 it became increasingly
apparent that the police would not much longer benefit from the
law's silence on street encounters. Notwithstanding the common use
of such delightful euphemisms as "stop," "frisk," and "field interrogation," it was clear that sooner or later courts would have to determine whether these practices could be squared with the Constitution.
The fact that this assessment took place later and not sooner does
not mean that these police practices were a dark secret. Perhaps stop
and frisk was a low-visibility procedure in one sense, but striking illustrations of the practice did reach trial and appellate courts with
some frequency. Indeed, they arose in almost every context except
that which would require a direct answer to the question of whether
stop and frisk was constitutional. This is because what the police
viewed as a distinct procedure simply did not fit comfortably within
any extant legal pigeonhole.15 As a result, instances of what in fact
13. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.
15. It is true, however, that the Uniform Arrest Act had been in exisence since 1942,
and contained the following provisions governing street encounters:
Section 2. Questioning and Detaining Suspects.
(I) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable ground
to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may
demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his
actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned
and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed
two hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in
any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be
released or be arrested and charged with a crime.
Section 3. Searching for Weapons. Persons Who Have Not Been Arrested.
A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he has
stopped or detained to question as provided in section 2, whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous
weapon. If the officer finds a weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion
of the questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest the person. The arrest
may be for the illegal possession of the weapon.
INTERSTATE CoMMN. ON CRIME, INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 86-89 (1942); Warner, The
Uniform A.rrest A.ct, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942). The Act had drifted into
obscurity by the beginning of this decade, however, and was in force in only three
states in slightly modified form. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1901-12 (1953); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:1-25 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 12-7-1 through 13 (1956).
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were stops and frisks were usually disposed of by a rather mechanical process of determining whether an "arrest" had taken place.16
In other cases, the matter was dealt with solely in terms of substantive law because the suspect was prosecuted for "being suspicious"
under a vagrancy statute or similar provision.17
In 1964, the state of New York adopted a statute entitled "Temporary questioning of persons in public places; search for weapons,"18 which immediately was dubbed the "stop and frisk" law.
While this statute contributed little toward resolution of the difficult constitutional issues involved-it was all but ignored by the
Supreme Court in Sibron and Peters19-it did serve to focus the attention of the legal world upon this particular police practice. A
flurry of articles criticizing and defending the statute appeared; 20 in
short order the New York courts were confronted with cases in
which the practices authorized by the statute were challenged. 21
Two years later, the American Law Institute published the first
tentative draft of A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure,
dealing in part with the stopping of suspects for investigation,22
16. E.g., People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y.S. 326 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1922).
17. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 603
(1956).
18. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1967), which provides in part:
I. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he
reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony
or any of the crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and
may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this
section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search
such person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or
any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take
and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either
return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.
19. The majority dismissed the statute by saying:
We decline ••• to be drawn into what we view as the abstract and unproductive
exercise of laying the extraordinarily elastic categories of § 180-a next to the
categories of the Fourth Amendment in an effort to determine whether the two
are in some sense compatible•••• The operative categories of § 180-a are not the
categories of the Fourth Amendment, and they are susceptible of a wide variety
of interpretations.
392 U.S. at 59-60. See also 392 U.S. at 60 n.20.
20. See note 4 supra. The New York statute also received considerable attention in
the public media. See DETECTION OF CRIME 7 n.3.
21. The statute took effect on July 1, 1964, and, in a sense, was upheld on July
IO in People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964). Although
Rivera concerned a 1962 incident and did not involve the statute, the court recognized
a common-law power essentially the same as that granted by the statute. For a discussion of the subsequent New York decisions, see Schwartz, supra note 12.
22. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966):
(I) Stopping of Persons Having Knowledge of Crime. A law enforcement officer
lawfully present in any place may, if he has reasonable cause to believe that a felony
or misdemeanor has been committed and that any person has knowledge which
may be of material aid to the investigation thereof, order such person to remain
in or near such place in the officer's presence for a period of not more than twenty
minutes.
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which also stimulated the debate. 23
Another significant development was the fact that in recent years
we began to learn more about this particular aspect of police work
and its impact. Empirical studies on the subject were published,
the most noteworthy of which appeared as part of the American Bar
Foundation's (ABF) Survey of the Administration of Criminal ]us(2) Stopping of Persons in Suspicious Circumstances. A law enforcement officer
lawfully present in any place may, if a person is observed in circumstances which
suggest that he has committed or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, and
such action is reasonably necessary to enable the officer to determine the lawfulness
of that person's conduct, order that person to remain in or near such place in the
officer's presence for a period of not more than twenty minutes.
(3) Action to Be Taken During Period of Stop. A law enforcement officer may
require a person to remain in his presence pursuant to subsection (I) or (2) of this
section only insofar as such action is reasonably necessary to
(a) obtain the identification of such person;
(b) verify by readily available information an identification of such person;
(c) request cooperation pursuant to and subject to the limitations of Section
2.01; or
(d) verify by readily available information any account of his presence or
conduct or other information given by such person.
(4) Use of Force. In order to exercise the authority conferred in subsections
(I) and (2) of this section, a law enforcement officer may use such force, other
than deadly force, as is reasonably necessary to stop any person or vehicle or to
cause any person to remain in the officer's presence.
(5) Search for Dangerous Weapons. A law enforcement officer who has stopped
or ordered any person to remain in his presence pursuant to this section may, if
he reasonably believes that his safety so requires, search such person and his immediate surroundings, but only to the extent necessary to discover any dangerous
weapons which may on that occasion be used against the officer.
(6) Action to Be Taken After Period of Stop. Unless an officer acting hereunder
arrests a person during the time he is authorized by subsections (I) and (2) of this
section to require such person to remain in his presence, he shall, at the end of
such time, inform such person that he is free to go.
(7) Records Relating to Persons Stopped. A law enforcement officer, who has
ordered any person to remain in his presence pursuant to this section, shall with
reasonable promptness thereafter prepare and sign a report setting forth the
name and address of such person; the place, time and purpose of the stop; the
names of additional officers and other persons present; whether the person stopped
objected thereto; whether force was used and, if so, the degree and circumstances
thereof; and whether the person stopped was searched and, if so, a description of
all items seized and their disposition.
(8) Limitations to Prevent Abuse. The authority to stop persons granted in
subsections (I) and (2) of this section may not be used solely to aid in the investigation or prevention of the following crimes:
(a) any misdemeanor the maximum penalty for which docs not include a
sentence of imprisonment of more than thirty days;
(b) loitering;
(c) vagrancy;
(d) ••• [Note: There should be added to this list those felonies and misdemeanors, in connection with which the stop authority is unnecessary, or creates
an undue risk of abuse or harassment, such as ordinances requiring permits
for public parades or gatherings.]
As a general matter, the members of the ALI were not opposed to allowing the
police to frisk for weapons in order to protect themselves. However, some members
were afraid that the police would abuse this power and conduct a general search for
narcotics and other contraband. E.g., 43 ALI PROCEEDINGS 114-17 (1966).
23. Compare w. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 23-26, 40-43 (1967), with Souris,
Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM.
L.C. 8c P.S. 251 (1966).
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tice.24 Stop and frisk was also investigated by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which
recommended that state legislatures enact statutory provisions prescribing the authority of law enforcement officers to stop persons
for brief questioning.25 The National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders agreed that guidelines for "field interrogation" and its
incidents were needed, and that it was imperative for police and
others to distinguish legitimate investigative procedures from somewhat similar actions of dubious legality and efficacy (often called
"aggressive preventive patrol").26
It was against this backdrop that the United States Supreme
Court, on June IO, 1968, decided the Terry, Sibron, and Peters
cases,27 the Court's first word-but certainly not its last-on the
subject of stop and frisk. The several opinions in these cases cover
a total of seventy-six pages in the official reports, and a close reading of them might well lead one to wish that the Court had written
less and said more. Given the oft-stated need for guidelines, one is
struck with the fact that very few specific guidelines can be distilled
from these cases. However, this point should not be pushed too far;
this was the Court's first foray into this particular thicket, and it is
thus understandable that it made a conscious effort to leave sufficient
room for later movement in almost any direction.28 One could
hardly expect the Court to pass upon the full range of constitutional
issues which lurk in the area of stop and frisk, if for no other reason
24. DETECTION OF CRIME 5-94. Other helpful studies, based at least in part upon
empirical data, include: POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY, FIELD SURVEYS IV: A REPORT OF A
REsEJ\RCH STUDY SUBMITIED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1966); NATIONAL CENTER ON POLICE AND COMMUNITY
RELATIONS, FIEU> SURVEYS V: A REPORT OF A R.EsEARCH STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967);
Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Investigation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 465 (1967);
. Reiss &: Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS 47 (1967); Note,
Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City Police Practices, 9 UTAH L. REv. 593 (1965).
25. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON I.Aw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 95 (1967).
26. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ClVIL DISORDERS 159-61, 164-65
(Bantam ed. 1968).
27. A fourth case before the Court also involved a stopping for investigation, but
the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Wainwright v. New
Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968). However, the concurring and dissenting opinions contain
some interesting discussion. 392 U.S. at 598, 600, 610.
28. This is what Karl Llewellyn called "the essence of good appellate judging."
First, he said, "a court ought always to be slow in uncharted territory, and, in such
territory, ought to be narrow, again and again, in any ground for decision." Second,
"once there is a clearish light, a court should make effort to state an ever broader line
for guidance." Finally, it is important that "each line is promptly and overtly checked
up and checked on and at need rephrased on each subsequent occasion of new
illumination ••••" K. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN, DECIDING APl'EALS
389 (1960) (emphasis in original).
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than the fact that many of these issues-such as those concerning
the fifth amendment limits on questioning during street encounters
-were not before the Court. This was no occasion, then, for a Miranda-style decision, but rather a time for a few tentative steps. But
if one compares the Court's previous tentative steps with their progeny-Betts v. Brady 29 with Gideon v. Wainwright, 80 or Brown v. Mississippi81 with Miranda v. Arizona,82 for example-it seems clear that
more precise and far-reaching constitutional limitations can be expected.83
In light of the surfeit of law review commentary on the subject
of stop and frisk, a word about what follows is in order. This Article
is not intended to be a restatement or summary of the recent debate
on stop and frisk. Terry and its companions have put some of the issues to rest and pushed others to the forefront, and with the resulting change in the battle lines the time is ripe for a reassessment.
The concern here is with the approach taken by the Supreme Court
in Terry, Sibron, and Peters, and the emphasis is upon what the
Court has and has not done, and upon what is likely to happen in
future cases.
II. THE RECENT CASES

A. Terry v. Ohio
One afternoon, a Cleveland police officer became suspicious of
two men standing on a street corner in the downtmrn area. One of
the suspects walked up the street, peered into a store, walked on,
started back, looked into the same store, and then joined and conferred with his companion. The other suspect repeated this ritual,
and between them the two men went through this performance
about a dozen times. They also talked with a third man, and then
followed him up the street about ten minutes after his departure.
The officer, thinking that the suspects were "casing" a stickup and
might be armed, followed and confronted the three men as they
were again conversing. He identified himself and asked the suspects
for their names. The men only mumbled something, and the officer
spun Terry around and patted his breast pocket. The policeman felt
a pistol, which he removed. A frisk of Terry's companion also un~
29. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. For a discussion of the movement toward increasingly generalized statements in
Supreme Court decisions concerning criminal procedure, see Friendly, The Bill of
Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965); Packer, The
Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CroM:. L.C. &: P.S. 238 (1966).

Michigan Law Review

48

[Vol. 67:ll9

covered a pistol; a frisk of the third man did not disclose that he was
armed, and he was not searched further. Terry was charged with the
crime of carrying a concealed weapon, and he moved to suppress the
weapon as evidence. The motion was denied by the trial judge, who
upheld the officer's actions on a stop-and-frisk theory. The Ohio court
of appeals affirmed, 34 and the state supreme court dismissed Terry's
appeal. 35
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by the
Chief Justice, stating the issue in the narrowest possible terms:
"whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person
and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is
probable cause for an arrest." 36 Stops and frisks, said the Court, are
governed by the fourth amendment, but the officer's actions had
been reasonable. Justice Black concurred in one sentence; 37 Justice
Harlan concurred but thought that more attention should be given
to the right to stop as the real basis for the right to frisk, 38 and the
concurrence of Justice White added a few words on the right to ask
questions during a stop. 39 Only Justice Douglas dissented. He took
the position that probable cause is required by the fourth amendment but was not present on the given facts. 40
B. Sibron v. New York
A Brooklyn officer, while patrolling his beat in uniform, observed Sibron in an area from four p.m. until midnight. Sibron conversed with six or eight known narcotics addicts during this time,
and later entered a restaurant and talked with three more known
addicts. The officer then approached Sibron, told him to come outside, and said, "You know what I am after." Sibron mumbled something and reached into his pocket; the officer simultaneously reached
into the pocket and pulled out several glassine envelopes of heroin.
The officer's sworn complaint alleged that Sibron had thrown the
envelopes away, but his testimony on the defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence was to the contrary. The trial court ruled
that the officer had had probable cause for arrest, but clearly erred
in basing this determination upon Sibron's in-court admission that
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
392 U.S. at 15.
392 U.S. at 31.
392 U.S. at 31.
392 U.S. at 34.
392 U.S. at 35.
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he had been talking to the addicts about narcotics. 41 Sibron was convicted on his plea of guilty for the unlawful possession of heroin,
the appellate division affirmed without opinion,42 and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the New York stopand-frisk law but wrote no opinion.43 It is hard to imagine a less appealing set of circumstances upon which to justify a stop and frisk
before the United States Supreme Court, and the prosecutor understandably confessed error.
The Chief Justice declined the confession of error and refused
to find that the case was now moot because Sibron had completed
his six-month sentence. He also declined to pass upon whether the
New York statute was or was not constitutional on its face, as argued by the parties on both sides of this and the Peters case. The
search in this case was found to be unlawful because the officer was
seeking narcotics rather than acting from fear for his own safety,
and because, in any event, the officer had not followed the necessary
procedures for a frisk for weapons. Justice White joined this part of
the opinion in his concurrence; 44 Justice Fortas said he would accept the confession of error; 45 Justice Harlan preferred to dispose of
the case on the basis that there were not grounds for a stop; 46 and
Justice Douglas also concurred, stressing the right of privacy for
sick people.47 Justice Black dissented, claiming that the officer had
grounds to frisk and also grounds to arrest.48
C. Peters v. New York
A New York City officer, home one afternoon in his sixth-floor
apartment, heard a noise outside his door49 and went to the peep41. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 47 (1968).
42. See 392 U.S. at 47.
43. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966).
44. 392 U.S. at 69.
45. 392 U.S. at 70.
46. 392 U.S. at 70.
47. 392 U.S. at 68.
48. Although Justice Black said that the seizure was not unreasonable for "both
these reasons" (392 U.S. at 79), he later made the curious observation that "there was
sufficient evidence here on which to base findings that after recovery of the heroin,
in particular, an officer could reasonably believe there was probable cause to charge
Sibron with violating New York's narcotics laws." 392 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added). What
bearing that has on the admissibility of the heroin is far from clear.
49. Actually, the statement of the facts says that the officer "heard a noise at his
door" (392 U.S. at 48), which the Chief Justice assumed "led him to believe that
someone sought to force entry." 392 U.S. at 66. Justice Harlan responded that the officer
had not testified as to such a belief and no state court had concluded that he had held
such a belief. 392 U.S. at 75. This is the critical fact in the case. On the basis of one
interpretation of what a noise "at" the door is, the Chief Justice concluded that the
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the suspects had attempted a burglary; on

50
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hole to see what was happening. He observed two strangers50 tiptoeing out of the alcove toward the stairway. He then called the police,
put on civilian clothes, grabbed his service revolver, and looked out
again. The two men were now headed toward the stairway. Believing that the suspects were in the building to commit a burglary, the
officer entered the hallway and slammed the door behind him, at
which point the two men quickly started down the stairs. The officer gave chase and collared Peters, who claimed to be in the building visiting his girl friend, but refused to identify her because she
was a married woman. The officer patted him down and felt what
might have been a knife in his pocket. He then removed the object,
which was an opaque plastic envelope containing burglar's tools.
After Peters was charged with possession of burglary tools with intent to employ them in commission of a crime, the trial court upheld the officer's actions on the basis of the New York stop-and-frisk
statute.51 Peters was convicted, and the appellate division52 and
Court of Appeals53 affirmed.
For the Chief Justice, this case was easy; there was no need to
worry about the right to stop and frisk, since the officer had made an
arrest on probable cause and thus could search the suspect in order
to find weapons and prevent the destruction of evidence. 54 The
opinions of Justices Fottas55 and Black56 agreed as to this defendant;
Justice Douglas concurred because this fact situation presented
what to him is the only constitutionally permissible kind of stop
and frisk-that in which there is probable cause for belief that the
suspect is about to commit a crime; 51 Justices White and Harlan
objected that the officer's actions should instead be upheld on the
ground that a lawful stop and frisk (rather than an arrest and
search) had occurred. 58
the basis of a quite different interpretation, Justice Harlan said there were grounds to
suspect only that the men were in the building for the purpose of committing a
burglary.
50. The offiecer testified that he had lived in the 120-unit building for twelve
years and did not recognize either of the men as tenants. 392 U.S. at 48.
51. People v. Peters, 44 Misc. 2d 470, 254 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1964).
52. People v. Peters, 24 App. Div. 2d 989, 265 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1965).
53. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
54. See note 49 supra for the interpretation of the facts needed to reach such a
conclusion.
55. 392 U.S. at 70.
56. 392 U.S. at 79.
57. 392 U.S. at 68.
58. 392 U.S, at 69, 70.
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STOP AND FRISK AND FOURTH .AMENDMENT THEORY

Before looking in more detail at precisely what the Court has or
has not done in these opinions, it is important to consider a more
fundamental question: To what extent does existing fourth amendment theory support the proposition that what is commonly referred
to as a stop and frisk is constitutionally permissible in circumstances
where it would be a violation of the amendment to make an arrest
and search? Or, to put it another way, is Justice Douglas correct in
saying that the Terry decision amounts to a rewriting of the fourth
amendment? 59 To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider
whether stops and frisks fall within the fourth amendment, and, if
they do, to determine what requirements of the amendment are
applicable.

A. In or out of the Fourth Amendment
In the Terry case, the Chief Justice criticizes "the distinctions of
classical 'stop-and-frisk' theory" on the ground that they serve to divert attention from the basic question of whether the officer's conduct was reasonable. 60 The distinctions to which he referred, of
course, are between a stopping on the street and a to-the-station arrest, and also between a frisk for weapons and the more extensive
search that is commonly made incident to an arrest. Abjuring such
labels, the Chief Justice concludes that they do not mark the boundaries of the fourth amendment; restraining a person on the street is
certainly a "seizure," and an exploration of the outer surfaces of his
clothing is beyond question a "search." The Court therefore rejects
"the notions that the fourth amendment does not come into play at
all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of
something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search.' " 61
It is hard to see how anyone could quarrel with that conclusion.
Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that the Court labors so hard to
reach it, except for the fact that it assumed that "classical 'stop-andfrisk' theory" somehow supports a contrary position. This is not the
case. Notwithstanding an occasional unfortunate choice of words in
a few decisions,62 it has never been seriously contended that merely
59. ll92 U.S. at ll8·ll9.
60. ll92 U.S. at 19.
61. ll92 U.S. at 19.
62, The Court refers (ll92 U.S. at 16 n.12) to the Ohio court of appeals' statement
that "we must be careful to distinguish that the 'frisk' authorized herein includes only
a 'frisk' for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for contraband,
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characterizing certain police activity as a ''stop" or a "frisk" removes
that conduct from the limitations of the fourth amendment. Rather,
the traditional argument has been that the words "stop" and "frisk"
are convenient ways of describing certain limited intrusions63 which,
because of their scope, should be permitted in circumstances which
would not justify the more serious intrusions of a to-the-station arrest accompanied by a search for weapons and evidence.64 The Supreme Court does not reject that argument, but embraces it. 65
This is not to suggest, however, that the Court's failure to attach
importance to the "stop" and "frisk" labels is not of major significance. As one commentator has correctly observed, a most important
feature of these cases "is that the Supreme Court of the United
States has dissipated the notion that the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment are subject to verbal manipulation."66 It is the reasonableness of the officer's conduct, not what the
state chooses to call it, which is in issue. If courts adhere to this prin,
ciple, then "the importance of another verbalism-the term 'arrest'
-which for a long time has tended to dominate legal thinking in
this area," 67 may wane. 68
evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest.
Such a search is controlled by the Fourth Amendment and probable cause is essential."
Although the Ohio court might have stated the point more clearly, this language
essentially seems to be an attempt to distinguish two kinds of searches which are quite
different in terms of their degree of imposition, rather than a "suggestion . • • that
such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment." 392 U.S. at 16.
63. Indeed, there may be some merit in the continued use of these labels as a
convenient way to single out what the police consider to be unique and distinct en•
forcement techniques. The police, if they are to have a clear understanding of their
authority (which is necessary if the exclusionary rule is to have any deterrent effect),
must be instructed in terms of how much evidence is needed for certain actions, and
not merely told that they must somehow "balance" all the factors. See text accompany•
ing notes 87-96 infra.
64. This argument is discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying notes
74-76 infra. For other statements of the "classical 'stop-and-frisk' theory," see sources
cited in note 74 infra.
65. 392 U.S. at 18 n.15:
In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs
all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the
scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a
central element in the analysis of reasonableness.
66. Remarks of Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, Institute
of Continuing Legal Education program on "Criminal Law and the Constitution: The
Expanding Revolution," July 19, 1968.
67. Id.
68. It has often been assumed that whether an officer has made an "arrest" is critical
in passing upon the validity of a search without warrant. If an arrest has been made,
the tendency of courts is to uphold the subsequent search without serious consideration
of whether it can otherwise be justified. See LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course
of True Law •.. Has Not ... Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 277-98. On the other
hand, if the officer has not first gone through the formalities of an arrest, it is common
for courts to assume that it is improper to search. Id. at 302-03. Cf. In re Boykin, 39
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B. Is Probable Cause Required'!
If these more limited intrusions arising out of street encounters
-whatever they may be called-are governed by the fourth amendment, then it is appropriate to look to the language of that amendment to determine precisely what constitutional requirements must
be met:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.69
This language, which students of constitutional history tell us was
in part a result of an oversight in the redrafting process,70 has been
a source of confusion since its adoption. 71 The basic difficulty concerns the proper relationship between the reasonableness clause and
the warrant clause. Can a search or seizure with a warrant on probable cause still be unreasonable? Or, perhaps more important, can
a search or seizure without a warrant be reasonable even in the absence of probable cause?
It is this latter question that divides the Chief Justice and Justice
Douglas in Terry. Says the Chief Justice:
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause
of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether
"probable cause" existed to justify the search and seizure which took
place. However, that is not the case.... Instead, the conduct involved
in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.72

This approach seems to assume that a lesser quantum of evidence
may suffice when an officer is acting without a warrant because he is
so acting and thus has escaped the reach of the probable cause half
of the amendment.
To this analysis, Justice Douglas replies: "We hold today that
Ill. 2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968) (reasonable for officer to search high school student
for gun on information from assistant principal that he had anonymous tip that student
had a gun, without regard to whether there was probable cause to make an arrest).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
70. Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IowA
L. REv. 1093, 1101 (1967); Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54
J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 393, 397-98 (1963); Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme
Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 664, 679 (1961).
71. For a critical examination of many of these problems, see Comment, supra note
70, at 678-92.
72. 392 U.S. at 20.
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the police have greater authority to make a 'seizure' and conduct a
'search' than a judge has to authorize such action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again." 73 I would award this round
to Justice Douglas, as it is unmistakably clear that the Court has repeatedly held that police may not act upon less evidence merely by
avoiding the magistrate. Thus, it may be said that the officer's actions in Terry should be upheld only if they would have been
equally permissible had there been a magistrate at his elbow who
supplied a warrant. Of course, the nature of stop and frisk is such
that a magistrate is unlikely to be involved, but this hardly justifies
a departure from the long-standing premise that the absence of a
warrant does not of itself confer greater authority upon the police.
It is at this point, however, that I part company with Justice
Douglas, for he then seems to assume that this constitutional requirement of probable cause is an inflexible standard which demands precisely the same amount of evidence no matter what kind
of police action is involved. This, of course, amounts to a rejection
of what I have come to believe is the best-reasoned analysis in support of stop and frisk. 74 In brief, this analysis proceeds as follows:
the requirement of probable cause is a compromise for accommodating the opposing interests of the public in crime prevention and
detection, and of individuals in privacy and security.75 The same
compromise is not called for in all situations, and thus this balancing process should take account of precisely what lies in the balance
in a given case. Because one variable is the degree of imposition on
the individual, it may be postulated that less evidence is needed to
meet the probable cause test when the consequences for the individual are less serious. Thus, it may be said that a brief on-the-street
seizure does not require as much evidence of probable cause as one
which involves taking the individual to the station, since the former
is relatively short, less conspicuous, less humiliating to the person,
and offers less chance for police coercion than the latter. Similarly,
it could be concluded that patting down for weapons, although it is
a search, is a lesser imposition than a complete search of the person
73. 392 U.S. at 36.
74. For other statements of this or very similar analysis, see Leagre, supra note 70,
at 411-16; Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S.
465, 468-71 (1967); Stem, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem,
58 J, CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 532, 536-37 (1967); Younger, Stop and Frisk: "Say It Like It Is",
58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 293, 298 (1967); Recent Statute, New York Authorizes Police
To "Stop and Frisk" on Reasonable Suspicion, 78 HARv. L. R.Ev 473 (1964); Note, Stop
and Frisk: Dilemma for the Courts, 41 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 161 (1967); Note, Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 158, 162-66 (1966).
75. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
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and his "immediate presence"-and consider how broadly those
words have been construed76-for weapons and for the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime.
But does this analysis square with pre-Terry theories of the
fourth amendment? I think so, although I would have been more
hesitant with my answer about a year ago. Then, notwithstanding
the urgings of some writers, 77 the Court had not expressly recognized a variable probable cause test, although some Justices seemed
to support such a position. There is, for example, the oft-quoted
dissent of Justice Jackson in Brinegar v. United States to the effect
that he would strive to uphold a roadblock if it was thrown up
to terminate a kidnapping but not if it was used "to salvage a few
bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger." 78
Then in 1967 came the Camara79 and See80 decisions, concerning
health and safety inspections of residential and business premises.
The Court held that the inspector, if turned away, must obtain a
warrant; but this was of minor importance compared to what the
Court had to say about what evidence was needed to secure the warrant. Although the warrant clause was clearly in issue, the Court
called for a "balancing [of] the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.''81 The Court then adopted a lower standard of probable cause for inspection warrants, in part because these
inspections "involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.''82 Thus, a new fourth amendment calculus was
76. See LaFave, supra note 68, at 285-87. Although the Supreme Court has said
that "the rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified • • • by the need to
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime" [Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364, 367 (1964)], the Court has not so limited the scope of search incident to arrest in
prior cases. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search of defendant's desk, safe, and filing cabinet after he was in custody of officers); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search of defendant's four-room apartment after he
was arrested and handcuffed).
77. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960
SuP. CT. R.Ev. 46, 63; Leagre, supra note 70, at 413-16; Comment, supra note 70, at
704-06.
78. 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
79. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
80. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
81. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
82. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). This was one of three
"persuasive factors" listed by the Court. The other two, a long history of acceptance of
such programs and the theory that the public interest demands that all dangerous
conditions be prevented, are less than convincing. See LaFave, Administrative Searches
and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. I, 13-17.
It would seem to follow that a higher standard of probable cause than ordinarily
required would be called for when the intrusion is particularly severe. Thus, Justice
Stewart, concurring in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 68-69 (1967), said:
The standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands
that the showing of justification match the degree of intrusion. By its very nature
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brought into being-one which was immediately recognized as
pointing the way toward the Court's acceptance of the rationale
supporting stop and frisk. 83 The balancing test of Camara was
quoted and relied upon in Terry v. Ohio. 84
For one who subscribes to the stop-and-frisk analysis summarized
above, the most significant part of Terry is the Court's response to
the petitioner's contention that if there was not sufficient evidence
for arrest then there was not sufficient evidence for any other form
of intrusion. The majority rejects this argument, saying: "It assumes
that the interests sought to be vindicated and the invasions of personal security may be equated in the two cases, and thereby ignores
a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types
of conduct under the Fourth Amendment." 85 Although it would
make no difference in terms of results, 86 it is unfortunate that the
Court did not say that this is so even though probable cause is required, instead of saying that the argument fails because probable
cause is irrelevant. Then the dissent of Justice Douglas could not
have been written the way it is, and he would have had to confront
directly the issue of how the variable probable-cause test should be
applied to the police conduct in question. That, of course, is an issue which not all men would resolve in the same way, but it seems
much more sensible to acknowledge that this is the issue than to accept the unjustified assumption that stopping and frisking must be
unconstitutional because these practices are indistinguishable from
arrest and search incident to arrest.
C. The Utility of the Balancing Test

Several commentators have raised the question of whether the
balancing test is not too subtle and sophisticated a device to be
workable in day-to-day practice. 87 This certainly would be a valid
electronic eavesdropping for a 60-day period, even of a specified office, involves a
broad invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Only the most precise and
rigorous standard of probable cause should justify an intrusion of this sort.
83. LaFave, supra note 82, at 13 n.39.
84. 392 U.S. at 21, 27.
85. 392 U.S. at 27.
86. If the balancing technique is used, it would seem to make no difference in terms
of outcome whether the balancing is done merely to determine what is reasonable or
to determine what level of probable cause is required.
87. See, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the
Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433, 448 (1967):
Are all of these subtle considerations to be balanced by the policeman on the spot,
in a matter of seconds or minutes, subject to second guessing by the courts? If
the policeman's "balancing" turns out to produce evidence of crime, how many
courts will be ready to find that he balanced wrongly, that there was not enough
suspicion for the crime suspected?
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objection if balancing were used to the extent that there was no single test of probable cause for arrest or for stopping, and instead the
police and the courts were expected to make slide-rule computations based upon all the facts and circumstances of each individual
case. While this might well be a stimulating exercise in the rarefied
atmosphere of an appellate court or a law school classroom, it is
clearly asking too much to expect policemen to make on-the-spot
judgments in this way or, indeed, to require trial judges to review
police conduct in this fashion.
The balancing test makes more sense if it is viewed not so much
as a matter for case-by-case application, but rather as a technique
for establishing the quantum of evidence needed for certain distinct
kinds of official action. That is, it is one thing to say that each instance of arrest or of stop and frisk requires a somewhat different
measure of probable cause, depending upon all sorts of variables; it
is quite another to say that through a process of balancing we can
conclude that a brief stopping for investigation requires a different
amount of evidence than a taking to the station. It is the latter kind
of balancing which was involved in Camara; the Court resorted to
a balancing process to decide that a lesser amount of evidence was
needed to procure health and fire inspection warrants than to procure search warrants in criminal cases, and there was no suggestion
that the magistrate is expected to perform a balancing act in each
case to determine whether somewhat more or less evidence than was
presented in Camara is necessary.88
In the criminal law, however, there is one case-by-case variablethe seriousness of the offense-which cannot be ignored by police
and courts.80 Taking into account the seriousness of the offense does
not require the use of some fine-spun theory whereby each offense
in the criminal code has its own probable-cause standard; rather, it
involves only the common-sense notion that murder, rape, armed
robbery, and the like call for a somewhat different police response
than, say, gambling, prostitution, or possession of narcotics. After
88. Terry does not appear to be inconsistent with this approach. Although the
Court abjures the "stop" and "frisk" labels and limits its holding to the facts of the
case, there is no suggestion that the quantum-of-evidence test which the Court begins
shaping there is inapplicable to other instances of stop and frisk, except for the
intimation that serious violent crimes may warrant different consideration than minor
offenses. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
89. See, e.g., ·w. LAFA\'E, ARREST: THE DECISION To TA.KE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
246-48 (1965) [hereinafter ARREST]; DETECTION OF CRIME 36-38. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND} OF TORTS § II9, comment j (1965), which lists "the nature of the crime committed or feared" as an important factor in determining whether the actor's suspicion
was reasonable.
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all, "[t]here is no war between the Constitution and common
sense,"90 and it is this pragmatic approach which prompts judges to
say that the conduct of an officer is proper when a failure so to act
would be "poor police work" 91 or a justifiable basis for discipline92
or discharge93 of the officer. The view one would take of police inaction under the circumstances is bound to be affected to some
degree by the nature of the criminal conduct involved.
The nature of the offense takes on additional importance when
the police are acting, as in Terry, for the purpose of preventing
crime. While one might well argue that the need to detect past
crimes is of considerable importance for all forms of criminal activity, the need to prevent crimes from occurring is most compelling
as to offenses risking violence, and is least compelling as to offenses
without victims or with willing victims.94 Indeed, a comparison of
Terry and Sibron reveals that the Court was undoubtedly influenced
by the nature of crimes involved in these two cases. In Terry, the
officer observed the suspects for no more than twelve minutes, and
saw equivocal conduct; the suspects might have been casing the
store for a robbery, or they might have been window-shopping or
impatiently waiting for a friend in the store.95 Yet the Court concluded, quite properly, that "it would have been poor police work
indeed" for the officer "to have failed to investigate this behavior" 86
or to have waited until the suspects actually took the dangerous step
of attempting the robbery. In Sibron, the suspect was continuously
observed for eight hours in a vicinity frequented by narcotics addicts
90. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
91. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 23 (1968).
92. E.g., People v. Moore, 35 Ill. 2d 399, 403, 220 N.E.2d 443, 445 (1966).
93. Cf. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPEcr AND SOCIETY 41-42 (1967):
When writing opinions I have often been tempted to state the test of the reasonableness of a police officer's conduct in terms of what the reaction would be if he
had not done what he is charged with having done wrongfully. "If you would
fire the officer for not doing what he did, then what he did was reasonable." •••
I agree that it isn't a very stylish way of expressing the concept of reasonableness,
and that somewhat circular reasoning is involved. But to me there is value in
restating the question so that the whole problem may be seen.
94. The point is also reflected in Justice Jackson's statement, text accompanying
note 78 supra. Although he was discussing crimes which have already occurred, Justice
Jackson did not merely distinguish between kidnapping and bootlegging, but rather
referred to a hypothetical incident in which a child was still being held and there
was a need not only to "detect a vicious crime" but also to "save a threatened life."
95. On the motion to suppress, the officer acknowledged that his thirty-nine years
of police experience did not give him some special insight into the conduct of suspects,
since he had been assigned to watch for shoplifters and pickpockets for thirty years
and had not had occasion to witness the planning or execution of a robbery. Remarks
of Louis Stokes, counsel for the petitioner in Terry, Institute of Continuing Legal
Education program on "Criminal Law and the Constitution: The Expanding Revolu,
tion, July 19, 1968.
96. 392 U.S. at 23.
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and was seen conversing with as many as eleven known addicts
during this time; these facts would seem to make the possibility
that Sibron was attempting to sell narcotics at least as strong as the
possibility that Terry and his cohorts were planning a robbery.97
Yet there is understandably no suggestion from the Court that it
would have been "poor police work" not to step in and prevent some
addict from obtaining a new supply from this particular source.
IV.

STOP AND FRISK AND THE HARD REALITIES

To many of those who have honestly opposed Supreme Court
recognition of the power of police to stop and frisk, all of this talk
about variable probable cause and the like would appear to be the
irrelevant musings of a nai:ve academician. For them, the central
point is that police often have utilized street encounters for improper purposes such as the wholesale harassment of certain elements of the community, usually minority groups and Negroes in
particular.98 These practices, it is contended, should not be sanctioned or even given indirect support by a holding that the fourth
amendment allows some on-the-street interference with persons who
could not lawfully be arrested. Argument along these lines was forcefully presented to the Supreme Court,99 and it is apparent from the
opinion in Terry that this was a matter of great concern to the Court.
The Chief Justice responds to this argument by talking about the
limitations of the exclusionary rule, which "in some contexts ... is
ineffective as a deterrent." 100 He notes:
Doubtless some police "field interrogation" conduct violates the
Fourth Amendment. But a stern refusal by this Court to condone
97. Justice Harlan, who felt that the Court should have spoken more directly to
the circumstances in which a stop can be made, concluded that the suspicion in Sibron
was not equal to that in Terry because during the eight-hour period the officer did not
overhear any incriminating conversation or see any suspicious actions, such as the
passing of packages. But, it is not too surprising that Sibron did not incriminate himself while in earshot of a uniformed officer; more convincing is Justice Harlan's later
observation, that here, unlike Terry, there was no "need for immediate action." 392
U.S. at 73.
98. See Schwartz, supra note 87, at 444, 452 (1967); Souris, Stop and Frisk or A.rrest
and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM, L.C. & P.S. 251, 251-53
(1966). For detailed descriptions of these practices and the hostility engendered by
them, see THE PouCE AND THE COMMUNITY, FIELD SURVEYS IV: A REPORT OF A REsEARCH
STUDY StmMlTTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1966); NATIONAL CENTER ON PoUCE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS,
FllW> SURVEYS V, A REPORT OF A R.EsEARCH STUDY StmMlTTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COM·
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967).
99. See Oberman & Finkel, Constitutional A.rguments A.gainst "Stop and Frisk", 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 441, 470-75 (1967), which contains excerpts from the appelant's brief in

Sibron.
100. 392 U.S. at I!!.
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such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule may be where
obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing
to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other
goal.... [A] rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary
rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used
effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human injury and
frustration of efforts to prevent crime.101
This language, I have been surprised to learn, has been the focus of
a good deal of criticism of the Terry decision. As I understand the
criticism, it rests on the hypothesis that the Court had no business
allowing the police, in effect, to set the limits of the exclusionary
rule by ignoring it under some circumstances. Or, to put the matter
another way, the Court is charged with incorrectly deciding that because deterrence of the police is the primary objective of the exclusionary rule, the rule is to be applied only in those contexts where
it in fact deters. It is said that this is wrong because the exclusionary
rule, though intended primarily as a "deterrent safeguard," 102 also
serves to "preserve the judicial process from contamination,"103 to
ensure that the government does not profit from its own wrongdoing,104 and even to provide some measure of vindication for
the individual whose constitutional right of privacy has been
infringed.105
Such criticism would be wholly justified if the Supreme Court
had said something quite different-if, for example, the Court had
adopted one part of the Ohio court of appeals' reasoning in Terry:
If we keep in mind this raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule [deterrence], we can guard against confusion in the attendant rules that are
developed. A judicial rule rendering evidence produced as the result
of a "frisk" inadmissible would fail to deter the police from "frisking" suspects believed to be armed, as police "frisk" for their own
protection rather than for the purpose of looking for evidence. A
101. 392 U.S. at 13•15.
102. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). Cf. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth
Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 1, 37 ("It is clear that assumptions as to the efficacy of the rule in this respect are of the first importance in the
Court's view of the mater.").
103. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis). See also Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 S. 329 (1922); Fraenkel, Recent
Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 IowA L. REv. 472, 498
(1948).
104. Allen, supra note 102, at 34; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 449, 282 P .2d
905, 912 (1955).
105. Allen, supra note 102, at 35 refers to a "privilege against conviction by unlawfully obtained evidence." See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 64!1, 656 (1961).
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rule of inadmissibility in such cases could only result in allowing
the armed criminal to go free although failing to any meaningful
extent to protect individual liberty.10 6

This, of course, is an extremely simplistic approach to the problem,
and the criticism stated above would be fully justified if the Supreme
Court had adopted such a view.
Fortunately, the Court did not subscribe to a strict deterrence
rationale. Instead, it made somewhat different observations about
the exclusionary rule to underscore another, most fundamental
point: "The exclusionary rule ... cannot properly be invoked to
exclude the products of legitimate police investigative techniques
on the ground that much conduct which is closely similar involves
unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections." 101 It is this
sentence which the critics of Terry seem to have missed, for it reveals
the reason underlying the observation that the exclusionary rule
does not always deter. The Court's thinking was essentially this: If
we really thought that exclusion of the fruits of all street encounters
would somehow put a stop to those which are in violation of the
fourth amendment, we might consider paying that price; but it is
clear that this result would not follow because the illegal encounters
are usually motivated by objectives other than conviction.
In considering the question of whether the Supreme Court
reached the proper conclusion in Terry, then, it is essential to keep
in mind that street encounters "are initiated by the police for a wide
variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire
to prosecute for crime."108 In support of this observation, the Court
cites the ABF study, which helpfully catalogs the various other onthe-street police practices which "raise issues substantially different from those likely to arise from field interrogation, where
the questioning will be followed by arrest and prosecution if
sufficient reason is found to believe the suspect guilty of a crime."100
These other practices, which are commonly subsumed under
the euphemism "aggressive preventive patrol," 110 include: (I) vice
control practices, an attempt to restrict criminal activity which is
difficult to detect by ordinary procedures and which is viewed ambivalently by many individuals in the community; (2) weapons
confiscation, an attempt to remove weapons from circulation;
106.
107.
108.
109,
110.

State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 131-32, 214 N.E.2d 114, 121 (1966).
392 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added).
392 U.S. at 13.
DETEcrION OF CRIME 15,
Id. at IO.
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(3) control of gangs and juveniles, an attempt to get teenagers
off the streets; (4) disturbance control, an attempt to prevent and
terminate instances of mutual combat; (5) control of public drinking and drunks, an attempt to safeguard those who are or might
become incapacitated from drinking; and (6) traffic control, an attempt to find dangerous drivers and to render assistance to motorists
generally.111
Although it is true that the police have often failed to assess the
wisdom of these practices112 or even to distinguish them carefully
from good-faith, reasonable investigative stops,118 it would be harsh
medicine indeed to declare the latter unconstitutional in order to
administer an indirect and ineffective slap at the former. Many
arrests are also made for purposes other than the sole legitimate
objective-prosecution114-but it has not been seriously suggested
that the answer is to abolish the right to make an arrest on probable
cause. It is equally clear that many searches are not prosecutionoriented,115 but this hardly calls for the conclusion that the police
should never be permitted to conduct a search. All of these practices
ought to be a matter of serious concern, but this concern would be
better expressed by attempting to find new remedies to curtail potential abuses than by trying to use the exclusionary rule as a
blunderbuss.

V.

TEMPORARY SEIZURE FOR INVESTIGATION

The concern of the Supreme Court in the recent stop-and-frisk
cases, therefore, was most directly focused upon what might be
called "temporary seizure for investigation." This practice is a seizure
and thus falls within the ambit of the fourth amendment; it is temporary and thus distinguishable from what is usually understood by
the term "arrest"; and it is for investigation rather than for one of
111. Id. at 10-17.
112. Id. at xix: "It is probable that an aggressive program of preventive patrol does
reduce the amount of crime on the street, though it is a significant comment on police
attitude toward policy-making responsibility that there has been no noticeable effort
to measure the effectiveness of this technique ••• whether, even solely from a law
enforcement point of view, the gain_ in enforcement outweighs the cost in community
alienation." See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
159-61 (Bantam ed. 1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 95 (1967).
113. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT .AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POUCE 23 (1967).
114. ARREST 436-82. For a discussion of what the police perceive as the gains from
an arrest even when a conviction is not forthcoming, see LaFave, Improving Police
Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and Local Court
Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 447-55 (1965).
115. DETECTION OF CRIME 183-99.
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the other purposes mentioned earlier. When is such a stop permissible?
A. Possible Limitations
It is unfortunate that a majority of the Court avoids the issue of
limitations upon investigative stops in all three cases. In Terry we
are told that "[t]he crux of this case . . . is not the propriety of
Officer McFadden's taking steps to iµvestigate petitioner's suspicious
behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's
invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons
in the course of that investigation."116 The Court acknowledges that
there was a seizure of Terry at some point prior to the search of his
person, 117 but clearly does not want to talk about it: "[w]e . . .
decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an
investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause ...." 118 Similarly, in Sibron the Court proceeds directly to the frisk issue without
a word about the propriety of the officer's previous action in directing
the suspect to leave the restaurant. And in Peters, of course, the problem is avoided entirely by characterizing the officer's conduct as a
lawful arrest.
Justice Harlan, on the other hand, correctly concludes that the
issue of the officer's right to stop should be resolved before any
other questions q.Te reached:

[I]£ the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any per116. 392 U.S. at 23.
117. The Court asserts that it must determine when the seizure occurred (392 U.S.
at 16) but then-though seizure is defined as an instance in which "a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"---determines only that
the seizure occurred at least when the officer took hold of Terry.
Whether in a given case it is to be concluded that the suspect was actually seized
or only consented to remain and be questioned may prove to be a sticky problem,
much like the question of whether an arrest was made, in light of the courts' insistence
that arrest must precede search, and the question of whether a suspect had been
"deprived of his freedom in any significant way" so as to be entitled to the Miranda
warnings before questioning. In all three situations, it may be asked, for example,
which of the following tests apply: "(I) whether the officer's conduct indicates he has
restrained the individual, (2) whether the individual understands that he is restrained,
and (3) whether a reasonable man under the circumstances would believe he was
restrained." Abrams, supra note 70, at 1103. Perhaps, as has been suggested, it is not
meaningful to attempt to distinguish between field interrogations undertaken with
consent and those performed without consent, and thus the real question is when may
police stop a suspect regardless of his consent. DETECTION OF CRIME 17. Thus, as in the
better view of arrest and search, the admissibility of evidence found in a frisk would
not rest upon whether or not the officer bad first actµally seized the suspect, but
rather upon whether the officer had grounds to seize him.
118. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. If the Court had followed the analysis suggested in section
Ill supra, this phrase would be "less probable cause than is needed for an arrest,"
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son, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to
disarm such a person for his own protection he must first have a
right not to avoid him but to be in his presence. That right must be
more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address
questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has
an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection. I
would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a
suspected crime.119
The failure of the majority to heed this advice, it would seem, was
unwise, for the Court has thereby detoured around the threshold
issue about stop and frisk, one on which courts, lawyers, and police
deserve guidance.
There is, to be sure, some dictum in Terry which lends support
to the proposition that stops for investigation are permissible on
evidence insufficient for arrest, but the language affords few hints
as to what the proper standards are. It is said, for example, that the
officer's conduct should be judged by this "objective standard: would
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the
action taken was appropriate?" 120 It would be hard to quarrel with
this generality, although it is unclear what help it offers in the development of police guidelines. More promising, perhaps, is the reference made in the holding (which, again, does not give separate consideration to the grounds for the seizure) to the situation "where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot." 121 But Justice Harlan objects that this is not as precise as the
formula provided in the New York statute, which requires that the
officer must "reasonably suspect" that the person he stops "is commiting, has committed, or is about to commit" an offense; 122 and the
Court refuses to pass judgment upon the New York standard.123
119. 392 U.S. at 32-33 (emphasis in original).
120. 392 U.S. at 21-22.
121. 392 U.S. at 30.
122. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1967).
123. The Court's refusal to pass upon the facial constitutionality of the New York
statute is understandable, particularly in view of the unrestrained interpretation which
it has received in the New York courts. Yet, as Justice Harlan noted:
This does not mean .•. that the statute should be ignored here. The State of New
York has made a deliberate effort to deal with the complex problem of on-thestreet police work. Without giving carte blanche to any particu1ar verbal formulation, we should, I think, where relevant, indicate the extent to which that effort
has been constitutionally successful.
392 U.S. at 71.
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I do not mean to underestimate the difficulty of the task which
the Court has not yet even begun. Articulating meaningful standards
for arrest has proved difficult enough, and the prospect of now having
to give content to a different kind of probable cause for investigative
stops is a chilling one. There is no ready solution, although it may
be that something might be gained if an attempt were made to develop the standards for a permissible forcible stop in terms of evidence which falls short of grounds for arrest in some identifiable way.
Before considering that possibility in greater detail, note should
be taken of the fact that the stop-and-frisk decisions leave ample
room for the development of other kinds of limitations on the power
of police to make temporary seizures for investigation. For example,
one might ask whether the nature of the suspected crime should
make any difference. not merely in terms of variable probable cause,
but also in determining whether a stopping should ever be permitted. In Terry the anticipated crime was armed robbery, while
in Peters it was burglary; both are serious offenses and not infrequently are attended by violence. Sibron, on the other hand, involved
possession of narcotics. As noted earlier, this may have contributed
in some measure to the Court's refusal to permit inferences in that
case as generous as in the other two-the failure to consider, for
example, if it was not unusual for a person to spend eight consecutive hours loitering in an area frequented by narcotics addicts.
Justice Harlan's analysis of Sibron is also revealing, for he says that
the real question is whether there was a need for immediate action,
and adds that he would apply as a general formula the New York
statutory requirement that the officer must reasonably suspect a
felony. 124 His failure to quote the balance of the statute, which also
permits stop and frisk where the officer reasonably suspects the misdemeanor of narcotics possession,125 might well have been deliberate.
There would be considerable merit in barring the police from
employing stop and frisk for minor crimes like possession of narcotics
in order to remove the temptation for the police to go on fishing
expeditions for contraband.126 This may be the kind of limitation
124. 392 U.S. at 104.
125. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 18Oa (McKinney Supp. 1967) also covers suspicion of
"any of the crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter." Section
552, by reference, incorporates the crime of narcotics possession and various other
narcotics offenses.
126. Cf. 43 ALI PROCEEDINGS 117 (1966) (remarks of Harris Steinberg). If an officer
were permitted to stop persons suspected of carrying, say, narcotics or gambling paraphernalia, there would be a lingering temptation for the officer to look for the
contraband rather than for dangerous weapons. Even if the Supreme Court's twostep frisk process would bar admission of the contraband on the theory that the
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which cannot easily be drawn as a matter of fourth amendment interpretation,127 but it could readily be imposed by state legislation designed to prevent stop and frisk from becoming "stop and fish." 128
Similarly, it may be desirable to draw some distinction, in terms
of the quantum of public interest, between detection of crime and
prevention of crime. Terry expressly deals only with the latter, for
the officer feared that a crime was about to be committed; thus, there
is nothing in that case which forecloses the contention that the only
new police authority for which a genuine need can be shown is the
power to take preventive action in such circumstances.129 It is in
this situation that the police have heretofore lacked any clear authority to act, even with the most compelling evidence; and it is
hep:! that all members of the Court agree that some new authority,
in the interest of cri:rp.e prevention, is imperative.130
It is not at all clear that the line should be drawn at preventive
action, but the case for additional police authority is certainly most
convincing in this situation.131 As one state court judge recently obofficer could search only for a weapon, the officer might stretch the truth in order
to establish some other apparent justification for coming onto the contraband. Such
"minor 'surgery' upon the facts" is not unhe~d of, and it is acknowledged by those
with extensive experience in prosecution offices that it happens too often. E.g., Kuh,
In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, !l CRIM. L. BuLL. 597,
604 (1967).
If such stops were permitted, a police officer could employ several tactics to justify
what was in fact an illegal search: (1) He might, as did the officer in Sibron, claim that
the suspect threw the contraband away. (2) He might claim that the suspect consented
tq the search, in which case the admissibility of the evidence will turn upon whether
the magistrate believes the officer or the offender. (3) He might claim that the suspect
admitted in response to questioning that he was carrying the contraband and that on
¢.is basis an arrest and search was made. It is interesting to note that, although suspects generally do not make direct admissions of guilt during a stopping for investigation, in a substantial number of the reported cases the officer testified that the
defendaµt voluntarily admitted po~session of contraband. DETEcrION OF CRIME at 65.
127. Cf. the similar difficulties in interpreting other constitutional provisions. The
kinds pf 'offenses for which the sixth amendment does not require provision of counsel
for the indigent [Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)] or jury trial [Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)] remain unclear.
128. THE MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02(8) (Tent. Draft No. I,
1966) might serve as a model, although it does not appear to go far enough.
129. The Court did, however, characterize the governmental interests involved as
"effective crime prevention and detection," 392 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added), although
the officer in Terry acted only because he believed the men "were contemplating a daylfght robbery." 392 U.S. at 28.
130. Even Justice Douglas acknowledges that the traditional grounds for arrestwhen an offense has been or is being committed-are not adequate for the "equally if
not more important function [of] crime prevention." 392 U.S. at 35 n.l.
131. It could be argued that the need to establish police authority for preventive
measures is not great, ~ince the suspect presumably has not committed a crime and
thus will not be subject to a prosecution in which the propriety of the officer's conduct
will be put in issue. But, the tail should not wag the dog; it is in the interest of both
the poli1:e and the public to :qave the limits on police authority clearly delineated,
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served:
Prevention within the area of the criminal law is greatly underdeveloped. The doctrine is widely practiced and constantly undergoing
development in business and medicine, but unfortunately not within
the law .... It is important, if constitutionally permissible, to sanction a statute whereby crime can be prevented.132

I would only add that if the police are to be given the right to step
in before a crime has occurred, it is certainly preferable to recognize
that power openly rather than to confer it indirectly by the use of
broad vagrancy provisions133 or by pushing the law of attempts back
into the preparation stage.134

B. The Required Amount of Evidence
Whatever may be the fate of these nvo possible limitations (or,
perhaps, a combination of the two), 135 it is clear that in the years
ahead one of the major tasks of the courts will be to flesh out the
evidentiary standards for temporary investigative seizures. Whether
regardless of whether or not the matter of exclusion of evidence will arise. In any
event, fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary questions can arise in this context, as
a person stopped for the purpose of preventing a crime may make damaging admission concerning another crime, or be frisked for a weapon.
132. Parker v. Municipal Judge, 427 P.2d 642, 645 (Nev. 1967) (dissenting).
133. There is considerable evidence that such substantive provisions have often
been adopted for this purpose. See LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the
Problems and Practices of the Police, 45 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 434, 451-52 n.77 (1967). This
use of vagrancy statutes has often been criticized. See, e.g., Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law
and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 603, 649, (1956); Note, Use of VagrancyType Laws For Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950).
For further discussion of problems in this area, see Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest
on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal
Condition, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1203 (1953); Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS
L.J. 237 (1958); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of
Revision, 48 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 557 (1960); Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered:
Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 102 (1962).
134. The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code acknowledged that it would be difficult to justify legislation dealing with inchoate offense on grounds of deterrence, but
noted that other functions of the criminal law are served by such statutes. Model Penal
Code art. 5, Comment at 24 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). They stated the first of these
as follows:
When a person is seriously dedicated to commission of a crime, there is obviously need for a firm legal basis for the intervention of the agencies of law enforcement to prevent its consummation. In determining that basis, there must be
attention to the danger of abuse; equivocal behavior may be misconstrued by an
unfriendly eye as preparation to commit a crime. It is no less important, on the
other side, that lines should not be drawn so rigidly that the police confront insoluble dilemmas in deciding when to intervene, facing the risk that if they wait
the crime may be committed while if they act they may not yet have any valid
charge.
Id. at 25. However, it may well be that the question of when the police should be permitted to intervene and the question of when conviction should be permitted for
coming close to the commission of a cohate offense will sometimes call for separate
answers, in which case the former is best dealt with in terms of stop and frisk. Consider, for example, the facts of the Terry case.
135. See text accompanying note 282 infra.
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one resorts to the reasonableness approach or to the variable probable cause test, it is nonetheless necessary for this process to occur
if police are to have reasonably clear guidelines as to what they
may do, and if trial judges are to have adequate guidelines for reviewing police action. For many opponents of stop and frisk, however, this is a most unlikely prospect; to them, any evidentiary standard which falls below that required for arrest is bound to be vague
and subjective.
I. Of Vagueness and Subjectivity

The critics of stop and frisk "deplore the abandonment of probable cause, the traditional constitutional standard necessary to deprive a person of his liberty, in favor of reasonable suspicion, which
they find too vague." 138 Most of this criticism has centered upon the
New York statutory test of whether the officer "reasonably suspects
a ... crime"; 137 it is claimed, for example, that it is impossible to
draw a distinction between "mere" suspicion and "reasonable" suspicion138 (in contrast, I take it, to drawing a distinction between
"mere" belief and "reasonable" belief for arrest). These critics, I am
sure, are just as unhappy with the standard-such as it is-that is
given in Terry, for it is no more specifi.c.139
The vagueness argument, of course, is a convenient means for
contesting any statement of the limitations on police power with
which one disagrees, and one might wonder whether the critics of
stop and frisk were equally concerned, for example, with the uncertainty engendered by Escobedo v. Illinois.140 But even apart from
this, it is not at all clear what characteristics of the unique police
practice of stopping for investigation render it less susceptible to
clearly stated limitations than arrest, search, or in-custody interrogation.
Reasonable suspicion of crime or any comparable test will, of
course, seem rather vague when unadorned by judicial interpretation
based upon specific fact situations, as would the "reasonable grounds
to believe" test for arrest, or, for that matter, the "probable cause"
136. Schwartz, supra note 98, at 434.
137. See Schwartz, supra note 98, at 444; Oberman 8e Finkel, Constitutional Arguments Against "Stop and Frisk," !l CRIM. L. BULL. 441, 451·60 (1967); Recent Statute,
Criminal Law-New York Authorizes Police to "Stop-and-Frisk" on Resasanable
Suspicion, 78 HARV. L. REv. 473, 477 (1964); Comment, The "No-Knack" and "Stop and
Frisk" Provisions of the New Yark Cade of Criminal Procedure, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
392, 403-04 (1964).
138. Schwartz, supra note 98, at 445.
139. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
140. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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requirement of the fourth amendment. It is certainly asking too
much to expect that the basic standard which is to serve as the
starting point for analysis should from its inception provide a
ready answer for every conceivable fact situation.141 Indeed, those
who demand such a self-defining standard have a short memory, for
only a few years ago it could be said that the law of arrest was largely
undefined in at least half of the states. True, the Supreme Court had
provided some helpful benchmarks, but there was "an exceedingly
small number of cases in [that] Court indicating what suffices for
probable cause."142 The law of arrest remained vague, in the sense
that the police could not be instructed in concrete terms,143 until
state courts had occasion to decide a substantial number of cases, and
in twenty-five jurisdictions this process began only after Mapp v.
Ohio144 in 1961.145
Some of the criticism about vagueness, however, has been directed both to the New York statute and the interpretations it has
received in the appellate courts of that state.146 If this means that
some of the decisions of these courts are troublesome and not too
helpful in clarifying the statute, I would agree. But here again past
experience in the development of the grounds for arrest is instructive. Some state courts, when left entirely to their own devices, failed
to develop precise and reasonable limitations on the authority to
arrest, but this problem has been largely overcome by a few sig141. This is equally true whether the starting point is a statute, which obviously
cannot spell out fact constellations for all of the various kinds of cases which might
arise, or a court decision. See note 28 supra.
142. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968).
143. In Illinois the exclusionary rule was adopted in 1923, and as a result the
appellate courts of the state have decided a substantial number of cases over the years
on what are and are not grounds for arrest, It is possible, therefore, to be quite specific
in instructing Illinois police on the evidence needed to arrest. See 2 Chicago Police
Dept. Law Training Bulletin Series, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, &: 6 (1967).
144. 367 U.S. 643.
145. See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary RulePart II: Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REv. 566, 579-86 (1965).
One of the principal virtues of the exclusionary rule, then, is that it "assures a great
deal of judicial attention" to police practices. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 255, 260 (1961). In states which did not
have the exclusionary rule before Mapp, only a dribble of tort actions against police
reached the appellate courts, and the civil suit context often diverted the courts from
the question of whether the police action was proper, to the problem of whether the
errant officer should be subject to personal liability. See, e.g., Odinetz v. Budds, 315
Mich. 512, 517-18, 24 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1946). Moreover, if a court receives only a few
cases, "the bits or slices or splinters which are cast up may be too fragmentary to yield
a proper picture or to allow the shaping and joining of complementary hubs and
spokes and rims to form a doctrinal wheel." K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEAIS 263 (1960).
146. E.g., Oberman&: Finkel, supra note 137, at 456-60.
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nificant Supreme Court decisions.147 Now that the Court has gotten
its eighteen feet wet in the murky waters of stop and frisk, there is
ample reason to anticipate further clarification of the grounds for
stopping.
In many instances, of course, the vagueness criticism comes down
to a concern that temporary seizures for investigation will be undertaken upon the subjective judgment of police officers and that courts
will be reluctant to second-guess them.148 Again, it is not clear why
this must be so. Surely, everyone by now has grasped the simple point
that the "reasonable belief" required for arrest is not to be determined by what the arresting officer did or did not believe, but rather
by whether the available facts would "warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief" that the person arrested had committed an
offense.149 This being so, how can it seriously be contended that the
require:rµent of "reasonable suspicion" grants police carte blanche
to detain "on a purely subjective reaction"?150 If the difficulty emanates from the word "suspicion,"151 then it should be dropped from
stop-and-frisk vocabulary as the Court suggests in Terry. There is
no 4isadvantage in saying that an officer may stop an individual for
investigation when he reasonably believes that the person may be
guilty of a crime,152 instead of saying that he can act when he reasonably suspects that the person is guilty of a crime.153
The notion that subjective judgments will prevail is sometimes
rested on the ground that police, in determining whether to stop an
individual for investigation, will reach judgments based upon their
experience and expertise. 154 It is certainly true that they will do so,
but they have long done precisely this in deciding whether an arrest
or search is called for, and courts have long accepted the fact that the
training and experience of police may equip them to reach conclu. 147. Compare, e.g., State v. Beck, 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963), with Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
148. Oberman &: Finkel, supra note 137, at 456-60; Schwartz, supra note 98, at 445;
Comment, Police Power To Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 848, 859 (1965).
149. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
150. DETECTION OF CRIME 6, quoting NEW YORK STATE BAR AssocIATION, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON PENAL LAw AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Feb. 25, 1964).
151. See Schwartz, supra note 98, at 445-46.
152. The holding in Terry uses essentially this language by embracing the situation
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." 392 U.S. at 30.
153. The former standard also possesses the advantage of avoiding the use of a
troublesome word which is sometimes defined as "to imagine [one] to be guilty or
culpable on slight evidence or without proof.'.' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2303 (1968 ed.) (emphasis added).
154. See, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the
Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 433, 445 (1967).
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sions different from those of a layman.1515 This fact, of course, cuts
two ways: an officer because of his training and experience may be
held to have probable cause when a layman confronted with the same
facts would not; 156 or he may for this reason not be entitled to mistakes which would be reasonable for a layman, and thus not have
probable cause. 157 In any event, a standard does not become subjective rather than objective merely because it takes into account the
special skills and knowledge of the actor.158
Once again, the New York Court of Appeals may be the villain
in creating confusion and conflict. More than one commentator159 has
pointed with alarm to the Court of Appeals' statement that the New
York reasonable-suspicion requirement "incorporates the police
officer's intuitive knowledge and appraisal of the appearance of criminal activity." 160 The word "intuitive" clearly should not have been
used, at least if one defines intuition as "immediate cognizance or
conviction without rational thought,"161 and fortunately the United
States Supreme Court has in effect removed it. In Terry, the Court
emphasized that "the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 162
Thus, the Court has made clear its belief that there is no clash
between the precept that the right of privacy is "too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime,''163
and the notion that the police are expected to rely upon their train155. E.g., Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1958); People v. Langley, 182
Cal. App. 2d 89, 5 Cal Rptr. 826 (1960); People v. Bartoletta, 248 Mich. 499, 227 N.W.
763 (1929); People v. Valentine, 17 N.Y.2d 128, 216 N.E.2d 321, 269 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1966).
156. See cases cited in note 155 supra.
157. In Jewell v. Hempleman, 210 Wis. 265, 246 N.W. 441 (1933), a jury apparently
imposed liability on an officer for his failure to use his special skills. A conservation
warden made an arrest for possession of part of a deer carcass during closed season.
The warden "testified that he had had a rather extended experience as a conservation
warden, had seen lots of venison and deer bones, and was familiar with and knew the
difference in texture, color, size of bones, etc., between venison and beef [which the
meat turned out to be]; that after looking at the meat in the milkhouse and without
cutting it up or particularly examining it he had considered it venison." 210 Wis. at
268, 246 N.W. at 442. The appellate court held that "the jury might well have concluded that [the warden's] examination of the meat was, to say the least, cursory and
careless, that his conclusion was a hasty one, and that as an experienced warden he
did not act prudently." 210 Wis. at 270, 246 N.W. at 443.
158. This has never been questioned in the law of torts; see, e.g., 2 F. HARPER 8:
F. JAMES, TORTS 919 (1956).
159. E.g., Oberman 8: Finkel, supra note 148, at 457; Schwartz, supra note 154, at
455.
160. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 245, 219 N.E.2d 595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217,
222 (1966).
161. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW lNTERNAnONAL DICTIONARY 1187 (1961).
162. 392 U.S. at 21.
163. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
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ing and experience in reaching search and seizure decisions. It is for
the courts to determine when an officer's conduct squares with the
fourth amendment, giving "due weight ... to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience." 164 And, it is for the police to articulate the facts and
what their experience reveals as to those facts. Such generalities as "he didn't look right" will not suffice; like Officer McFadden
in Terry, the officer must relate what he has observed, and, when
appropriate, indicate why his knowledge of the crime problem and
the habits of the residents on his beat or of the practices of those
planning or engaging in certain forms of criminal conduct gives
special significance to what he observed.165 There are limits, of
course, on what may be expected from the police in terms of verbalizing their observations and impressions,166 but a reasonably specific
statement by an officer of the circumstances underlying his actionwhen considered together with how he in fact reacted to the situation
which confronted him167-should afford an adequate basis for judicial review.
164. 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). See also the language of the Court quoted in
note 152 supra.
165. Such knowledge is also important with respect to grounds for arrest, but
officers have often failed to communicate it to the judge at the hearing on a motion
to suppress. Frequently, the result is that what in fact was a lawful arrest is declared
unlawful. See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule
-Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. R.Ev. 391, 398-401, 417-18
(1965). Some police departments are making efforts to remedy this situation. Id. at
417-18 n.82.
166. There is no more reason to take a "grudging or negative attitude" toward such
oral communication than there is to do so with respect to search warrant affidavits,
which "are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). Both situations have
their unique difficulties. In the stop-and-frisk situation, very little time passes between
observation and decision, but considerable time intervenes between the officer's decision and his articulation in court. In the search warrant situation, by contrast, there
is at least some time for reflection and review between the time the evidence is received and a decision is made, but articulation-preparation of the affidavit-comes
hard on the heels of the decision.
167. It has been suggested, and I think wisely, that in some cases where it appears
that the officer has had some difficulty in trying to articulate the grounds of his suspicion, it would be appropriate to take into account how he reacted on the spur of
the moment to the situation. For example, in the Peters case the fact that Officer Lasky
called the police before venturing into the hallway is entitled to weight, as is the fact
in Terry that Officer McFadden interposed the body of one of the suspects between
himself and the other two suspects. Remarks of Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, at Institute of Continuing Legal Education program on
"Criminal Law and the Constitution: The Expanding Revolution," July 19, 1968.
This suggestion does not seem inconsistent with the Court's admonition that good
faith on the part of the officer is not enough (392 U.S. at 27) nor does it suggest that
the conduct of the officer should in all cases be regarded as a kind of self-justification.
Rather, as Justice Schaefer pointed out, the suggestion is merely that the law is equally
as able to deal with inferences in this situation as it is in the many other civil and
criminal contexts in which inferences are drawn from conduct.
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2. Toward Precise Standards

The preceding discussion is not intended to reopen the pre-Terry
debate on stop and frisk, but only to suggest that the fears of many
are unwarranted when they contend that stopping for investigation,
if permitted, would of necessity be judged by a vague and subjective
standard. This is not to say that many answers can be found in the
Terry decision itself; rather, Terry's value lies in the Court's firm
assertion that police action under this new power will be scrutinized
as closely as other enforcement activities touched by the Constitution. Terry is not the end; it is the beginning, and more specific
limits will later emerge by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.168
Although prognostication about future Supreme Court decisions
is a hazardous game, I would like to consider briefly how some of these
specific limits might ultimately be drawn. One reason for such a venture is to demonstrate that the standards for an investigative stop
could become just as precise as those that have been developed for
arrest. Another function of the following inquiry is to explore the
earlier suggestion that something might be gained from an attempt
to define the grounds for a stop in terms of evidence that falls short
of grounds for arrest in some identifiable way.
Despite claims that the distinction between "reasonable grounds
to believe" and "reasonable grounds to suspect" is only a "semantic
quibble,"169 it does seem that separate, distinguishable standards for
arrest and for stopping could be developed. Both procedures require
probable cause, but a somewhat different kind of probable cause: for
arrest the officer must have "reasonable grounds to believe" that
the person has committed a crime, but for stopping (to use the language in Terry instead of the much-maligned New York formula)
he must "reasonably ... conclude [that is, believe] ... that criminal
activity may be afoot." 170 Since "in dealing with probable cause ...
we deal with probabilities,"171 the difference between these two formulae may lie in the degree of probability required.
As to the probability required for an arrest, it may generally be
stated that it must be more probable than not that the person has
committed an offense, although this is less certain as to the proba168. The evolution of more precise guidelines is illustrated by experience in California, the state which first expressly recognized the power of police to stop and frisk.
See cases cited in DETECTION OF CRIME ch. 2.
169. DeSalvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 557, 16!1 A.2d 244, 249 (1960) (emphasis in
original).
170. 392 U.S. at l!O.
171. Brinegar v, United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
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bility that a particular person is the bffender than to the probability
that a crime has been committed by someone. In the latter situation, 172 which assumes central importance when there is no doubt
who the offender is if a crime has been committed, courts ordinarily require that criminal conduct be more probable than noncriminal activity. 173 This approach is reflected in those decisions
which say that there must be "more evidence for [the existence of
criminal conduct] than against"174 or that the suspect's actions must
be "inconsistent with any innocent pursuit,''175 and also in the many
cases where grounds for arrest have been found lacking because the
conduct of the suspect was equivocal, that is, where the possibility
of criminal conduct was no greater than the possibility of innocent
behavior.176
When it is at least more probable than not that a crime has
occurred, courts usually hold that a particular person may be arrested
for that crime only if it is more probable than not that that person
is the offender; the information must be such that "reasonable men
would conclude that in all probability" the suspect is the perpetrator.177 This, however, cannot be stated as a universal rule, for it
does not take account of the classic case in which a man is shot in
the back in a locked room and the two persons present at the time
accuse each other.178 In such a case, it would seem that both suspects
172. See ARREST 256-58.
173. It would be difficult to say that this should always be the case, in light of a
notion of variable probable cause ,that takes into account the seriousness of the offense,
On a variation of Justice Jackson's hypothetical, text at note 78 supra, one might ask
if it is necessary that there be a more than 50% probability when the suspected crime
is a kidnapping with the child in the hands of the suspect.,
174. E.g., People v. Ingle, 53 Cal. 2d 407,413, 348 P.2d 577,580, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17
(1960). See also 1 C. fil.EXANDER, THE LAw OF ARREST IN CRIMINAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS 365 (1949).
,
175. E.g., State v. Beadbetter, 210 Wis. 327, 333, 246 N.W. 443, 445 (1933) (concerning statute which allows search by conservation warden on "reason to believe"). Cf. the
recent dictum of the same court that evidence for arrest need not "be sufficient to prove
that guilt is more probable than not." Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491,504, 129 N.W.2d
175, 180, rehearing denied, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964).
176. E.g., People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 251 N.W. 788 (1933).
177. State v. Phillips, 262 Wis. 303, 307, 55 N.W.2d 384, 386 (1952).
178. Quite similar is the following illustration from REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 119, comment j (1965):
A sees B and C bending over a dead man, D. B and C each accuse the other of
murdering D. A is not sure that either B or C did the killing, bul: he has a reasonable suspicion that either B or C killed D. A is privileged to arrest either or both.
For other hard cases and the commentators' views about them, see ARREsT 259-63.
The very fact that the right to stop and question is acknowledged may justify some
limitation in this sort of arrest authority. Courts have said that although an officer
must act on the information at hand, "where there is an opportunity for inquiry and
investigation, inquiry and investigation should be made." Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347,
354, 55 N.W. 999, 1001 (1893). The right to stop and question would provide the opportunity for inquiry, and tlihs it might be concluded that arrest of either or both of
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might be arrested, although this exception is probably a limited
one and may apply only (as the hypothetical suggests) where the
offense is a most serious one179 and, perhaps, where it is also clear
that the actual offender is almost certain to be one of the persons
arrested. 180 But whatever the boundaries of this limited exception,
the general rule-as repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court
-is that where there are several actual or potential suspects, all of
them may not be arrested nor may any one be arrested at random.181
By contrast, when a case involves temporary seizure for investigation, and it is "more releyant to ask whether there is probable
cause for restraining a suspect than to ask whether there is probable
cause for believing in the suspect'$ guilt,"182 the more-probable-thannot test is inapplicable. Rather, as is suggested by the reference in
Terry to reasonable belief "that criminal activity may be afoot,"183
it should be sufficient that there is a substantial possibility that a
crime has been or is about to be committed and that the suspect is
the person who committed or is planning the offense.184 Consider the
following possible situations.
the suspects would be improper unless the process of questioning did not identify one
of the bystanders as the killer.
179. "In determining whether such drastic action wonld ever be reasonable, one
would probably weigh the seriousness of the crime." Foote, Problems of the Protection
of Human Rights in Criminal Law and Procedure, U.N. Doc. TE 326/1 (40-2) LA, at
l!6 (1958).
180. THE

REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 178, notes the anomoly of
holding multiple arrests unlawful "although it is clear at the time of the arrest that
one of them is guilty and that the guilty one may escape unless both are arrested."
181. In Wong Sun v. United States, l!71 U.S. 471 (1963), an informant had said that
an individual named "Blackie Toy,'' the proprietor of a laundry on Leavet)worth Street,
had sold an ounce of heroin. There were several Chinese laundries on this street, and
apparently more than one Toy, and thus the arrest of one of them was unlawful because there was no showing that the officers "had some information of some kind which
had narrowed the scope of their search to this particular Toy." 371 U.S. at 481.
In Mallory v. United States, l!54 U.S. 449 (1957), involving a rape by a masked
Negro, three Negroes who had access to the basement where the rape occurred and
who fit the general description of the rapist were arrested. Said the Court:
Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on "probable cause." It
is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters in order to determine whom µiey should
charge before a committing magistrate on "probable cause."
l!54 U.S. at 456.
Johnson v. United States, 33l! U.S. IO (1948), was a rather ridiculous extension of
the principle. Officers smelled burning opium outside a hotel room. The Court held
that a search warrant could have been obtained on this evidence, but that it was improper to knock on the door and then arrest the petitioner after she was found to be
alone, since "the arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest petitioner until
he had entered her room and found her to be the sole occupant." 333 U.S. at 16.
182. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 25 (1967).
183. l!92 U.S. at l!O (emphasis added).
184. Others have made similar suggestions. Stern, Stop and Frisk: An Historical
Answer to a Modern Prqblem, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 532 (l967), states at 536: "Prob-
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a. Known but untested informant. When the police act on the
basis of information from an informant, the informant usually is able
to identify the alleged offender with sufficient specificity.185 The central problem, then, is whether there is reason for the officer to find
the information credible. On this issue, courts have typically distinguished between the informer who has given reliable information
in the past and the informer who is known but has not established
his reliability. If the informant has given information to the police
in the past, and the officer can truthfully say that this information
was not merely acted upon,186 but that as a result convictions187 or
at least indictments188 were obtained, and he can also testify specifically about the manner in which the informant acquired the present
information,189 then an arrest made solely upon the information
provided will be upheld. 190 In short, under such circumstances it is
more probable than not that the informant's information is correct.
By contrast, courts have not held that an arrest may be made
solely upon the word of a known but untested informant. Rather, in
such a case it is necessary that there be some corroborating evidence.
For example, _if the informant says that the suspect committed some
past crime, the fact that the named person seems to fit the description
given by the victim would suffice; 191 or, if the informant claims that
able cause is the officer's reasonable belief-the probability under the circumstances.
The basis for detention under the stop and frisk statutes is reasonable suspicion-the
possibility under the circumstances. By definition suspicion is just one step removed
from belief" (emphasis in original). Another commentator has said that the grounds
for stopping should ordinarily be limited "to situations in which only another detail of
description or closer proximity or connection to the crime would be needed for probable
cause [for arrest], or in which only an unequivocal act would be needed to constitute
an attempt." Recent Statute, supra note 137, at 476 (emphasis in original).
185. E.g., People v. Durr, 28 Ill. 2d 308, 192 N.E.2d 379 (1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 973 (1964). Occasionally this is not the case, as in People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App.
2d 119, 310 P.2d 162 (1957), where a reliable informant said that a Negro known as
"Bozo," driving a 1953 Oldsmobile "98" convertible with a black top and a light
colored body was selling narcotics. The court took the view that this information was
not specific enough for arrest, but that it did justify stopping for investigation a per•
son fitting this description. The problem in such a case is essentially the same as that
most frequently encountered when the information comes from a victim or witness.
See text accompanying note 203 infra.
186. A statement that arrests followed from the prior information given by this in•
formant is not sufficient; see, e.g., People v. McClellan, 34 Ill. 2d 572, 218 N.E.2d 97
(1966).
187. E.g., People v. Truelock, 35 Ill. 2d 189, 220 N.E.2d 187 (1966); People v.
Thomas, 76 Ill. App. 2d 42, 221, N.E.2d 800 (1966).
188. E.g., People v. Miller, 34 Ill. 2d 527, 216 N.E.2d 793 (1966).
189. E.g., People v. McCray, 33 Ill. 2d 66, 210 N.E.2d 161 (1965), affd, 386 U.S. 300
(1967). Cf. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (search warrant).
190. E.g., People v. Freeman, 34 Ill. 2d 362, 215 N.E.2d 206 (1966). Cf. Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (search warrant).
191. E.g., People v. Ostrand, 35 Ill. 2d 520, 221 N.E.2d 499 (1960).
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the suspect is in a given area for the purpose of committing a crime,
observed suspicious conduct will be adequate to sustain the arrest.192
Mere appearance of the suspect at the time and place predicted, often
the clincher when a reliable informant is used,193 does not appear to
be adequate corroboration for arrest.194 But, it is submitted that in
this kind of case there is such a substantial possibility that the informant is right that a stopping of the suspect for investigation would
be proper. 195 Or, to put the point another way, since the suspect's
presence there may be either an innocent but predictable act (and
thus a matter on which the informant could speak) or an act done
in furtherance of the scheme alleged by the informant, it is appropriate to detain the suspect briefly in an attempt to determine which
is the case. Such a power to stop and question dovetails neatly with
the power to arrest, since a lawful arrest could be made if the suspect's presence proves to be suspicious apart from the informant's
story (as it might turn out to be upon questioning).196
b. Anonymous informant. When the police receive information
from an anonymous informant, 197 they may not arrest solely upon
the basis of that information.198 This is true even when the informa192. The suspicious conduct may itself be equivocal and thus be insufficient for
arrest by itself, as where the suspect in a narcotics case was overheard to say, "I have
the money, do you have the stuff?" People v. Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 81, 83, 203 N.E.2d 882,
883 (1965).
193. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
194. Courts have usually required more than one story to support such an equivocal
appearance. Appearance has been sufficient corroboration where three informants of
unknown reliability gave the information, People v. La Bostrie, 14 Ill. 2d 617, 153
N.E.2d 570 (1958), and where the officer heard the informant place a telephone call to
the suspect to arrange his appearance for the specific purpose of selling narcotics,
People v. Jones, 16 Ill. 2d 569, 158 N.E.2d 773 (1959).
195. Some would be unhappy with such a rule because of the fact that the police
need not disclose the name of the informant, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967),
which creates the risk (also present in the arrest cases) that the police may create an
imaginary informant after the fact to justify their earlier action. See Younger, The
Perjury Routine, 3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 551 (1967). Since real or imagined informants are
utilized most often in narcotics cases, the limitation suggested earlier that stop and
frisk not be permitted for this kind of offense, takes on added importance. See text
accompanying note 126 supra.
196. Cf. In re Boykin, 39 Ill. 2d 617,237 N.E.2d 460 (1968), where an assistant principal of a school told the police that he had anonymous information that a student
had a gun. It was possible that the informant was not anonymous but that assistant
principal said so "to avoid future difficulties in the school and the creation of a feud."
Held proper to search the student for a weapon even if there were no grounds for
arrest.
197. That is, the informant remains anonymous to the police, as contrasted to a
case in which the police know the informer's identity but do not wish to disclose it.
The police are not required to reveal an informant's identity when the information
obtained from him only provides the basis for arrest. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967).
198. The rule has even been applied to such a serious crime as murder. People v.
Humphreys, 353 Ill. 340, 187 N.E. 446 (193!1).
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tion is to the effect that the named individual will be in a certain
place at a certain time for the purpose of committing the crime and
he does in fact appear; 19!! what is needed for arrest is more substantial
corroboration.2 Qo This is because there is less reason to credit information received from an anonymous source; the informant simply
may not want to get involved, or he may be unwilling to identify
himself because he is fabricating a story for some ulterior motive.
For this reason, "using anonymous information as a basis for
intrusive police action is highly dangerous," 201 and the better view
would be that such information (even with the slight corroboration
of the suspect's appearance as predicted) does not, as a general proposition, justify a stopping for questioning. That is, the anonymous
inforI1J.ation ordinarily raises a possibility, but not a substantial
possibility, of criminal conduct. But, in this context the word "substantial" takes on special importance; whether the possibility is great
enough to justify stopping the suspect who appeared as predicted
may well depend upon the nature of the crime-particularly where
such action might prevent a serious crime from occurring. No one
would seriously question the authority of police to detain for investigation an individual who was reported by an anonymous informant
to be planning to bomb an airplane, ~nd who appears at the airport
carrying a suitcase. Action on the basis of anonymous information~
then, should be allowed only in cases involving the risk of "serious
personal injury or grave irreparable property damage" and certainly
should not be underta~en for "the enforcement of sumptuary laws,
such as gambling, and laws of limited public consequence, such as
narcotics violations, prostitution, larcenies of the ordinary kind, and
the like." 202 This is not to suggest that anonymous information must
be ignored in the latter instances; it offers a legitimate basis £pr a
"stakeout" or other surveillance, but not for a seizure.
199. E.g., People v. Pitts, 26 Ill. 2d 395, 186 N.E.24 357 (1962): People v. Farren, 24
Ill. 2d 572, 182 N.E.2d 662 (1962); People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 209 N.E.2d 694,
262 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965); Pepple v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 191 N.E.2d 263, 240 N.Y.S.2d
'721 (1963).
200. Sµch corroboration has been foun4 where the suspect appeared at the time
and place predicted and the suspect's cozµpanion proved to be involved in the offense
predicted. People v. Tillman, 1 Ill. 2d 525, 116 N.E.2d 344 (1954).
201. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 343, 229 N.E.2d 581, 586, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 9
(1967).
202. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335,340,229 N.E.2d 581,584,283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6. In
Taggart the anonymous caller stated that a specifically described person was at a certain
place and that he had a loaded revolver in his pocket. The suspect was found at the
named location in the midst of a group of children, which the court concluded justified
a search for the weapon. Justi1=e Fuld, dissenting, agreed that there was a need to act on
this information, but thought that the police should have patted the suspect down
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c. Information from victim or witnesses. While informants usually provide information about ongoing or future criminal conduct,
the victim of or witness to a crime obviously is giving information
concerning past criminal conduct. In contrast to the informer cases,
there is ordinarily no problem concerning the reliability of the person providing the information. Often, as where damage to property
or injury to a person is apparent, corroboration of the fact that an
offense has occurred is at hand, 203 and even when this is not the case
the police are entitled to assume the veracity of the alleged victim
or witness absent special circumstances which should put them on
guard. 204 The problem, except where the offender is a prior acquaintance of the victim or witness, is whether a sufficiently detailed description can be given to justify the arrest of any one person.
Sometimes, as where a series of crimes with the same modus
operandi has been committed in a certain vicinity, the several victims
or witnesses may together be able to provide a very specific description of the offender. Under such circumstances, a person who fits the
description and is found in that area may be lawfully arrested, even
though the encounter takes place sometime after the offense was
reported. 20 is In the more usual case, however, the police are called to
the scene of a just-completed crime and are able to obtain only a
general description of the offender. Experience has shown that when
the victim or witness cannot name the offender his apprehension is
unlikely unless he is immediately found in the area,206 so the police
instead of immediately looking into his pocket. This is consistent with the view later
taken by the Supreme Court in Terry.
The majority in Taggart was also concerned with the possibility that police might
invent informants after the fact to justify their action (see note 195 supra), and said
that "the police should be required to make contemporaneous or reasonably prompt
detailed records of any such communications which should be subject to inspection
and examination on a suppression hearing on the issue of credibility." Id. at 343, 229
N.E.2d at 587, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
203. E.g., Hood v. Brinson, 30 Ill. App. 2d 498, 175 N.E.2d 300 (1961).
204. E.g., Watkins v. Sullivan, 11 Ill. App. 2d 134, 136 N.E.2d 528 (1956).
205. Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (rash of daytime housebreakings in northeast Washington; description of offender indicated that he was a
brown-skinned Negro, about five feet seven inches tall and 150 pounds, late teens to
mid-twenties, very neatly dressed, wore topcoat with half-belt and a hat; held, proper
to arrest man fitting this description who, while observed, approached a house, knocked
on the door, looked about for a few minutes, and then left); Mercurius v. Rolon, 231
Cal. App. 2d 859, 41 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1964) (series of burglary-rapes within a five-block
circle; general description of offender was that he was a male Negro with short hair,
about six feet tall, and 165-210 pounds, very muscular and strong with large hands,
from mid-twenties to thirties in age, wore a jacket of a certain fabric with distinct
cuffs, and always drove from crimes in a car; held, proper to, arrest person fitting this
description seated iri car two or three blocks from point where most recent offense
had occurred the day before).
206. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISS!ON ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICI!:, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 97 (1967).
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response in these cases is to broadcast the general description and
bring as many officers as possible into the area to search for a person
or persons fitting the description. However, courts have generally
taken the position-and this is the most striking illustration of the
"more probable than not" test-that an arrest may not be made
upon a general description when the circumstances, including the
lapse of time and size of the area being searched, are such that more
than one person would likely fit that description.201
In such a situation, as even many who oppose stop and frisk in
other contexts would likely admit,208 the police must have some authority to freeze the situation. If it is inherent in the circumstances
that no one person can be singled out as the probable offender, then
it should be permissible to detain briefly every person in the area
who fits the general description. Clearly, only one can be guilty, but
as to each of the suspects there exists a substantial possibility of
guilt.209 Common sense, of course, suggests that whether the possi207. In People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963),
a supermarket robber was described as being a fairly tall man of large build with dark
hair who was wearing a red sweater. Twenty minutes later and six blocks from the
scene of the robbery, a man fitting this description was stopped. The court held that
the stopping (but not the subsequent search through the car) was proper, but observed that the police officer "did not have probable cause • • • to arrest [the suspect]
for robbery. There could have been more than one tall white man with dark hair
wearing a red sweater abroad at night in such a metropolitan area." 59 Cal. 2d at
454, 388 P.2d at 662, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 22. Similarly, in People v. Gibson, 220 Cal. App.
2d 75, 33 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1963), a report over the police radio that a robber wore a
dark felt hat, a leather coat, and dark glasses, was held not to justify arrest of a man
with a dark hat, dark glasses, and a coat which looked like leather (but was not), who
had been spotted in a car forty blocks from the scene of the robbery.
Sometimes, however, a single fact from the victim, together with other circumstances, will identify only one person in the area. See People v. Posley, 71 III. App. 2d
186, 218 N.E.2d 47 (1966) (police called to burglary, girl reported that man in her room
smelled of shaving lotion; car one block away was only car in area without condensation on the windshield; smell of saving lotion detected in car; suspect hiding in car
properly arrested). Also, it is once again important to note that the "more•probablethan-not" test may not be applicable in the case of a most serious crime; see text accompanying note 178 supra. Illustrative of this exception is People v. Schader, 62 Cal.
2d 716, 401 P .2d 665, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965), where a policeman was killed during a
robbery; a radio report that the two robbers were headed east in a late model red
Cadillac was held to justify the arrest of a man who was apparently alone in such a
car. The defendant relied upon the Mickelson case, but the court said that this case
was distinguishable because the crime was murder, relying upon Justice Jackson's dissent in Brinegar, text accompanying note 59 supra.
208. See, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A. Case Study in Judicial Control of tlle
Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 443, 456 (1967).
209. See People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P .2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963)
(summarized in note 207 supra); People v. King, 175 Cal. App. 2d 386, 346 P.2d 235
(1959) (information that robbery was committed by two men in a two-tone green, dark
and dirty car which rattled and had a loud mufiler, held to be adequate grounds for
stopping a car fitting this description two miles from the robbery); Wilson v. State,
186 S.2d 208 (Miss. 1966) (witness saw theft of safe from supermarket and observed four men, one in an unusually long coat, depart in a light-colored Plymouth
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bility is substantial will depend upon the size of the area in which
the offender might be found (which in turn depends upon how
recently the crime was committed and whether the offender fled on
foot or in a car), the number of persons now in the area, and the
extent to which the general description affords some basis for selection. If, for example, a robbery occurred some fifteen minutes earlier
and the only report is that the robber wore brown shoes, and there
are several hundred people on the streets in the area, no one would
seriously suggest that all those with brown shoes should be stopped.210
d. Calls for assistance. A somewhat different kind of case is presented when the police find themselves on the scene of what appears
to be an offense being committed or just completed, and the circumstances suggest a need for action even prior to any attempt at questioning the victim or witnesses about the details. Police on patrol
duty are occasionally confronted with situations in which they suddenly hear a call of "Help!" or "Police!" and then see one or more
persons leaving the area. Ordinarily, probable cause for arrest will
be lacking on such facts. 211 The call may be a prank or othenvise
unrelated to any criminal conduct, and, in any event, no one person
has been identified as the one who is more-probably-than-not guilty.
Here, as in the previous situation, there probably will be a basis
for an investigative stop. Once again, the police should be required
to meet the substantial possibility test, but, while in the previous
situation a general description utilized to select persons in the vicinstation wagon; court does not question police detention of three men, one with described coat, who were seated in described vehicle).
210. The real problem of this kind occurs when the victim or witness can say only
that the offender had brown skin; a common complaint of Negroes is that they are a
highly visible minority and thus particularly susceptible to this kind of rough selection. The complaint is a valid one when race does not afford a reasonable basis for
selection from the many persons in the area, which is often-but not always--the case.
See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. I, 223 A.2d 873 (1966), where the police
were told a burglary had been attempted by a Negro with a brown coat and a mustache, and this was held to justify the stopping for investigation of a Negro with a
light colored coat without a mustache but in need of a shave, who was walking down
the street some five blocks away. In the absence of some additional data not provided
in the opinion such as the fact that this incident occurred in a section of Philadelphia
not frequented by Negroes, or that the streets in the area were otherwise deserted,
this is an outrageous decision; one of every four persons in Philadelphia is Negro.
On the other hand, it would be foolish to contend that race alone could never
provide a basis for a stopping. The question is whether, given the nature of those in
the suspect population (the characteristics of persons one would expect to find at that
time in the vicinity of the crime), the one factor of race (or some other single bit of
information, such as the fact that the offender wore a red shirt) is sufficiently selective.
A Negro in an exclusive white residential area, a white person in Chinatown, or an
American Indian in a Negro area might all be stopped if a member of their race had
just committed an offense in the immediate vicinity.
211. E.g., People v. Mirbelle, 276 Ill. App. 533 (1934).
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ity will meet the test, here the requirement may be satisfied even
without any description because all the suspects will be in immediate
proximity to a possible crime scene.212
e. Direct observations. Most police stops for investigation are
probably the result of direct observations, a particularly difficult
category because the various fact situations which arise are not all
of a kind. A few of the most common, however, will provide an adequate basis for analysis.
Because of the high incidence of property crimes and the fact
that such crimes are infrequently solved by other meahs, 213 most field
interrogations are undertaken with respect to such crimes.214 The
typical case is one in which a patrolman sees a person on the street
tarrying property under circumstances which suggest that the property might have been obtained unlawfully. The problem is precisely
the converse of that present when an account of a crime has been
received from a victim or witness; here, it is clear that the burglar,
thief, fence, or what have you, has been caught red-handed if a crime
has occurred, but the facts may not make it more probable than not
that a crime has been committed. Since the property provides a
specific foctis for questioning, a stopping for such investigation is
certainly appropriate when there is a substantial possibility of criminality, that is, reason to believe that "criminal activity may be
afoot."215 Merely unusual conduct-such as sitting in a park in broad
daylight and dividing up a pile of coins-does not of itself call for
inquiry,216 but the following actions do justify questioning: (1) carrying a large bundle of clothing carelessly wadded together at 9:20
p.m. while carefully staying in the shadows; 217 (2) carrying a new
212. With regard to calls for assistance, for example, if a policeman standing
outside an apartment house were to hear a cry for help within, it should be permissible for him to stop anyone leaving the apartment house immediately thereafter, "even though it again was perfectly possible that no one present was guilty of
wrongdoing, and certain that not all -0£ the persons were guilty of the commission of
a crime." United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 79 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Similarly,
when the police hear a cry for help at 4:30 a.m., a person observed running out of a
nearby alley could properly be stopped. Bell v. United States, 280 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
,
The distinction between this section and the one preceding is between what
is referred to as a "hot" search (at the crime scene) and a "warm" search (in the general vicinity of the crime). The third possibility is a "cold" search, not limited in area,
which of course would require a much more specific description. See PRESIDENT'S COM•
MISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JumCE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE POUCE 58 (1967).
213. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 97 (1967).
214. DETECTION OF CRIME 28.
215. 392 U.S. at 30.
216. People v. Henze, 61 Cal. Rptr. 545 (App. Ct. 1967).
217. People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 300 P.2d 729 (1956).
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console-type record player with the store tags still on it, where the
two men involved were recognized as having prior larceny convictions;218 and (3) carrying a brown carton, which appeared to have
come from an adjacent railway express terminal, at I: 15 a.m.219 In
each of these examples, the possibility that the property was obtained by criminal means is so compelling as to call for investigation.
A second general situation-one which provides another opportunity to juxtapose the standards for arrest with those required for
a temporary seizure for investigation-arises when an individual
is suspected because of his companionship with another who has just
been lawfully arrested. Assume, for example, that A has just been
arrested while in the process of committing a crime. While the possibility that his companion, B, may also be arrested is greater than
would be the case if A were being arrested for an offense committed
at some time in the past,220 it does not follow that B may always be
arrested too. The cases tell us that it is necessary to distinguish between those instances in which there is evidence of a "common de~
sign" between A and B,221 on the one hand, and those in which A's
offense might well have been unknown to B and their "meeting is
not secretive or in a suspicious hide-out," 222 on the other. In the latter
case the probabilities are not sufficient to allow the arrest of B, but
it would seem that the fact of companionship at the time the crime
was committed223 might well raise a substantial possibility that B
was involved. This would be particularly true if B were to engage
in any unusual conduct after the officer made his movie to arrest A. 224
218. Brooks v. United States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960).
219. United States v. Lewis, 362 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1966).
220. If A were arrested for a crime committed in the past, then it would have to
appear both that the past offense was committed by more than one person and that
there was some basis for believing that A's present companion had been his accomplice. Compare People v. Henneman, 373 Ill. 603, 27 N.E.2d 448 (1940) (unlawful to
arrest man riding in car with another man who fitted description of person who held
up gas station the night before) with People v. Derrico, 409 Ill. 453, 100 N.E.2d 607
(1951) (when man known to have burglarized safe four months previously was properly
arrested, and one of the weapons found in the car appeared to belong to his companion, the companion could also be arrested for burglary, which was known to involve at least two men).
221. E.g., People v. West, 15 Ill. 2d 171, 154 N.E.2d 286 (1958); People v. McGowan,
415 Ill. 375, 114 N.E.2d 407 (1953).
222. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
223. B's companionship with A, even at a later date, might be sufficient. In a case
such as People v. Henneman, 373 Ill. 603, 27 N.E.2d 448 (1940), where the car was
stopped so that A could be arrested for armed robbery, B, passenger in the car, has in
a sense been stopped too, and given the professional and dangerous nature of the
crime for which A is being arrested, prudence would seem to dictate a frisk of B.
224. In People v. Bowen, 29 Ill. 2d 349, 194 N.E.2d 316 (1963), two officers lawfully
arrested A for carrying a concealed weapon. A's companion B (later found to be A's
husband) then began to depart quickly, but stopped when ordered to do so by one
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While the preceding five categories do not exhaust all of the
possible situations in which the police might consider stopping a
suspect for investigation, they do account for most of the instances
of such stopping in current practice225 which appear consistent with
the standard suggested by the Supreme Court in Terry. Without
regard to whether the Court will ultimately adopt each of the distinctions suggested above, this discussion does support two important conclusions: the permissible grounds for a stopping can be
made just as precise as the grounds for arrest; and, the permissible
grounds for a stopping can be set forth in objective terms.

VI.

PROTECTIVE SEARCH

Assuming that grounds for a temporary seizure for investigation
are present,226 the next question is whether the officer may conduct
what is commonly called a "frisk" or what might more appropriately
be described as a "protective search." By hypothesis, it is clearly a
search and thus within the fourth amendment; it is to be undertaken for the sole purpose of protecting the officer. As a consequence, it is more limited and thus distinguishable from other
forms of search, such as search incident to arrest. Protective
searches, said the Court in Terry, must be reasonable "both at
their inception and as conducted,"227 and thus separate consideration must be given to these questions: (1) How much evidence of
what is needed to justify a protective search? (2) What are the constitutional boundaries of a protective search made on sufficient
evidence?

A. The Required Amount of Evidence
Much of the language in the Terry opinion referring to the
quantum of evidence needed to search is confusing and contradictory. The problem is initially cast in terms of the authority of an
of the officers. One officer patted B down and found no weapons, but shortly thereafter
the other officer conducted a more thorough search of B and found a packet of concealed narcotics. The Supreme Court of Illinois took the view that the patting down
for a weapon was a lawful search of B incident to the arrest of A., but that the second,
more extensive search of B was improper. This notion that one person may be searched
for a weapon incident to the arrest of another person is an interesting idea, and certainiy makes sense in some situations. See note 223 supra. In Bowen, however, it seems
inapposite, since B was leaving the scene and did not present any danger to the arresting officers. Since the officers called B back to find out in what way he might be involved with A., a better explanation would be that the officers properly stopped B for
investigation and frisked him incident to that stop.
225.
226.
seizure,
227.

The police practices are described in DErECTION OF CluME 19-38.
This discussion is not directed to the question of whether there actually was a
which would raise a difficult factual issue. See note 117 supra.
392 U.S. at 27-28.
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officer to act for his own protection when he does not have probable
cause for arrest; but then it is said that "the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." 228 An officer must be allowed to conduct a protective search, says the Court,
when he "is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous,'' 220 that is, "where he has reason to believe that he
is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual." 230 The conduct of Officer McFadden was proper, the Court concludes, because
"a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing
petitioner was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's
safety." 231
All of this language may seem familiar; it is precisely the language which the Court has used time and again to define the probable cause requisite for arrest.232 It thus seems to support the curious conclusion that if an officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that a person is carrying a concealed weapon,233 so that he might
make a lawful arrest, 234 he may instead conduct a protective search
without arrest if he also has reasonable grounds to believe that the
person is dangerous. Such a conclusion would hardly be cause for
celebration in the precinct stations of this country, even though it
would have two limited benefits: (I) contrary to a number of silly
228. 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
229. 392 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
230. 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
231. 392 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added).
232. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
233. Possession of a concealed weapon is an offense in most jurisdictions, although
definition of the offense varies from state to state. See Brabner &: Smith, Firearm
Regulation, 1 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 400 (1934); Eller, Legislation-Control of Fire•
arms, 35 N.C. L. R.Ev. 149 (1956); McKenna, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms,
MARQ. L. R.Ev. 138 (1928); Turner, Criminal Law-The Law as to Concealed Deadly
Weapons, 21 J. CRIM. LAw [now J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S.] 375 (1957); Note, The Law as to
Concealed Deadly Weapons, 43 KY. L.J. 523 (1955); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 492 (1955).
Typical is the statute involved in Terry, which provides in part that "no person shall
carry a pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or other dangerous weapon concealed on or about his
person." For other illustrative statutes, see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.06, 5.07, app. (Tent.
Draft No. 13, 1961).
234. The arrest would at least be constitutional. It seems clear that a state may
authorize the police to arrest without a warrant for any crime when the officer has
reasonable grounds for belief, as some have done, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2(c)
(1965); but in several states misdemeanor arrest without a warrant is limited to
crimes which occur in the officer's presence. Precisely what "in his presence" means
has proved troublesome, and it is often unclear whether the officer must be positive
before arrest that the crime has occurred or whether it is sufficient that he have
reasonable grounds to believe that the offense is presently occurring. See ARREsT
2!11-43.
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decisidns, 235 it would now be possible to search for a weapon when
there are grounds for arrest without first going through the formalities of arrest; 236 and (2) it would now be possible to search on probable cause for items usable as weapons which are not (and perhaps
as a matter of substantive due process could not be237) included in
a statute prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons.
This, however, is not the conclusion implicit in Terry, in part
because it would strike habitual readers of Supreme Court cases as
a most unusual decision. We have become accustomed to opinions
in which the Court's rhetoric far outruns the holding, and thus it
is no longer cause for surprise to find, at the very end of an opinion,
a "we-only-hold" statement in which the Court pulls up short and,
in effect, converts some earlier strong language into dictum. 238 But
Terry runs the other way; after the reader has had it hammered into
his head several times that a protective search is permissible only
when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and
dangerous, it finally tomes out that this is not true at all:
We mereiy hold today that where a police officer observes unusal
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous;
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries; and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
235. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 715 (1963). Thus, it has been said that "if the search
comes before the arrest, it is clear that the search is invalid." LAW &: TACTICS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 67 (Shadoan ed. 1964). It has been noted, however, that in most
of these cases "there were either other reasons for holding the search unreasonable or
the statement of the rule was dictum." :M:. PAULSEN &: s. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAw AND
ITS PROCESSES 740 n.i (1962). For a discussion of why search with probable cause should
be permitted before arrest, see LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True
Law .•• Has not .• . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 303.
236. In this regard, it should be noted that Justice Harlan was critical of the
disposition of the Peters case on arrest-and-search grounds, fu part because the Court
implied that
[A]lthough there is no problem about whether the arrest of Peters occurred late
enough, i.e., after probable cause developed, there might be a problem about
whether it occurred early enough, i.e., before Peters was searched. This seems to
me a false problem•.•. If the prosecution shows probable cause to arrest prior to
a search of a man's person, it has met its total burden.
392 U.S. at 76-77 (emphasis in original).
237. See, e.g., People v. Munoz, 9 N.Y.2d 51, 172 N.E.2d 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146
(1961). See also DETECTION OF CRIME where it is stated at 47:
[O]ccasionally a small knife is found to have a matchstick inserted under the blade
so that the knife can be opened hurriedly merely by catching the protruding
blade point on the trouser pocket as the knife is taken out. The effect is the same
as having a switchblade knife. The fact that the size of the blade would prevent
prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon is not reflected in the police attitude
toward these knives.
238. E.g., Escobedo v. lliinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.239

Thus, assuming a proper stopping for investigation, a protective
search is permissible when there is reason to believe that the suspect
may be armed and dangerous. This has some advantages over the
New York formulation of a reasonable suspicion that the individual
is dangerous,240 and would seem to permit use of the substantial
possibility test in much the same way as in determining whether
there are grounds for a stop, as discussed earlier. In short, the officer
would not have to establish that it was more probable than not that
the suspect was armed, but only that there was a substantial possibility that the suspect possessed items which could be used for an
attack and that he would so use them.
As the quoted language makes clear, whether it is proper to
make a protective search incident to a stopping for investigation is
a question separate from the isssue of whether it is permissible to
stop the suspect; not all stops call for a frisk. The police are frequently cautioned to assume that every person encountered may
be armed,241 which is sound advice if it means only that the officer
should remain alert in every case; but it cannot mean and has not
been interpreted by the police to mean that a search for weapons
may be undertaken in every case.242 It is undoubtedly true, however,
239. 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
240. See note 153 supra.
241. See, e.g., A. BRISrow, FIELD INTERROGATION 25 (2d eq. 1964); 2 Chicago Police
Dept., Training Bulletin, No. 7 (Feb. 13, 1961).
242. Available data, however, do not provide a clear picture as to bow often and
why frisks are made. It bas been reported that New York City police made searches in
81.6% of the reported stops [PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusrrCE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE PouCE 185 (1967)], although on
another occasion the New York department released figures indicating searches occurred in 75.7% of the stops [Schwartz, supra note 208 at 444 n.63]. By contrast, direct
observation of police activities in the high crime areas of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., disclosed that a search was conducted in about one third of the field
interrogations. Reiss & Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS 47
(1967). In any event, it is clear that frisks are not always made when they might be
called for. One limited study of the killing and wounding of policemen by guns disclosed that in 43% of the shootings which occurred while the officer was checking
out a suspect in a vehicle, the policeman was shot after the initial contact bad been
made. Also, more officers were shot while conducting field interrogations than while
dealing with those known or reasonably believed to be felons. Bristow, Police Officer
Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963).
Data on the productivity of such searches are also inconclusive. The New York
figures, which are questionable in many other respects, indicate that weapons were
found in about 8% of the frisks (Schwartz, supra note 208, at 444 n.63), while the
President's Commission found that "one out of every five persons frisked was carrying a dangerous weapon-IO percent were carrying guns and another 10 percent
knives." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra at 185.
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that in some cases the right to conduct a protective search must follow directly from the right to stop the suspect. The Court seems to
take this view in Terry, 248 although Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion proceeds to "make explicit what I think is implicit" in the
majority opinion, namely, that a protective search may always be
made when the stopping is to investigate what appears to be a crime
of violence.244 For other crimes, Harlan later asserts, there must be
"other circumstances"245 present; in such cases, it would apparently
take noticeable bulges in the suspect's clothing, movements by the
suspect toward his pockets, or similar observations to give rise to a
substantial possibility that the suspect was armed. 246

B. Scope of the Search
The Court is somewhat more successful in stating what is required for a protective search to be conducted reasonably. For one
thing, the Court's emphasis upon the procedures followed by the
officer in Terry indicates that a two-step process must ordinarily be
followed: the officer must pat down first and then intrude beneath
the surface only if he comes upon something which feels like a
weapon. 247 Thus in Sibron the Court says that, even assuming the
officer had grounds for a search, he exceeded the permissible scope
of such a search in that he made "no attempt at an initial limited
exploration for arms" but instead "thrust his hand into Sibron's
pocket." 248
Justice Harlan, concurring, suggests that because it was otherwise
clear that the officer's actions in Sibron were improper, there was
"no need here to resolve the question of whether this frisk exceeded
243. In finding that the officer had grounds for his search, the Court observes that
the suspects' actions "were consistent with [his] hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery-which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to
involve the use of weapons." 392 U.S. at 28.
244. 392 U.S. at 33.
245. 392 U.S. at 74.
246. In this context, there may be some truth in the allegation that courts are
not likely to second-guess the officer's judgment that he thought he might be in
danger (see text accompanying note 148 supra). This may be another reason for
giving consideration to the possibility of permitting investigative stops only for
serious crimes (see text accompanying note 124 supra) where the right to frisk is likely
to flow directly from the right to stop.
247. See 392 U.S. at 29-30 where the Court states:
The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of these
standards. Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his
companions. He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer
surface of their garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached
for and removed the guns. He never did invade Katz's person beyond the outer
surfaces of his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat down which might
have been a weapon.
248. 392 U.S. at 65.

November 1968]

"Street Encounters" and the Constitution

89

[permissible] bounds."249 He is apparently troubled because the
Chief Justice has said that the two-step process must be followed
even when, as in Sibron, the suspect has thrust his own hand into
his pocket. Certainly a forceful argument for an exception could be
made in such a case; there may not be time for a game of pattycake
in this situation, and anyway the patting would likely be inconclusive if the suspect's hand were over the weapon.
On the other hand, it is understandable why there might be
some reluctance to acknowledge such an exception. If some aspect
of a street encounter is subsequently questioned, it is difficult to reconstruct the events.250 A major virtue of the two-step requirement is
that the officer will not be able to justify an intrusion beneath the
surface of the suspect's clothing without first showing that he felt a
hard object, a matter which often could be subject to later verification by showing that there was such an object.251 But if a beneaththe-surface search may be made without a patting-down when the
suspect makes some movement toward his pockets, courts will frequently be confronted with the difficult task of determining, on the
basis of conflicting testimony, whether the suspect actually made
such a movement. If incriminating evidence is found, it is understandable that many suspects would claim falsely that they had not
made any dangerous moves, and it is less understandable but unfortunately true that some police would claim falsely that the suspect
had made such motions. 252
The Court also emphasizes in Terry that the protective search
must be used only where its sole justification-protection of the
officer and others nearby-applies. Thus, it must be limited in scope
"to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs,
or other hidden instruments for the assault of [sic] the police officer."253 This seems to mean that the search must be limited to those
places to which the suspect had immediate access, a limitation which
had not been imposed upon the power to search an arrested person
and his "immediate presence."254 The Court's formulation, however,
249. 392 U.S. at 74.
250. Cf. Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police
.,1uthority, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 160, 165 (1967).
251. This is not a foolproof safeguard, however. Cf. Reiss, Police BrutalityAnswers to Key Questions, TRANs-AcnoN, July-Aug. 1968, at IO, 12, describing the
practice of some police of carrying pistols and knives so that they may be placed at a
scene should it be necessary to establish a case of self-defense.
252. See notes 126 and 195 supra as to similar misrepresentations in current
practice.
253. 392 U.S. at 29.
254. See note 76 supra.
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raises two questions: (1) Is a protective search limited to the person
of the suspect? (2) How extensive may the patting down of the
person be?
In answer to the first question, it may be that some limited extension of the officer's right to act for his own protection will be
recognized when unusual circumstances present him with no reasonable alternative. The hard case involves a suspect seated in a vehicle; this has been the circumstance in many police shootings.255
The police can and do resort to special measures to protect themselves under these conditions: asking the suspect to get out of the
car immediately or making a "flashlight search" of the automobile.256 However, if the suspect does not respond or if in doing so
he appears to be reaching for something in the vehicle, prudence
may dktate an immediate search of so much of the interior of the
car as is accessible to the suspect. Recognition of an exception under
these circumstances need not lead to other exceptions, such as authority to search into objects carried by the suspect; in the latter
situation, there is available the easy alternative of placing the object 9ut qf reach of the suspect until the inquiry is completed.257
As to the permissible extent of the patting down, the Supreme
Court may have inadvertently suggested that more is permitted
than is necessary. In making the point that a frisk is more than a
"petty indignity," the Court describes in some detail the police procedures for a frisk, which include "[a] thorough search ... of the
prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the
feet." 258 Several comment4 tors, for the same reason, have supplied
255. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 93 (1963).
256, DETECTION OF CRIME 48-52.
257. There is no reasonable basis, for example, to follow the outrageous decision
of People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 225 N.Y.S.2d 833 H964), which
approved the search of a closed briefcase held by the suspect while he was being
questioned in a patrol car surrounded by three policemen. An interesting discussion
of why the court may have dealt with the case in this way is given in Schwartz, supra
note 208, at 437-39. The New York statute, which was not the basis of the Pugach
holding, permits only search of the "person" [N.Y. CODE CRIM PRQC, § 180a (1958)], and
New York police have been advised that "if the suspect is carrying an object such as
a handbag, suitcase, sack, etc. which may conceal a weapoµ, the officer should not
opeii that item, but should see that it i~ placed out of reach of the suspect so that its
presence will not represent any immediate danger to the officer." New York State
Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, Memorandum Re: The "Stop-and•
Frisk" and "Knock, Knock" Laws, Jt1ne 1, 1964, reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISfRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
POLICE 38, 40 (1967). Compare the ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), which would also allow search of the suspect's "im•
mediate surroundings."
258. 292 U.S. at 17 n.18, quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming Crimi•
nals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954).
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equally distressing descriptions.259 Unfortunately, however, the
Court and the commentators have failed to Iiote that the procedures
being described are those used after arrest and before the arrested
person is taken to the station,260 a situation in which the need is
quite different than in the context of a field interrogation.
The limited search permitted by Terry, it is important to remember, is to find weapons "for the assault of [sic] the police officer,"261 not merely to find weapons; thus there is no reason to cover
every square inch of the suspect's body. The need is only to find implements which could readily be grasped by the suspect during the
brief face-to-face encounter, not to uncover items which are cleverly
concealed and which could be brought out only with considerable
delay and difficulty. By contrast, the on-the-scene search of a person
who has been arrested and who is to be transported to the station
(often unwatched in the rear of a police van), is also frequently referred to as a "frisk,"262 but must be more extensive because the arrestee may well have an opportunity to get his hands on a carefully
concealed weapon. The difference between the two situations is appreciated by the police, who normally pat down only around the
armpits and pockets during a stopping for irivestigation263 but make
a more detailed search after arrest.264

C. The Exclusionary Rule
Some commentators have suggested that the practice of conducting protective searches incident to a stopping for investigation ought
to be dealt with by rather unusual applications of the exclusionary
rule. One proposal is that nothing, not even a weapon, found in a
frisk should be admissible in evidence.265 The rationale of this proposal apparently starts with the premise that police will frisk when
they think they are in danger whatever the law reads, and therefore
259. See, e.g., Oberman & Finkel, Constitutional Arguments Against "Stop and
Frisk", 3 CRIM. L. BULL, 441; 462 (1967), and Comment, Stop and Frisk: Dilemma for
the Courts, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 161, 167 n.41 (1967), both quoting J. MOYNIHAN, POLICE
SEARCHING PROCEDURES 7 (1963); Schwartz, supra note 208, at 435-36, quoting from the
record in People v. Hoffman, 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1965).
260. Both Priar & Martin, supra note 258, and J. MOYNAHAN, supra note 259, make
it absolutely clear that the procedures described are for use when a suspect has been
placed under arrest. People v. Hoffman, 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1965),
involved a case in which the officer frisked prior to taking two suspects to the station.
261. 392 U.S. at 29.
262. E.g., DETECTION OF CRL'\!E 123. This has undoubtedly contributed to the
confusion over what was being discussed in the materials cited in note 260 supra.
26!!. Pilcher, The Law and Practice in Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8: P.S.
465, 488 (1967).
264. DETECTION OF CRIME 141, 144.
265. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPEar .AND SOCIETY 43 (1967); Comment, Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 158, 166 (1966).
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it would be best to acknowledge that they may lawfully do so; but,
so the argument goes, frisking can best be confined to this purpose
if self-protection is the only benefit to be derived. 266 Terry, of course,
amounts to a rejection of this view, since the Court held that the
weapon was admissible in evidence.
A more reasonable theory is that only weapons should be ad•
missible because only weapons are the proper objects of a protec•
tive search.267 This, of course, would be a significant departure from
existing law; for under what might be called the "serendipity doctrine," contraband not sought but discovered during a properly
limited search may be seized and is admissible in evidence.268 Many
who would not question the wisdom of this rule in other contexts
would refuse to apply it to frisks because the dangers of police misuse of this power seem to be so substantial that the temptation to
feign justification for the seizure of other items on stop-and-frisk
grounds should be removed.
It is unclear just how great this danger of abuse actually is; 269
therefore, it might be well to reserve judgment on this proposal until we have had more experience under the newly recognized stopand-frisk power. It may be that the Supreme Court wished to leave
266. This would not discourage all searches for purposes other than self-protection,
however, since many are undertaken without any intent to prosecute. See Schwartz,
Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &:
P.S. 4!l3, 462 (1967). Cf. the Administration's proposed (but unpassed) Crime Control
Act which allows the President to authorize the use of electronic surveillance in any
situation where he feels it is neccessary to protect national security, but forbids introduction of information obtained through such surveillance as evidence "in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding" unless the surveillance was "reasonable." Proposed Crime
Control Act, H.R. 5037, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. 3, § 2511 (3) (1968), reprinted in !l6
U.S.L.W. 109, 114 Gune 25, 1968).
267. Schoenfeld, The "Stop and Frisk" Law Is Unconstitutional, 7 SYRACUSE L. REV.
627, 640 (1966); Note, Probable Cause Held Not Requisite for Stop and Frisk, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (1964). See also the remarks of Professor Yale Kamisar and
Mr. Harris Steinberg, 1966 ALI PROCEEDINGS 140-42, 166-67, proposing such an exclusionary rule for MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02(5), supra note 22.
At the oral argument of the Sibron case, Justice Fortas inquired of counsel whether
a distinction could be drawn between admission of a weapon and admission of, for
example, narcotics, but counsel for appellant responded that no such distinction could
be made. 2 CRIM. L. REP. 2213, 2214 (1967).
268. In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), the Supreme Court permitted
seizure of contraband incident to an arrest unrelated to the presence of that contraband. Abel v. United States, !162 U.S. 217, 238 (1960), arguably established the even
broader proposition that the fruits and instrumentalities of any crime are subject to
seizure if found in a search for items related to the purpose of the arrest.
Cf. the situation in which a search is made under the authority of a proper war•
rant: many courts have interpreted Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), as
barring seizure of any items not named in the warrant. This hardly seems sound,
because it discourages officers from resorting to search warrants. See LaFave, Search and
Seizure: "The Course of True Law ••. Has Not ••• Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
255, 274-77.
269. The decided New York cases on stop and frisk are not encouraging. See
Schwartz, supra note 266, at 44!l.
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the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule completely
open; at least, it is difficult to find any other explanation for the
Court's otherwise questionable disposition of the Peters case.270 Peters, it will be recalled, involved the admissibility of burglar's tools.
Notwithstanding the fact that three state courts had already dealt
with the case in terms of stop and frisk and that the evidence available to the officer was no greater than that which the Court had
found inadequate for arrest on other occasions,271 the Supreme Court
concluded that the officer had arrested Peters and had done so on
sufficient evidence.

VII.

FIELD INTERROGATION AND IDENTIFICATION

A street encounter such as that in Terry, the Court acknowledged, is for the purpose "of investigating possibly criminal behavior,"272 and the usual means of investigation is questioning of the
suspect, long referred to by police as "field interrogation." 278 Experience has shown that suspects questioned under these circumstances
rarely make a direct admission of guilt, 274 but it is even more unusual for a suspect to offer no response at all. 275 Typically, the suspect
either provides an explanation of his actions which satisfies the officer, or else gives an account which adds to the prior suspicion and
thus, in many cases, presents the officer with a situation in which he
may make a lawful arrest. 276
270. Unless it is that disposition of the case on stop-and-frisk grounds would have
required consideration of the difficult question of whether it was proper for the officer,
once he removed the opaque envelope from Peters' pocket, to open the envelope to see
what was inside. See Schwartz, supra note 266 at 441-42.
271. Cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). Justice Harlan, citing Henry,
objected to the result in Peters: "I find it hard to believe that if Peters had made
good his escape and there were no report of a burglary in the neighborhood, this
Court would hold it proper for a prudent neutral magistrate to issue a warrant for his
arrest." !192 U.S. at 76.
272. !192 U.S. at 22.
27!1, DETECTION OF CRIME 6.
274. Id. at 65. In Reiss &: Black, supra note 242, at 54, it is reported that in 86%
of all field interrogations observed in that study no admission was made by the suspect;
but it is not made clear whether "admission" is intended to mean only a direct admission of criminal conduct or is meant to include a damaging admission through an
unsuccessful attempt of the suspect to exonerate himself.
Judging from the appellate cases, the most frequent admissions of guilt concern
the suspect's possession of contraband. DETEcrioN OF CRIME 65. It is not surprising
that this should be so, since the suspect may often believe that the officer is about
to search him and find the contraband anyway; but it may also be true that some
of these cases only represent instances in which the policeman has doctored the facts
in order to justify what was in fact an illegal search. See note 126 supra.
275. DETECflON OF CRIME 59. In Pilcher, supra note 263, at 475, it is reported that,
of !100 field interrogations observed in Chicago, in not one instance did the suspect
refuse to answer any questions.
276. The suspect's explanation may be found unconvincing because it is incon-
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In other instances, the investigation involves what might be
called "field identification." Sometimes this involves limited questioning for the purpose of discovering the name of the suspect. For
example, an individual may be stopped because he generally resembles a person, known by name, who is wanted for some past crime.
Or, more commonly, if the suspect's name can be determined but
nothing else is learned which tends to verify the officer's suspicions
which led to the stopping, the officer may make a quick check with
headquarters to determine if there are any outstanding warrants for
that individual. 277 A quite different kind of identification, not requiring any questioning, is involved when the suspect is stopped at
the scene or in the vicinity of what appears to be a just-completed
crime. In such a case, it is the practice to hold the suspect briefly so
that he may be viewed on the spot by those thought to be the victims or witnesses of the offense.278
The constitutional limits upon such investigative techniques
were not in issue in the three recent cases. No attempt at identification was made in any of these cases, and only in Peters did the sussistent with prior knowledge of the officer, because it is internally inconsistent, because
it is inherently incredible, or because it is inconsistent with observable facts or other
information obtained by the officer immediately thereafter. DEI'ECTION OF CRIME 68-72.
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 362 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1966) (man carrying box near
express terminal late at night said that he found it and that he worked near there,
then admitted he was not so employed when the officer indicated an intention to
check); People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 300 P.2d 729 (1956) (man staying within
shadows carrying large bundle of carelessly wadded clothing claimed that clothes were
his own and that he had just picked them up from the cleaners; some of garments
were women's clothes and men's garments not suspect's size); Brooks v. United States,
159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960) (men carrying console record player on street
after dark explained that it was being taken in for repairs, but when officer asked
about the store tags still on the record player, they claimed it was given them by a
stranger, whom they could not describe); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196
N.E.2d 840 (1964) (suspect carrying two large boxes late at night said he had a quarrel
with his wife and had left with his own belongings, but then said that box contained
silverware and similar items; officer then checked with the suspect's wife and found they
had not quarreled).
277. Police also frequently check to see if the car that the suspect is driving has
been reported as stolen. DETECTION OF CRIME 82. In a city with modern record-keeping
equipment, an answer can be obtained in a minute or two. Id. The new National
Crime Information Center (presently serving 790 police departments in 43 states, the
District of Columbia, and Canada, with a great many more departments likely to
become affiliated in the future) serves as a warehouse of facts on 586,000 wanted men,
stolen cars, missing guns, and hundreds of other items bearing serial numbers, and is
said to be responsible for 500-600 arrests or recoveries of stolen property each month.
An officer in a stopping-for-investigation situation could radio his headquarters, where
a teletype would be immediately sent out and relayed through one of the 62 terminals
to a huge computer at the center which would supply the requested information
immediately. Barr, FBI Computer Fingers Criminal in Seconds, Assoc. Press Release,
Aug. 7, 1968. Brief detention for purposes of a quick records check has been upheld;
e.g., People v. Anguiano, 198 Cal. App. 2d 426, 18 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1961); People v.
Stewart, 189 Cal. App. 2d 176, 10 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1961).
278 DETECTION OF CRIME 83. See People v. Hanamoto, 234 Cal, App. 2d 6, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 153 (1965).
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pect give an intelligible response; in the latter case the Court
avoided comment by holding that a lawful arrest had occurred
prior to the statement.279 The Court expressly disclaimed any intention of ruling upon the dimensions of police investigative authority
at this time, 280 and only Justice White, concurring in Terry, appears
to have been willing to do more. His opinion, to the extent that it
reflects some dissatisfaction with the majority's treatment of the
case, seems to say this: It would not have done any harm simply to
acknowledge that there is a right to question during a stop, for if
there is no such right then there is no reason to permit a stop; and,
if that is so there is no reason to allow a protective search, as we have
done. 281 This certainly makes sense, unless stops are permissible
only to make identification (in which case Terry would make no
sense) or may be made only on suspicion that the person is armed
for the purpose of committing a crime (in which case the frisk alone
would either prove or disprove the officer's suspicions). The latter
possibility, though not inconsistent with Terry,282 is an unlikely
one, and thus it seems that the Supreme Court will ultimately have
to resolve several difficult issues concerning the constitutionality of
techniques used during a temporary seizure for investigation. In doing so, the Court will find itself in the uncharted territory between
what is permitted in Terry and what is prohibited by Miranda v.
Arizona,283 Wong Sun v. United States,284 and United States v.
Wade.285
A. Between Terry and Miranda
Between Terry and Miranda lies the unanswered question of
whether all or at least some of the fourfold warnings286-which are
279. In the statement of facts, the Supreme Court does not even acknowledge that
the officer asked any questions, although it is clear that he did so: "Officer Lasky apprehended defendant . • • and asked him what he was doing in the building."
People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 241, 219 N.E.2d 595, 597, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (1966).
280. In Terry there is a cautionary footnote asserting that nothing has been decided about the constitutional propriety of seizure for investigation. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
In Sibron and Peters, again by footnotes, the Court says it is not passing on the
New York law and thus will not speculate upon whether the authority given there
for the officer to "demand" an explanation involves custodial interrogation, or whether
it contemplates an obligation to answer or some added power on the part of the
officer if the suspect refuses to answer. 392 U.S. at 61 n.20
281. 392 U.S. at 34-35.
282. In Terry the Court did not discuss the right to stop, apart from the right to
frisk, thus leaving some room for the contention that a stop should be allowed only
when the frisk would serve both as a means of protecting the officer and as the only
necessary investigative technique.
283. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
284. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
285. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
286. Since squad cars are not as yet equipped with public defenders [Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)], it may well be argued that
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a prereqms1te to at-the-station interrogation-are required in the
context of a temporary on-the-street seizure for investigation. Such
a seizure, the Court instructs in Terry, occurs whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away," 287 while in Miranda the Court states that the warnings are
a prerequisite to any questioning that takes place "after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." 288 The issue, then, if it were framed
within the structure provided by the Court, is whether one restrained in his freedom to walk off during a brief field interrogation
is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Few clues to the answer of this sixty-four-dollar question are to
be found in the sixty-four pages of the Court's opinion in Miranda.
Perhaps, as has been suggested, this is not surprising: the pre-Miranda controversy had centered on the rights of a suspect at the police station; the Court had much experience with stationhouse interrogation but none with on-the-street questioning; and all four
cases decided in Miranda involved interrogation under the "policedominated atmosphere" of the stationhouse.289 Much has been
made, of course, of the Court's observation that "general on-thescene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by
our holding," 290 and the statement that "in such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogathe two warnings with respect to counsel need not be given and that it is sufficient
for the officer to tell the suspect only that he has a right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used against him.
287. 392 U.S. at 16.
288. 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). The word "significant" is itself significant,
as is indicated by the fact that it appeared in only one of the several statements of
the holding in the Miranda opinion as originally released, but was later inserted as a
part of all of the various statements of the holding. See Schwartz, supra note 266, at
459-60 n.187.
289. Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in CRIMI·
NAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION-SOURCES AND COMMENTARIES 335 0"• Israel &: Y.
Kamisar ed. 1968). This article contains a more detailed treatment of many of the
recent cases raising the question of whether Miranda applies on the streets.
The following exchange at the oral argument of the Sibron case has been reported:
The Chief Justice then asked if a police officer detaining a suspect in his car
could ask questions. Mr. Juviler answered that he could.
The Chief Justice: "Without giving the Miranda warnings?"
Mr. Juviler responded that the Miranda warnings would not necessarily have
to be issued; the Miranda opinion strictly limited the requirements to circumstances involving "custodial interrogation."
The Chief Justice pointed out that such a person would surely have his
freedom of movement restrained. But, Mr. Juviler answered, the suspect would
have to be restricted "in a significant way."
2 CRIM. L. REP. 2213, 2215 (1967).
290. 384 U.S. at 477.
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tion is not necessarily present."291 Whether "citizens" includes "suspects" is not made clear, but at least one sharp-eyed reader has
pointed out that appended to the last-quoted statement is a footnote
concerning questioning of a suspect.292 Those of a different persuasion prefer to place emphasis upon other language from Miranda
which is directed more toward police questioning generally than
toward questioning at the station: "there is still a general belief that
you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman, or at least
that it will be the worse for you if you do not.'' 293
It is difficult to tell which of these or other quotations from Miranda will ultimately prove to have the greatest significance, since
Miranda gives the fifth amendment new dimensions which, by their
nature, are far less precise than those which prevailed earlier. Under
the "old" fifth amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination
came into play only when there were legal sanctions for remaining
silent, and it then could be said with confidence that the privilege
did apply in court but did not apply to police questioning. 294 However, under the Miranda version of the fifth amendment, making it
"available outside of criminal court proceedings ... to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way," 295 there is no litmus-paper test for determining
what kind or degree of interference with one's freeedom of action
brings the amendment into play.

I. The Case Against Warnings on the Street
If one carefully examines the reasons underlying the Court's
concern in .l\:firanda, there is some foundation for the contention
that the AIiranda warnings should not be required in a street encounter setting. This is because the inherent circumstances and the
oft-used techniques of stationhouse grilling are not-and in most
instances could not be-a part of field interrogation. Consider the
following distinctions. (1) When a suspect is questioned at the station he has been "swept from familiar surroundings"296 and "thrust
into an unfamiliar atmosphere" 297 where the interrogator has the
psychological advantage of selecting the locale of the questioning; 298
291. 384 U.S. at 478.
292. Pilcher, supra note 263, at 486.
293. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37, quoting P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN
ENGLAND 32 (1958).
294. E.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (rev. ed. 1961).
295. 384 U.S. at 467.
296. 384 U.S. at 461.
297. 384 U.S. at 457.
298. 384 U.S. at 449.
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when questioned on the street he is neither "swept" nor "thrust"
but is merely stopped at a place where he has chosen to be and which
was not selected by the officer.299 (2) One questioned at the station
has been "cut off from the outside world" 800 and is alone with his
interrogator; 301 a person stopped for field interrogation remains in
the outside world, often but not always in the view of passersby,
and is frequently in the company of his companions during the
questioning. 302 (3) A suspect at the station is "surrounded by antagonistic forces" 303 in a "police dominated atmosphere" ;304 the suspect
detained on the street is confronted by few police-often only one
and seldom more than two. 305 (4) At the station the police may "interrogate steadily and without relent . . . for a spell of several
hours" ;306 field interrogations seldom extend beyond a few minutes. 307 (5) Questioning at the station house may result in "physical
299. It is most unusual for the officer to require the suspect to move away from the
place where he was stopped, and in any event the movement is likely to be to another
place in the same general vicinity. :Moreover, when such moves are made it is usually
for the purpose of having the suspect viewed by a victim or witness, or so that the
officer can contact the station and request guidance or information; in these cases
interrogation is less likely to follow. See DETEcrION OF CRIME 82-84.
300. 384 U.S. at 445.
301. 384 U.S. at 449.
302. One empirical study reported these results:
In over one-third of the [field] interrogations observed, two or more persons were
questioned, and in about one-fifth, three or more were questioned. That the field
interrogation is so often a confrontation between group and group places it somewhat at odds with popular stereotypes of the interrogation as an encounter
between one or more officers and a lone suspect.
Reiss & Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS 47, 52 (1967).
303. 384 U.S. at 461.
304. 384 U.S. at 445.
305. The suspect will be stopped by a lone patrolman or by an officer in a patrol
car who is likely to be alone, but-particularly in high-crime areas-may be accompanied by one additional officer. This fact obviously will influence techniques of
questioning; for example: "In the absence of other patrol units to lend assistance,
the classic technique of separating suspects for interrogation is often unavailable to
officers in a field setting. The support and surveillance given by his fellows may well
mitigate some of the suspect's vulnerability in such field confrontations." Reiss &
Black, supra note 302, at 52.
306. 384 U.S. at 451, quoting C. O'HARE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
112 (1956).
307. On the basis of observation of about 300 field interrogations in Chicago, it

was reported:
The average length of time a citizen was detained by a field stop was between two
and three minutes. One person was detained about 20 minutes until the victim
of an armed robbery arrived and made a negative identification. One driver was
detained for more than 45 minutes while a name check was being made. This
delay occurred on a Friday night while there was a computer malfunction; the
person was arrested when it was reported that his driver's license had been revoked. Other than these two instances a detention did not last over five or sb.:
minutes and, of course, the overwhelming majority were much less than that.
Pilcher, supra note 263, at 488.
Another study reports somewhat longer times:
About one-half of the suspects were detained for less than ten minutes and threefourths for less than twenty minutes. Nearly all of these persons were released in
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brutality"; 308 this is most unlikely in a street setting.300 (6) Police
questioning at the station may involve trickery, such as the "Muttand-J eff" routine or confrontation of the suspect with coached or
false accusers; 310 the officer on the street is not in a position to arrange such subterfuges.311 (7) The possibility of unrestrained questioning at the station may influence the police to make wholesale
arrests in the hope that one of the many suspects questioned will
confess; 312 no comparable risk exists as to street encounters, which
typically involve an individual or small group involved in suspicious
activity or a limited number of individuals near the scene of a recently committed crime. These are all differences of some importance, and they support the view that field interrogation need not
be governed by the same restraints as station-house questioning.
It is true, of course, as Professor Kamisar has cautioned,313 that
we should not mistake the "advocacy" in the Miranda opinion for
its scope. The Court, by presenting this parade of horribles, certainly did not mean to say that Miranda applies only when it can be
shown that one or more of these evils was present. It would be absurd, for example, to contend that the police may question at the
station without the warnings if they are careful to avoid use of any
force, tricks, ovenvhelming numbers, or the like.314 But it is quite
another matter to suggest that this "advocacy" in Miranda may provide a clue as to whether similar fifth amendment protections are
required in the context of a quite different kind of police procedure.
l\firanda should be extended to field interrogations, it is submitted,
only if there is a "potentiality for compulsion"315 in such encounters.
the field setting. Over nine-tenths of the suspects were detained less than forty
minutes; nevertheless, about 5 per cent were detained an hour or more before
the police made a decision to book or release.
Reiss &: Black, supra note 302, at 52. These latter statistics are probably not an accurate indication of what is herein referred to as on-the-street or field interrogation,
since they include instances of questioning on the way to the station and upon
arrival there.
308. 384 U.S. at 446.
309. The various empirical studies-e.g., DETECTION OF CRIME, Pilcher, supra note
263; and Reiss &: Black, supra note 302-report no instances in which force was used
in a street encounter to make the suspect talk. Also, force is generally not necessary to
make the indhidual stop, Pilcher, supra note 263, at 473, and thus it cannot be said
that suspects are being questioned after having been physically seized.
!110. 384 U.S. at 452-53.
311. This is because of the brief length of the inquiry, see note 307 supra, and the
circumstances of the inquiry, see notes 299, 302, & 305 supra.
312. 384 U.S. at 482-83 n.53.
313. Kamisar, supra note 289, at 337.
314. For one thing, requiring a showing of abusive practices would bring us right
back to the problem we started with: "A gap in our knowledge as to what in fact
goes on in the interrogation rooms." 384 U.S. at 448,
315. 384 U.S. at 457.
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And in determining whether there is this potentiality, it is quite
logical to contrast the range of possible police action on the street
with the available statiorthouse practices condemned in the Miranda
decision.
This is not to imply that Miranda can somehow be read as if it
were limited to station-house questioning of those under formal
arrest. The Court, "understandably reaching out to protect its
flanks," 316 provided a broader definition of custodial interrogation
in order to guard the fifth amendment from ready manipulation
by the police; Miranda cannot be evaded by using sleight-of-hand
in the booking process or by moving the "squeal room" out of the
police station. However, these and similar end runs around the Miranda requirements can be thwarted effectively without extending
those requirements to street encounters. Instances of field interrogation are readily distinguishable from the various "custodial interrogation" situations, including both at-the-station questioning and
any substantial equivalents arranged by the police.
2. The Irrelevance of Custody If Miranda Applies on the Street
If the above view does not prevail, then it would seem that the
Miranda warnings should be required in all police-suspect street encounters involving questioning, without regard to whether the suspect could be said to be "deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." That is, the only distinction to be made is between
those instances in which a general inquiry (for example, "What
happened?") is made to witnesses,317 and those in which an individual is called upon to inculpate or exculpate himself (for example,
"What are you doing here?" or "Where did you get that property?").318 In the latter instances the warnings should be required
whether or not there is "custody," a "seizure," or an "arrest." This
is so because there are two very good reasons for not trying to distinguish between those cases in which the suspect has been temporarily
316. Kamisar, supra note 289, at 382.
317. As indicated in the text following, the "potentiality for compulsion" in an
on-the-street setting does not seem to be significantly affected by whether or not there
is custody or whether the restraint is of a particular degree (temporary seizure v.
arrest). What is important is the fact that questions are being asked by a police officer
(see the statement from Miranda quoted in the text at note 293 supra), and thus it is
appropriate to consider the nature of the questions asked in determining whether the
situation is a suspect-officer confrontation. If it is not, then the Miranda warnings
are not called for, as a contrary rule "would venerate form over the substance of
sound relations between police and citizens in a large community • . . • The police
talk to too many people in the course of a day to make warnings compulsory every
time they inquire into a situation." Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476, 479 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
318. But not necessarily "Who are you?" See text accompanying note 345 infra.
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seized in the Terry sense, and quite similar situations on each side:
questioning on the street unaccompanied by such a temporary seizure; and questioning on the street after the incident has developed
to the point of arrest. First of all, if it is concluded that Miranda applies even when the seven circumstances listed above319 are not present, then the fact that the suspect was in some sense "deprived of his
freedom of action" becomes insignificant in terms of the "potentiality for compulsion"; 320 the dominant factor then is that questions
were being put to a suspect by a police officer. Second, any attempt
to draw distinctions among these three situations would involve police and reviewing courts with nits that are best left unpicked; there
is no reasonable and readily identifiable basis by which the distinctions may be made.
The strength of these two reasons becomes apparent when a critical examination is made of the various criteria which courts and
commentators have suggested or adopted for purposes of determining the reach of Afiranda in on-the-street situations. Assume these
facts: defendant enters a small clothing store and, when he believes
the proprietor is not watching, grabs several articles of clothing off
the counter and runs out of the store. As he leaves, he hears the proprietor call to him to stop and then direct a clerk to call the police.
Defendant trots down the street carrying the large bundle of clothing carelessly wadded together, and when he sees a police car approaching he tries to conceal himself in the shadows (it is eightthirty p.m. on a winter evening). The defendant's conduct is observed by the officer, who leaves his car, walks up to the defendant,
and says, "Just a minute there." The officer asks the defendant
where he obtained the clothing, and the defendant answers that he
just picked up the clothing from a cleaning establishment across the
street. The officer then responds that the cleaners have been closed
since six p.m., and asks the suspect-after patting him down for a
weapon-why price tags are hanging from some of the clothes. The
suspect then says, "I'm the one, I took the clothes from the store."
At no point did the officer give the Miranda warnings or any variation thereof. Are any of the suspect's statements admissible? If this
depends upon whether the suspect was at some point "deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way," then it will be necessary to apply one of the following tests.
(I) There has been such a deprivation when there has been a
"seizure" under the fourth amendment, and a "seizure" of the sus819. See text accompanying notes 296-312 supra.
820. 384 U.S. at 457.
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pect at least occurred (to take the language from Terry) when the
officer "took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his
clothing."321 This, however, is not a convincing distinction, as there
is really nothing about the frisk which substantially changes the
pressures on the suspect to talk; the "potentiality for compulsion"
has not changed. And, it is somewhat anomalous to say that an officer may either question without warnings or frisk but that he may
not do both. Why should only the suspect who might be armed and
dangerous be cautioned?
(2) There has been such a deprivation when the officer has
formed an intention to arrest, that is, to take the person to the station. This test, applied by some courts322 and rejected by others,323
hardly makes sense in terms of the "potentiality for compulsion,"
as the uncommunicated intentions of the officer do not change the
situation from the suspect's point of view. Also, it would be a most
difficult test for reviewing courts to apply, as it requires a determination of the officer's state of mind regarding something he had not
yet done.324
(3) There has been such a deprivation when the officer has
formed an intention to make a temporary seizure, that is, to prevent
the suspect from leaving if he tries to do so prior to the completion
of the questioning. This test325 has all the defects of the previous
one.326 In addition, it is unrealistic because in most instances an
officer will not think ahead to such a possibility; it is unnecessary to
do so because suspects being questioned on the street ordinarily do
not attempt to leave.327
321. 392 U.S. at 19.
322. United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968) (conclusion that custodial
interrogation not involved based in part on fact the police "had not formed an intention to arrest [the suspect]'); State v. Intogna, 101 Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 59 (1956) (suspect
questioned as to killing in his front yard; conclusion that this was custodial interrogation based in part on fact "the officer had no intention of letting defendant escape").
This is also proposed as one of several appropriate tests in N. SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSION STANDARDS, MIRANDA v. AruzoNA; A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE
60-61 (1966).
323. People v. Hazel, 252 Cal. App. 2d 412, 60 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1967); People v. P.
(Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967).
324. N. SOBEL, supra note 322, at 60-61, admits that if the officer testifies at the suppression hearing that the suspect was free to go, then the court must shift to an
objective test.
325. The test was applied in People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d
196 (Sup. Ct. 1966), where it was held that defendants questioned about items being
carried were subjected to custodial interrogation because the officer did not intend to
release them until the questioning was completed. The test was rejected in Allen v.
United States, 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
326. For example, in Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968), the
court said that even the officer's statement to the suspect that he was not being detained
in any way was not conclusive.
327. Pilcher, The Law and Practice in Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S.
465, 475 (1967).
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(4) There has been such a deprivation when the investigation
has "focused" on the suspect, in the sense that the officer has enough
evidence to make a lawful arrest. Although this test has been applied
by a number of courts,328 it has no relationship to the "potentiality
for compulsion" because it does not rest upon the situation as perceived by the suspect. The "focus" approach also has been criticized
for its logical inconsistencies:
[W]hile the existence of probable cause may shed light on the purpose of the police to evade-since presumably the more they have on
the suspect, the more likely that their purpose is to get a confession
-the dangers to the privilege are only indirectly related to probable
cause. Furthermore, this application would have the anomalous result of permitting more coercive techniques to be applied to those
apparently innocent than to those who are guilty.329
This notion of "focus," of course, comes from the Escobedo330 case,
but it was abandoned in J',firanda, 331 and for good reason. As the
Court pointed out in Hoffa v. United States:
There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not
required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they
have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the
Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth
Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are
under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause ....832
The same observation could well be made concerning street encounters; the police should not be trapped between the fourth and
fifth amendments.
(5) There has been such a deprivation when the investigation
has "focused" on the suspect, in the sense that he is the principal
suspect with regard to a specific crime.338 Under this approach, the
stopping of several suspects (obviously not acting in concert) near a
328. Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Ceccone,
67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1968); People v. Bolinski, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1968); People v. Allen,
50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1966); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 432 Pa. 541, 226
A.2d 765 (1967). The test was expressly rejected in People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d
I, 233 N.E,2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967); State v. Taylor, 437 P.2d 853 (Ore. 1968).
329. Graham, What Is "Custodial Interrogation"?: California's Anticipatory AP·
plication of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 UCLA L. REv. 59, 117 (1966).
330. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
331. On the significance of the curious definition of "focus" in Miranda, see
Kamisar, supra note 289, at 338-51.
332. 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966).
333. Something along these lines is suggested in Pilcher, supra note 327, at 478.
Although somewhat ambiguous, the decisions in People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 276
N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196
(Sup. Ct. 1966), seem to rely in part on "focus" in this sense.
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crime scene and, perhaps, the stopping of one suspect but not with
regard to any specific known offense, would be distinguished from
other cases. The defects in this test are essentially the same as those
encountered with the previous standard.
(6) There has been such a deprivation unless the suspect has
consented to the interview. Determining whether there is consent
in other contexts (for example, search) is difficult enough, but it
would be particularly troublesome here. In practice, suspects do
not ordinarily attempt to leave334 or othen'lise manifest their lack
of consent. This tendency prompted one empirical study to conclude
that it was not meaningful to distinguish field interrogations undertaken with consent from those that took place without consent.335
(7) There has been such a deprivation if the suspect believes
that he is under arrest, that is, if he believes that the officer is going
to take him to the station.336 This test, of course, does bear upon the
"potentiality for compulsion," as the emphasis is upon the suspect's
assessment of his predicament. It is questionable, however, if it is
correct to say that on-the-street questioning becomes more compelling when the suspect thinks the officer has already decided to take
him to the station house. Just as persuasive is the contention that a
"false exculpatory statement" is "much more tempting when it still
seems possible to avoid arrest."337 In any event, it would be wise to
avoid the formulation of rules to guide the police which speak in
terms of what someone else is thinking, for such rules would "place
upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question."338
(8) There has been such a deprivation if the suspect believes that
he is presently detained, in the sense that the officer would not permit him to go until the interview is completed.339 This presents essentially the same problems as the previous test.
(9) There has been such a deprivation if the suspect reasonably
334. Pilcher, supra note 327, at 473.
335. DETECTION OF CRIME 17:
[I]t is not meaningful in practice to attempt to distinguish between field interrogation with consent and that which takes place without consent. In high-crime
areas, particularly, persons who stop and answer police questions do so for a
variety of reasons, including a willingness to cooperate with police, a fear of
police, a belief that a refusal to cooperate will result in arrest, or a combination
of all three.
336. This test was applied in People v. Ceccone, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (App. Ct. 1968)
(alternative ground): it was rejected in People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1,
233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967).
337. Graham, supra note 329, at 86.
338. People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260, 286 N.Y.S.2d
225, 233 (1967).
339. The test apparently was used as an alternative ground of decision in State v.
Intogna, 101 Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 57 (1966).
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believes that he is under arrest, that is, that the officer plans to take
him to the station.340 In terms of the "potentiality for compulsion,"
this test would do only rough justice, since the person who honestly
but unreasonably thinks he is under arrest has been subjected to
precisely the same custodial pressures as the person whose belief in
this regard is reasonable. It could be argued, of course, that such a
sacrifice must be made because of the difficulties of proof when a
subjective test is used; here the question involves the "reasonable
man," long an object of scrutiny by courts.841 It again seems doubtful, however, whether the suspect who believes (now reasonably)
that he is under arrest is under any greater compulsion to talk then
the suspect who thinks he still has an opportunity to talk the officer
out of deciding to arrest him. Finally, shifting from a subjective to
objective test still does not put the officer in a position in which he
can determine whether the suspect has such a belief. Whether the
suspect has a reasonable belief is to be judged by the facts as they
reasonably appear to him, which means that under this test the officer would have to know what the suspect thinks the officer knows in
order to determine when the warnings must be given.342 In the earlier hypothetical, for example, the suspect might have believed that
the officer knew about the theft and approached to arrest him, as the
suspect was aware that the shopkeeper had called the police and
might have thought that the squad car had appeared in response to
that call.843
(10) There has been such a deprivation if the suspect reasonably
believes that he is presently detained, in the sense that the officer
would not permit him to go until the interview is finished.344 The
problems here are basically the same as with the previous test.
None of these tests, it is submitted, provides a sound basis for
determining the reach of Miranda in an on-the-street setting. Some
of them rest upon facts which neither police nor reviewing courts
340. The test was applied in People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d
255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967); see Kamisar, supra note 289, at 362.
341. This is not to suggest that courts would have an easy time under "a 'reasonable
belief' test." See People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1,233 N.E.2d 255,286 N.Y.S.2d 225
(1967), where the majority says that the suspect would not have reasonably believed
he was under arrest, since he did not know that his accomplice was in custody and
had implicated him; the dissent, on the other hand, says reasonable belief arose
as soon as the officers asked if he knew the boy who in fact was his accomplice.
342. For an excellent illustration of this conundrum, see Kamisar, supra note 340,
at 378 n.6.
343. Apparently the officer cannot overcome this dilemma by telling the suspect
that he is not under arrest, because of the possibility that a reasonable man might
not believe the officer. See Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968),
and the discussion of this case in Kamisar, supra note 340, at 371-72.
!!44. This approach was used in People v. Hazel, 252 Cal. App. 2d 412, 60 Cal. Rptr.
437 (1967).
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could readily determine, while others involve distinctions which
really do not relate to the "potentiality for compulsion'' involved.
Thus, one is led to conclude either that Miranda should not apply
to street encounters at all, or else that Miranda should be applied to
all such encounters which involve questioning an individual about
his mm conduct.345 There is no rational middle ground. Once the
former position is rejected, it must be admitted that whatever compulsion is present in an on-the-street setting stems not from minor
changes in the nature of the restraint but rather from the fact
that "there is still a general belief that you must answer all questions
put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will be the worse for
you if you do not.'' 34 6

3. The Significance of Refusal To Answer
If a suspect is properly stopped for purposes of field interrogation, but he refuses to answer any questions, what significance may
be attached to such a refusal? Justice White, concurring in Terry,
declared that "refusal to answer furnishes no basis for arrest."347 If
this means that the individual's refusal to respond, in and of itself,
does not constitute grounds for arresting him for the crime suspected, it is beyond question that Justice White is correct.348 It is
345. It has been suggested that "there may be a distinction between eliciting a
name and address, and seeking an account of a man's behavior. As to the latter,
there can be no doubt that the privilege can be claimed. One must closely consider,
however, whether or not a suspect may refuse on constitutional grounds to supply
his name and address. This inquiry is especially important because identification of
individuals is apparently the basic justification of a detention." Abrams, Constitu•
tional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IowA L. REv. 1093, 1115-16 (1967).
That author goes on to suggest that Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
supports such a distinction:
[T]he Court suggested that certain identification techniques, such as fingerprinting
and photographing, might be valid. A suspect is not likely to be more damaged
by supplying name and address than by being fingerprinted and photographed,
all of which may lead the prosecution to valuable testimony. Therefore, judging
by the Court's action in Schmerber, a suspect possibly would not be permitted
to refuse to give his name and address to police officers.
Abrams at 1117. Also relevant to the problem are the more recent cases of United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), holding that it is not a violation of the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination to be required to speak a phrase uttered to the
victim by a robber, and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), holding that there
was not fifth amendment violation in the taking of a handwriting exemplar. See also
Clark v. States, 240 A.2d 291 (Md, Ct. App. 1968) holding that it is not a violation
of Miranda to ask defendant his name, address and place of employment for purposes of booking, when he has been given the warnings but has indicated that he
wanted to consult with counsel; and that the "fruits" of the answers-location of
the stolen good as the place of employment-are therefore admissible).
346. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 32 (1958), quoted in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
347. 392 U.S. at 34-35.
348. See, e.g., State v, Gibbs, 252 Wis. 227, 31 N,W.2d 143 (1948).
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also probably unconstitutional to make refusal to answer questions
put by a police officer a crime.349 But it does not necessarily follow
that the suspect's refusal must be ignored completely by the officer;
it might be argued that refusal to answer is one factor which the
officer may consider, together with the evidence which gave rise to
his prior suspicion, in determining whether there are grounds for
an arrest. 350
In the pre-Miranda era, the majority of courts concluded that
the suspect's refusal to answer could be taken into account in this
way, 351 although a few jurisdictions held that "no adverse inference
may be drawn" from a refusal to respond. 352 Whether Miranda calls
for a different result remains unclear; as noted above, the application of :M.iranda to street encounters is still an open question. If it
is ultimately determined that Miranda warnings must be given on
the street, it seems to follow that the officer may attach no significance to the suspect's refusal to respond. Where the officer has advised the suspect that he may remain silent, the suspect's acceptance
349. See DETEcnoN OF CRIME 62-64; Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions
on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 205, 226-28 (1967); Schwartz,
Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &:
P.S. 433, 459 (1967).
350. Under the Uniform Arrest Act, appearing in INTERSTATE COMMN. ON CRIME,
INn:RSTATE CRIME CONTROL 86-89 (1942), such refusal is grounds for an additional brief
detention. Under the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 202(6) (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1966), refusal to answer is expressly recognized as a proper factor in the
arrest decision. The N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 180a (1958) says only that the officer
may "demand" such information, but does not indicate what significance is to be
attached to the suspect's failure to accede to the demand. However, the New York
police have been advised that "the suspect's refusal to answer shall not be considered as an element by the officer in determining whether or not there is a basis
for an arrest." New York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials,
Memorandum re: The "Stop-and-Frisk" and "Knock, Knock" Laws, June 1964,
reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE PouCE 38, 40 (1967). The reasoning behind this
advice is described in Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention and
Frisk, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 597, 613 (1967).
351. E.g., People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P .2d 531 (1955); People v. Romero, 156
Cal. App. 2d 48, 318 P.2d 835 (1957); Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 P. 43 (1908);
Baines v. Brady, 122 Cal. App. Supp. 957, 265 P.2d 194 (1953); Dickerson v. United
States, 120 A.2d 588 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1965); Harrer v. Montgomery Ward, 124 Mont, 295,
221 P .2d 428 (1950).
352. Poulas v. United States, 95 F.2d 412, 413 (9th Cir. 1938). Some courts have
supported the right of the police to stop and question on the supposition that refusal
to answer cannot in any way adversely affect the suspect. For example, in United
States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 86 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the court said: "It must
be borne in mind that the defendants in this case had a constitutional right to
remain silent when questioned by police or other investigatory agents or bodies, but
they chose not to do so. Had they chosen such a course, they would have suffered
no penalty." See also the similar dicta in Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Brooks v. United States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1960).
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of this advice cannot be regarded as tending to show anything concerning his possible guilt or innocence.858
But if the Miranda warnings are neither required nor given, it
seems appropriate for the investigating officer to take account of the
suspect's silence when questioned. As one commentator has noted:
It may be said that a man has . . . the constitutional right . . . to
refuse to answer incriminating questions, so that his refusal to
answer is not a circumstance of suspicion. But this would appear
to be too legalistic a view, for innocent people do in fact help the
police in their inquiries .... After all, the policeman is not trying
the guilt of the accused, but is only making an administrative decision whether to arrest.s54
This is not to suggest that no innocent person would refuse to respond; some do refuse,355 but common sense suggests that such refusals are more likely when the person questioned is guilty.850 The
Supreme Court has made it clear that the arrest decision involves a
common-sense judgment which may take into account facts which
would not be admissible in evidence: "[i]n dealing with probable
cause ... we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act."857
In practice, very few suspects stopped for field interrogation refuse to respond,358 so that the ultimate resolution of this issue may
353. Cf. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966),
where officers advised the defendant of his right to remain silent and defendant then
refused to speak for purposes of a voice identification. This refusal was admitted
as evidence at trial, but on appeal this was held to be error on the ground that
even though such a refusal is not covered by the fifth amendment, it was the direct
result of the police warning that he could remain silent and thus was not an
indication of guilt.
The same situation would be present even without the warnings if the suspect
were to claim the privilege in refusing to say anything. "The express claim of the
privilege would explain the failure to deny the accusation thus destroying the inference which would otherwise be raised." Remington, Police Investigation and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 WIS. B. BULL. 7, 64 (Dec. 1953).
354. Williams, Arrest for Felony at Common Law, 1954 CRIM. L. REv. 408, 413.
355. DETECTION OF CRIME 60:
It is probable that innocent persons may sometimes be indignant at the accusation necessarily implicit in a field interrogation and therefore refuse to cooperate.
In addition, persons with generally antagonistic attitudes toward the police may
occasionally decide to defy the police. To such persons, arrest may be preferable
to cooperating with the police.
356. Similarly, common sense suggests that one who flees a police officer is more
likely guilty, though obviously some innocent persons may panic and flee. Courts
have recognized flight as a factor; see e.g., United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe,
139 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Pa. 1956); but cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
483 n.10 (1963), and Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope,
42 NEB. L. REV. 483, 494 n.40 (1963).
357. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
358. DETECTION OF CRIHE 59; Pilcher, supra note 327, at 475.
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be of less than major importance. It has also been suggested that
there is little to be gained from recognizing refusal to answer as a
factor, because "an officer who has so little probable cause to make
an arrest that the refusal of a person to answer his questions will
swing the decision one way or the other, in all likelihood has a pretty
weak arrest to begin with." 359 It would be a "weak arrest," of course,
in the sense that no rational prosecutor would go to trial on such
facts, but to test an arrest in this way inappropriately confuses the
functions of arrest and charging.360 An arrest sometimes serves as
the invocation of the criminal process, in that it is a means of gaining control over the person of an individual who is to be prosecuted;
but it may also serve to facilitate an investigation which would not
be possible without custody of the suspect. 861 Thus, if a suspect is
stopped because he resembles a man named X who was responsible
for a crime, an arrest following that suspect's refusal to indicate
whether he is or is not X 362 is not "weak"--custody of the suspect
will make identification possible. Similarly, if a suspect is stopped
because of suspicious activity with respect to property in his possession863 and he refuses to offer an explanation for his actions, arrest
is not "weak" in that it provides a lawful basis for seizure of the
property, which may then be checked against the stolen property
file.
B. Between Terry and Wong Sun
Few Supreme Court decisions have caused as much confusion864
as that delightful Chinese puzzle, Wong Sun v. United States. 365 The
case arose when federal narcotics agents, without probable cause,
broke into Blackie Toy's laundry, pursued him into the bedroom
359. Pilcher, supra note 327, at 475.
360. See ARREST ch. 15.
361. The investigative techniques made possible by arrest are discussed in ARREST
at 308·16.
362. In terms of the application of Miranda and the requirement of warnings,
this may be a special case. See note 345 supra.
363. This is the most common field interrogation situation. DETECTION OF CRIME 28.
364. See Broeder, supra note 356; Note, Constitutional Law: Probable Cause for
Arrest Without Warrant, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 637 (1963); Recent Decision, EvidenceDefendant's Statement Made Immediately After His Illegal Arrest and Narcotics
Received from a Third Party as a Result of Such a Statement Are Inadmissible into
Evidence and Will Not Serve To Corroborate a Confession in a Federal Criminal
Proceeding, 51 GEO. L.J. 838 (1963); Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-Fourth
Amendment Bans Use of Voluntary Statement Made During Illegal Arrest, 31 GEO.
WASH, L. REV. 851 (1963); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 54, 117
(1963); Note, Criminal Law-Confessions-Admissibility of Corroborative Evidence,
42 N.C. L. REv. 219 (1963); Comment, Admissibility of Evidence-the Exclusionary
Rule Under the Fourth Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 292 (1963).
365. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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where his wife and child were sleeping, arrested and handcuffed him,
and then searched him and his premises, but found no narcotics. Toy
was then questioned; he denied having sold narcotics but admitted
knowing one Yee, who he said had done so. The officers subsequently apprehended Yee, who surrendered a quantity of narcotics
to them, saying that he had obtained them from none other than
Blackie Toy. On these facts the Supreme Court held that Toy's
statement and the narcotics uncovered thereby could not be admitted into evidence against him. The reasoning of the Court, however, was far from clear. The Court first indicated that it was
handling the case as it would a search case because "the policies underlying the exclusionary rule [do not] invite any logical distinction
between physical and verbal evidence." 366 If this is the crux of the
case, Wong Sun-contrary to the then-existing weight of authority
at both the state and federal levels367-stands for the proposition
that confessions or damaging admissions elicited from an illegally
arrested person are to be excluded in the same way as tangible evidence uncovered following an illegal arrest. But the Court went on
to say that the oppressive circumstances present made it "unreasonable to infer that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free
will," 368 leaving open the possibility that Wong Sun actually rests
upon the conclusion that Toy's admission was coerced.
Despite some early confusion about the applicability of Wong
Sun-whatever it stands for-to state proceedings,869 it now seems
clear that Wong Sun is constitutionally grounded and thus binding
on the states.370 It is of some importance, therefore, to consider the
possible significance of the case in the context of field interrogations
and identifications.

I. Temporary Seizure on Insufficient Evidence
Assume that a suspect is "seized" on the street for purposes of
field interrogation, but that the officer has acted on less than sufficient evidence-less evidence than is required to make the seizure
366. 371 U.S. at 486.
367. See Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating
Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL.
L.F. 78.
368. 371 U.S. at 486.
369. The confusion was engendered by language in Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 486, referring to the need for "deterring lawless conduct by federal officers"
and "closing the doors of the federal courts" to such evidence (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Court never cited Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
370. See Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493 (1963), in which a remand was granted
in light of Wong Sun; Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police
Interrogation, 25 Omo ST. L.J. 449, 459 (1964).
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"reasonable" under the Terry approach, or, as I have suggested, evidence insufficient to meet the special probable cause test which
should apply here. If required, the Miranda warnings are given; the
suspect agrees to answer some questions, and proceeds to incriminate
himself. Should this statement be admissible? Or, if the suspect's
statement puts the officer "over the top" as to the evidence needed
for arrest, and physical evidence is found in a search incident to
that arrest, should such evidence be excluded as the "fruits" of a
statement made while the suspect was illegally seized?
In the absence of any indication from the Supreme Court as to
what it meant in Wong Sun (or what it now wishes the case to
mean871), it can only be said that the answers will depend upon
which of the following propositions accurately reflects the Court's
primary concern in that case: (1) to deter the police from making
illegal seizures, all evidence gained by such seizures, tangible or intangible, must be excluded from evidence; or (2) to protect suspects
from having to speak except as "an act of free will," statements (and
their fruits) given during an unconstitutional seizure of the person
must be excluded whenever the circumstances of the seizure might
have deprived the suspect of his freedom to decide whether to speak
or remain silent. That is, the answers depend upon whether Wong
Sun is bottomed on the fourth or the fifth amendment.
The first of these alternatives has considerable appeal. As experience in the arrest area has shown, a "narrow" exclusionary rulethat is, one limited only to tangible evidence-restricts the development of fourth amendment standards relating to certain situations
commonly confronted by the police.372 Also, it is clear from preWong Sun practice that in important cases police were careful about
the grounds for arrest when the risk was that they might "blow the
case" by finding physical evidence on grounds insufficient to permit
admission of that evidence, but not when they simply wanted to
371. Consider the Court's rewriting of Escobedo in the Miranda decision by stating
that when it said "focus" in the former case it actually meant "custody," Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n.4 (1966), notwithstanding the fact that Escobedo listed
"focus" and "custody" side by side as separate elements.
872. Cf. ARREsr 495.95;
Until the recent case of Wong Sun v. United States, only physical evidence found
incident to an arrest could be challenged. Therefore, only crimes involving
physical evidence, such as narcotics, were likely to raise the issue of the lawfulness of the arrest. As a consequence there is a profusion of cases on the question
of when information from a narcotics informant is sufficient to justify an arrest ..
But there is little guidance on such questions as when, if ever, an officer can
arrest one or more than one member of a group of suspects each with physical
characteristics fitting the description given by an eyewitness, or when an officer
can make a felony arrest on the basis of suspicious conduct which he observes.
These questions, seldom considered, confront law eufQ:rcement officers. daily_
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bring a suspect in for questioning.873 Thus, exclusion of all state•
ments made after a temporary seizure on insufficient evidence would
have nvo advantages: it would lead to a more complete development
of case law on when such stoppings are permissible; and it would
result in some deterrence of such fourth amendment violations when
the police are motivated primarily by a desire to obtain statements
from suspects.374 One major disadvantage of this approach, however,
would be that whenever a court found that evidence to support a
temporary seizure was lacking, it would then have to determine
whether the street encounter in question involved a "seizure" or was
merely an instance of a citizen consenting to a delay in his journey
while responding to police inquiries. As noted earlier, there is good
reason to save courts from this difficult task. 375
The argument against the above-stated alternative, of course, is
simply that the search cases and confession-admission cases are not
of a kind. As one court declared well before Wong Sun:
[T]here is lacking the essential connection between the illegal detention and the voluntary statements made during that detention that
there is between the illegal search and the evidence obtained thereby .... When questioned by arresting officers a suspect may remain
silent or make only such statements as serve his interest; the victim
of an illegal search, however, has no opportunity to select the items
to be taken by the rummaging officer.376

That language clearly has a pre-Miranda flavor to it, for at the heart
of Miranda lies the notion that a suspect in custody does not necessarily have the choice to "remain silent or make only such statements as serve his interest." But, keeping this fact in mind, it may
well be that if Wong Sun is actually based on the "act of free
will" point, then that decision may have in effect been superseded
373 . .ARREsr 430-33.
374. Under this view of Wong Sun, even if the Miranda warnings were required
and given, so that there arguably is no room for a compulsion argument, the
suspect's statement would be excluded to effectuate the ban against illegal seizures.
375. See note 117 supra and text accompanying note 335 supra.
376. Rogers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 10-11, 291 P.2d
929, 933-34 (1955). Analysis along these lines is not uncommon in the cases holding
that Wong Sun does not mean that an illegal arrest renders inadmissible a statement
,obtained some time later at the station. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d
.535 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); Hollingsworth v. United States, 321
F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Burke, 215 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1963),
.afj'd, 328 F.2d 399 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 849 (1964), rehearing denied, 380
U.S. 927 (1965); State v. Lavallee, 104 N.H. 443, 189 A.2d 475 (1963); State v. Jackson,
43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d I (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965). Contra, United States
v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1964); People v. Robinson, 13 N.Y.2d 296, 196
NE.2d 261, 246 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1963).
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by Miranda. That is, if Wong Sun stands for the proposition that
there is sometimes a "potentiality for compulsion" in police custody
and that therefore statements obtained by illegal custody must be
excluded, it may now have given way to the broader rule in Miranda,
which recognizes this potentiality without regard to whether the
custody complies with the fourth amendment.
If Wong Sun should now be interpreted in this manner, so that
it is more of a fifth amendment case than a fourth amendment case,
it would take its place with Escobedo as a false start on the problem
finally resolved in Miranda. Under this theory, the only questions to
be answered when a temporary seizure for investigation is made on
insufficient evidence are whether the Miranda warnings are required in this context and, if so, whether they were given. Assuming
that they are required and were given, there would be no occasion
to apply Wong Sun since the suspect's freedom of choice would have
been restored by the warnings; that is, the "taint" of the illegal seizure would be "dissipated" by the warnings.377 Or, assuming that the
Court takes the view that the warnings are not required during
street encounters because there is no "potentiality for compulsion,"
consistency again would require the conclusion that Wong Sun (under its second interpretation) has no application.
Whether Wong Sun rests upon the fourth amendment or the
fifth amendment will also be important in those cases where the illegal temporary seizure for investigation bears fruit apart from the
suspect's statements or physical evidence obtained as a consequence
of his statements. Assume, for example, that a suspect is seized on
insufficient evidence, immediately thereafter viewed by the victim
of a crime just committed in the area, and identified as the perpetrator. Apart from the problems which would exist even if the seizure had been lawful,378 there is the question of whether the identification (and, indeed, any subsequent identification in court by the
victim) is the inadmissible fruit of a fourth amendment violation.
Obviously this situation is more like a search incident to an unlawful seizure than a statement incident to unlawful custody, since the
suspect cannot prevent the temporary seizure for investigation from
bearing this particular fruit; thus Wong Sun may have greater vitality here. It would not necessarily follow, of course, that the vie377. There would remain, of course, cases in which it might be argued that
Wong Sun applies even though .Miranda does not, as where a statement is volun-

teered following an illegal seizure.
378. Discussed in the next subsection; see text accompanying note 385 infra.
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tim could not make an in-court identification; the issue, as in the
more recent lineup cases, would be whether such identification was
"not tainted ... but ... of independent origin."379
2. "Fruits" of Failure To Give the Miranda Warnings
If it is ultimately decided that the Miranda warnings must be
given prior to on-the-street questioning, the following situation will
sometimes arise: a police officer stops a suspect for purposes of investigation, having ample evidence for doing so. However, he proceeds to question the suspect without first giving him the Miranda
warnings, and the suspect then makes certain damaging admissions.
Taking account of these admissions, together with the evidence
which caused the officer to stop the suspect in the first place, it is
clear that the probable cause standard for arrest has been satisfied,
and the officer places the suspect under arrest. A search of the suspect incident to that arrest yields certain physical evidence. Is that
evidence inadmissible on the theory that it is the "fruit" of a failure to comply with the fifth amendment requirements of Miranda?
While the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is well established in cases involving fourth amendment violations,380 the traditional rule with regard to confessions and admissions has been that
physical evidence is admissible even though found as the result of
an inadmissible statement.381 Although such a rule may have made
some sense during the time when the primary concern was with confessions that were not trustworthy, it is clearly "constitutionally
indefensible"382 now that statements of defendants are excluded for
other reasons. Indeed, Wong Sun amounts to a rejection of the traditional rule if it is interpreted as a fifth amendment case: Toy's
statement was excluded because it was not "an act of free will," and
the narcotics uncovered by using his statement were also held to be
inadmissible. Since the Miranda warnings are intended to ensure
that a suspect is not compelled "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," 383 it seems clear, as some courts have recently
held, that physical evidence which is the "fruit" of a failure to give
the Miranda warnings must be excluded.384
379. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). Cf. People v. Stoner, 65 Cal.
2d 595, 422 P.2d 585, 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1967).
380. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
381. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 856-59 (3d ed. 1940).
382. People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 439, 369 P.2d 714, 727, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 178
(1962).
383. 384 U.S. at 467.
384. This is implicit in Miranda, where it is said that unless "such warnings and
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C. Between Terry and Wade and Its Companions
It is also necessary to take account of the implications of the
Court's three recent decisions dealing with certain police practices
£or the identification of suspects. United States v. Wade 385 concerned
a lineup conducted by federal agents and consisting of the defendant and five or six other prisoners; notice of the procedure was
not given to Wade's attorney, although Wade had already been indicted and counsel had been appointed. The Court held that "for
Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was 'as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] ...
as at the trial itself.' " 386 The proper procedure, according to the
Court, is to notify both the prisoner and his counsel of the impending lineup; and, even after such notice, the lineup should be held
only when counsel is present, unless the defendant has made an intelligent waiver. In the companion case of Gilbert v. California, 387
the same standard was imposed upon a state lineup, and the Court
ruled that "the admission of . . . in-court identifications without
first determining that they were not tainted by the illegal lineup but
were of independent origin was constitutional error.'' 388
The third case in this series is Stovall v. Denno, 389 where it was
held that the Wade doctrine would not be applied retroactively.
This holding made it necessary £or the Court to consider the defendant's other claim, namely, that the pretrial identification in this
case was conducted in such a manner as to violate due process. Stovall had been arrested on the basis of evidence found at the scene of
a double stabbing, and was taken to the surviving victim's hospital
room, where he was identified as the assailant. No lineup was attempted; the defendant was the only Negro in the room at the time
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him," 384 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added).
See Dowlut v. State, 235 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1968) (fruit of poisonous tree doctrine
held applicable to Miranda violation, and weapon suppressed); State v. Taylor,
421 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1967) (doctrine held applicable to .Miranda violation, but
weapon admitted on ground it came from an independent source); People v. Soto,
285 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1967) (same). As the latter two cases illustrate, courts sometimes
have to stretch quite far to find that the physical evidence has an independent
source when the defendant has given a confession telling where the evidence could
be found. Such a finding, however, would seem most unlikely where the failure to
give the Miranda warnings results in arrest and the arrest in turn results in the
immediate finding of physical evidence on the defendant's person.
385.
386.
!187.
388.
389.

388
388
!188
388
388

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

218 (1967).
at 237.
263 (1967).
at 272.
293 (1967).
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and was handcuffed to a police officer; the victim was merely
asked if the defendant "was the man." Before the Supreme Court,
Stovall claimed that "the confrontation conducted in this case was
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification that he was denied due process of law."390 The Court
noted that the practice of showing suspects without a lineup has
been widely condemned, but held that due process was not violated,
considering the "totality of the circumstances," because an immediate hospital confrontation between the suspect and the badly
wounded victim was imperative.
It is important to consider the possible impact of these decisions
upon one kind of "field identification," that which involves temporary seizure of a suspect to take him to a nearby crime scene or to
hold him on the spot so that he can be viewed by one or more victims
or witnesses. This form of investigation is undertaken when the
police are conducting a "hot" or "warm" search391 at or near the
scene of a crime, and thus is not involved in a numerical majority of
temporary seizures for investigation. In terms of results, however, it
is probably true that such stops constitute a very significant police
practice.
I. The Due Process Issue
In a field identification situation, it is obviously unlikely that
the suspect will be viewed in anything resembling a lineup. Although
in some instances the police may stop two or more suspects while
acting on a general description and searching the area immediately
adjacent to the scene of a just-completed crime,392 in the usual field
identification case there will be but one suspect. Frequently, either
a single suspect is stopped on the basis of a description too general
to justify an arrest, or a single person is stopped because he is leaving
the scene from which a call for police assistance has been received.
Stovall indicates that in such a nonlineup situation the "totality of
the circumstances" must be considered in determining whether the
identification violates due process.
One of the circumstances to be considered is the exigency of the
particular situation, as reflected by the Court's emphasis in Stovall on
the fact that the victim was seriously injured and might have died
390. 388 U.S. at 301-02.
391. See note 212 supra.
392. There are other possibilities which are equally unusual, such as police
taking both a suspect and his companion to the crime scene, e.g., State v. Sears, 182
Neb. 384, 155 N.W.2d 332 (1967).

November 1968]

"Street Encounters" and the Constitution

117

without either implicating or clearing Stovall if the identification
had been delayed. While this kind of need can seldom be shown in
a field identification situation, there is a substantial need for the
police promptly to check out suspects at the crime scene. As the data
gathered by the President's Crime Commission make clear, a crime
committed by a person not known by name to the victims or witnesses is unlikely to be cleared up by arrest of the offender unless he
is apprehended in the immediate vicinity soon after the crime.393
And, as the Supreme Court has recently indicated, the need for police
"swiftly to determine whether they were on the right track" is
"hardly less compelling than that which we found to justify the 'oneman lineup' " in Stovall. 894
To put the matter another way, Stovall does not condemn all nonlineup identifications, but only those which are "unnecessarily suggestive."305 The Court, while expressing a preference for carefully
conducted lineup identifications, seems to have recognized that the
more suggestive one-man identification may sometimes be a necessary police procedure.306 This obviously is so when the police have
grounds for a temporary investigative seizure but not grounds for a
to-the-station arrest. A full lineup-attended by the victims, witnesses, the suspected offender, and his attorney-which displays several other persons bearing some resemblance to the suspect can hardly
be arranged within time limits that would pass muster for a "temporary" seizure. If any attempt is to be made to identify the suspect as
the offender or to clear him, it must be done by other means.397
393. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 58 (1967) (emphasis added):
In the survey, there were 1,905 crimes examined, of which 482 (25 percent) resulted in arrests or other clearances. Of these, 70 percent involved arrests, 90 percent of which were made by the patrol force. More than half of the arrests were
made within eight hours of the crime, many at or near the crime scene, and
almost two-thirds of the arrests were made within the first week after the crime.
If a suspect is neither known to the victim nor arrested at the scene of the crime,
the chances of ever arresting him are very slim. Of the 482 cleared cases, 63 percent
involved "named suspects." In the 1,556 cases without named suspects, only 181
(or 12 percent) were solved later by arrest.
See also INsrrruTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY ch. 2, App. B (1967).
394. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968).
395. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
396. Similarly, in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) the Court noted
that there was no suggestion that the identification by photograph was "unnecessary,''
and emphasized that it was necessary in that the evidence against the suspects was
inconclusive.
397. This is not to suggest that a reviewing court should condemn a crime-scene
identification on a finding that the officer did have grounds to arrest; as the Court
pointed out in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966), "The police are not
required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable
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There are, to be sure, risks involved in having a suspect viewed
outside a lineup.398 However, these risks are far less when witnesses
can see a suspect minutes after they have seen the offender. The ability to remember details drops off sharply in the first few hours after
an event occurs; 399 thus, a "factor which has a substantial effect upon
the reliability of an identification is the amount of time which elapsed
between crime and identification."400 Indeed, a nonlineup identification which occurs shortly after the crime is probably more reliable than the most carefully conducted lineup identification days,
weeks, or months later.401 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Supreme Court has concluded that there is little chance of mistake
when the identification is made by witnesses only a day after the
crime, "while their memories were still fresh." 402
It may be argued that a crime-scene identification is suggestive in
the sense that if a person is brought to the scene by police shortly
after the crime the witnesses may be willing to assume that the police
have apprehended the right man. The fact that the police have found
the suspect in the immediate area may have some such impact; but
this situation may be less suggestive than police presentation of an
individual at some later date, when the witness might assume that
the police "certainly would not have brought him here if he were
not the right man." 403 In the latter case, the witness might assume that
police investigation in the interim had established the guilt of that
individual-an assumption which is less likely when the suspect is
produced minutes after the crime. Also, many of the suggestive procedures which may be a part of a lineup at the police station simply
cannot be arranged during a crime-scene identification.404
For all of these reasons, it is appropriate to conclude that the
cause to arrest a suspect." See text accompanying note 328 supra for the related
point of why this should not be the test for when the Miranda warnings are required.
398. See P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 27-40 (1965).
399. M. BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 88-89 (1926); H. BURTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY
54-55 (1931).
400. P. WALL, supra note 398, at 127.
401. Consider the case of State v. Reeves, 20 Utah 434, 439 P.2d 288 (1968). Witnesses to a theft identified the thief on the scene immediately after his apprehension,
and the identification was beyond question in that the suspect had been found by
the police in the immediate area with the stolen items in his possession. Four months
later, these same witnesses picked someone else out of a lineup containing the thief.
402. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968). In Biggers v. Tennessee,
390 U.S. 404 (1968), an equally divided Court affirming, Justice Douglas noted in
dissent this language from Simmons, and then contrasted the instant case, where
the victim in a nonlineup identification "confronted petitioner seven months after
the rape, and the sharpness of her recall was being severely tested." 390 U.S. at 407.
403. H. GROSS, CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 37 (1911).
404. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1967), the Court listed the
following suggestive procedures: everyone in lineup known to witness except for
suspect; participants in the lineup grossly dissimilar; only suspect required to wear
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requirements of due process may be met in a field identification of
a person temporarily seized for purposes of such investigation
promptly after the commission of a crime. Several recent cases support this conclusion.405

2. The Right to Counsel Issue
The question of whether the right to counsel requirements contained in Wade and Gilbert apply to field identifications depends, as
have earlier right to counsel issues, 406 upon when that right attaches.
This is not to say, of course, that the right to counsel "begins" for
all purposes at the same time; during the short life of Escobedo, for
example, it was never seriously suggested that the coincidence of
focus and custody marked the point at which counsel had to be prodistinctive clothing; witness told by police that they have caught the culprit; suspect
pointed out to witness before or during lineup; participants in lineup asked to try
on clothing which fits only suspect; wholesale identification of defendant as perpetrator of several different crimes.
405. In these cases, it often appears that the suspect was actually under arrest,
although in many instances it would seem that the situation should be character•
ized as a temporary "seizure" in the sense of the Terry case. In most of them, the
suspect had been detained for a very brief period of time and the circumstances suggest that the purpose of the detention was to permit a viewing by the witness, with
a to-the-station arrest to follow only if the witness identified the suspect as the
offender. None of these cases involved a lineup. See Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d
171 (10th Cir. 1968) (victim of postal robbery brought to postal inspector's office
after suspect's arrest; held no due process violation); United States v. Quarles, 387
F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967) (FBI agents brought suspect, apparently not then under
arrest, to bank where robbery occurred, procedure upheld without discussion of
due process point); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 238 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Mass. 1968)
(suspect found nearby brought back to scene of burglary about half hour
after crime, held no due process violation; court noted that victim, "while the
events were very fresh in his mind ..• was probably in a better position to have a
clear recollection of the intruder than at any later time"); Harris v. State, 206 S.2d
829 (Miss. 1968) (suspect brought to scene of window-peeking the day following
crime; court stated that this fact affected only the weight of the identification, no
discussion of due process point); State v. Keeney, 425 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1968) (suspect
stopped two blocks away from scene of crime minutes after robbery of store; no
due process violation in bringing suspect to store, especially since "the lapse of time
between observation, description, arrest, and identification is insignificant'); State v.
Sears, 182 Neb. 384, 155 N.W .2d 332 (1967) (a few hours after burglary, owner of
car identified as used in crime and his companion brought to scene of crime for
viewing; held no due process violation); People v. Rodriguez, 288 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1968)
(identification at police station twenty minutes after robbery, held no due process
violation).
In the Bumpus case, the court had this to say about a stopping for investigation
situation:
If Greenberg [the victim] had pursued the intruder and the intruder had been
stopped by a policeman during the pursuit and then had been shown at close
range to Greenberg, it would have been a wholly reasonable confrontation, which
hardly could have been avoided. The field confrontation which in fact took place
seems to us to be of much the same type.
238 N.E.2d at 346-47.
406. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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vided to facilitate preparation for trial. The purpose of the WadeGilbert right to counsel is to "assure a meaningful confrontation at
trial" 407 by making it possible for counsel "to reconstruct at trial
any unfairness that occurred at the lineup" and thus "attack the
credibility of the witness' courtroom identification."408 This being
so, it would seem that the fact that those two cases involved postindictment lineups is not significant, and they would seem to "apply
whenever lineups are conducted."409 Yet, there obviously must be
some limits, and even though the right of cross-examination would
be bolstered if counsel were able to be present at every prior witnesssuspect confrontation, it is inherently impossible to extend the rule
that far. 410
In groping for the yet undefined limits on the Wade-Gilbert
right to counsel, one court recently held that the right begins only
at the "accusatory stage,"411 relying upon "the Court's repeated use
of the term 'accused' and its reference ... to Escobedo v. Illinois." 412
This, however, does not seem consistent with the above-stated rationale of Wade; moreover it ignores the fact that in Gilbert the Court
suppressed testimony given at the penalty stage of the trial by eight
witnesses concerning their lineup identification of the defendant
as the perpetrator of other robberies. Insofar as can be determined,
Gilbert had not yet been indicted for these other crimes, although it
might be said that he had become the "accused" as to theses crimes
if "accused" does not mean "formally charged" 413 but only-as in
Escobedo-that the investigation "had begun to focus" upon him. 414
407. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967).
408. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 232 (1967). Thus, the Court said that
there would be no right to counsel at a lineup if procedures were adopted "which
eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and
the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial." 388 U.S. at 239.
409. L. HALL & Y. KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 87 (2d ed., 1967 Supp.).
As noted in United States v. Davis, 3 BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 3221 (2d Cir. July 31, 1968),
there is language in the recent Supreme Court cases which "outrun their facts,"
such as the assertion in Wade that the Court must "scrutinize any pretrial confronta•
tion of the accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial," 388 U.S. at 227, and the
statement in Stovall that "we have, therefore, concluded that the confrontation is a
'critical stage,' and that counsel is required at all confrontations,'' 388 U.S. at 298.
410. It would be helpful, for example, if counsel could be present at the time of
the crime and thus more effectively cross-examine the witnesses as to their ability
to observe the features of the offender.
411. United States v. Davis, 3 BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 3221 (2d Cir. July 31, 1968).
This issue has been faced by few courts to date, as most cases in which the defendant
has raised a Wade argument have been disposed of on the nonretroactivity ground.
See, e.g., United States v. Quarles, 387 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967); State v. Sears, 182 Neb.
384, 155 N.W.2d 332 (1967).
412. United States v. Davis, 3 BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 3221, 3223 (2d Cir. July 31, 1968).
413. This was the interpretation given to "accused" by four members of the
Court in the pre-Escobedo case of Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
414. Clearly the investigation had begun to focus on Gilbert; six days before the
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However, the now-discredited "focus" test has no more appeal here
than in other contexts.415 If the right to counsel during identification comes into bloom at the time of "focus," then a defendant,
by showing that he could have been arrested, could challenge the
most cautious of police identification procedures, such as arranging
to have the suspect viewed "on the streets, entering or leaving his
home or place of business, at places of amusement, or at any other
place where he is not entitled to privacy."416 Likewise, it would
also mean that an officer could not confidently take a suspect a brief
distance to the scene of a just-completed crime for identification unless he were certain that he did not have grounds for arrest, which
again would have the unfortunate result of requiring police "to
guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable
cause to arrest." 417
Another possibility is that the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel
commences at the time the suspect is taken into custody. One court
has rejected the view that "the mere fact of custody ... automatically
triggers the Sixth Amendment right to counsel" and has concluded
that "the fact of custody adds little of Sixth Amendment relevance" ;418 this makes particularly good sense if custody is taken to
include a Terry type of seizure. A contrary view would mean that
street encounters for purposes of identification would be improper
"unless police cars are equipped with public defenders." 419 As a
federal court recently said of a hypothetical case in which a man
running away from the scene of an assault was collared by an officer
who asked the victim and the bystanders whether the man was the
perpetrator:
It is hard to believe the Court meant to prevent an officer from making such a routine, uncontrived inquiry and to require that the
lineup he had admitted committing the other crimes. Gilbert v. United States, 366
F.2d 923, 946 n.26 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967).
415. See text accompanying note 328 supra.
416. Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1965). Illustrative is United
States v. Quarles, 387 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967), where FBI agents took employees of a
robbed bank to one of the suspect's place of employment, where they picked the suspect
out of a group of employees lounging in the area.
417. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966).
418. United States v. Davis, 3 BNA CRIM, L. RPTR. 3221, 3222 {2d Cir. July 31, 1968).
But cf. Rivers v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 2183 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1968), where the
court held that failure to provide counsel for (or to obtain a waiver of the right to
counsel from) a suspect who was apprehended, placed under arrest, and immediately
brought before the victim for identification barred use of the victim's identification
as evidence in a federal criminal trial. The fifth circuit apparently noted that the record
did not reveal thH an emergency existed or that the police feared that the victim was
dying as in Stovall.
419, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1964) Gustice White, dissenting).
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victim and the bystanders be carted off to a police station, held on
the spot until counsel could be provided, or dismissed until a lineup
attended by counsel could be arranged at some later time.420

The notion that Wade and Gilbert do not apply to such field
identifications, it is submitted, does not do violence to the reasoning
in those cases. The risks in field identification, for the most part, are
inherent in that particular procedure and identical in almost every
case. Only one suspect is viewed, and it is apparent to all parties that
it was possible for the suspect to have committed the crime because
he was in the area. The presence of counsel at the identification is
not necessary to establish these points at trial. By contrast, there are
an infinite number of variations in the manner in which a stationhouse lineup might be conducted, and counsel's knowledge of precisely what occurred is of great value in making possible a meaningful cross-examination at trial.421 Most of the suggestive procedures
listed in Wade simply could not occur in the context of a field identification.422 Moreover, a suspect in a lineup is seldom in a position
to detect such suggestive procedures423 and thus needs counsel to
act as his eyes and ears, but a similar dilemma is unlikely in a field
identification.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
"Street encounters," the Chief Justice noted in Terry, "are incredibly rich in diversity." 424 To this might be added the observation
that the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment issues presented by such
encounters are likewise "rich in diversity." And, as reflected in a
number of recent state and federal cases, the solutions tendered for
these issues are also diverse; the authority of the police to make onthe-street investigations has sometimes been limited by such imponderables as the undisclosed intentions of the officer and the undisclosed assumptions of the suspect, or by such dubious factors as
whether the officer could have required the suspect to submit to more
than a street encounter.
420. United States v. Davis, 8 BNA CRIM. L. RFrn. 3221, 3222 (2d Cir. July 31, 1968).
421. Of course, the presence of a lawyer at a stationhouse lineup also serves as a
deterrent against suggestive police tactics.
422. See the list of abuses of the lineup procedure in note 404 supra. The only
one of these "suggestive procedures" which might occur at a field identification is a
police statement that they have caught the culprit.
423. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230-31 n.13 (1967) where the Court
stated:
An additional impediment to the detection of such influences by participants,
including the suspect, is the physical conditions often surrounding the conduct
of the lineup. In many, lights shine on the stage in such a way that the suspect
cannot see the witness •••. In some a one-way mirror is used and what is said
on the witness' side cannot be heard.
424. 392 U.S. at 13.
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All street encounters, despite their diversity, have in common
the fact that they are less of an intrusion on the suspect than what
has traditionally been referred to as an "arrest"-an actual taking to
the station for purposes of investigation or prosecution. In terms of
the fourth amendment, the seizure is a lesser invasion of personal
security, as emphasized in Terry. In terms of the fifth amendment,
the "potentiality for compulsion" does not approach that which pervades stationhouse questioning. And, in terms of the Wade-Gilbert
sixth amendment right and the Stovall due process protection, crimescene identifications are not attended by the risks of a one-man station-house showup or a lineup conducted long after the event.
Because this is so, such efforts at crime prevention and detection425 should be encouraged rather than discouraged through "a
grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts."426 Until police
and judges are replaced by computers, the contours of permissible
police action should not be drawn by resort to highly complex
formulae or largely unascertainable facts. Specifically, attempts to
resurrect the "focus" test for various purposes should be resisted
strenuously; the fact that the officer underestimated the amount of
evidence at hand or thoughtfully elected a lesser form of intrusion
upon the suspect should not be decisive. After all, "there is no
constitutional right to be arrested." 427
If the courts do take a positive attitude toward permitting street
encounters, Terry and its companions may mark the beginning of a
rational assessment of a highly important but long-ignored aspect of
police work. These cases, it may be hoped, will prompt the following
developments.
First: Terry paves the way for courts and Ia-wyers to see street
encounters for what they are-a unique and distinct form of police
activity which should not be judged as something indistinguishable
from other police practices. The police have long viewed their onthe-street actions in this way, and it is time for the law to do likewise.
For too many years, instances of what in fact were temporary seizures
for investigation have come before trial and appellate courts, but the
issues involved were argued and decided solely in terms of whether
there was a lawful arrest.428
Second: It is time for rethinking of what constitutes probable
425. Obviously the use of somewhat similar actions for purposes of harassment
should be distinguished. See section IV supra.
426. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
427. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966).
428. See Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning
and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM.
L.C. &: P .S. 386, 390 (1960).
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cause for arrest. Because of the long-standing judicial practice of
classifying a variety of police conduct as arrests, there has been a
tendency to water down the requirements for arrest in order to
justify what were in fact only stops for investigation. Now that it
is clear that such temporary seizures may be authorized without
calling them arrests, a reconsideration of the grounds for a taking
to the station are in order.429
Third: Police authority to investigate suspicious activity should
be conferred in terms of the power to make a temporary seizure;
concomitantly, the courts should become more vigilant in striking
down other investigative techniques which are more offensive. These
include the use of broad and vague crimes of vagrancy and the like
which permit arrest, prosecution, and conviction merely for being
suspicious,430 and such subterfuges as arrests for insignificant traffic
violations in order to investigate, search, or harrass. 431 Recognition
of police authority to detain suspects briefly in suspicious circumstances should make it somewhat easier to uncover many of these
other techniques. 432
Fourth: It is imperative that police agencies take the initiative
in developing sound policies to ensure that this newly recognized
authority concerning street encounters is exercised with restraint.
Unfortunately, the police have not done so in the past,433 but
rather have often proved to be their own worst enemies by pushing every uncertainty or ambiguity in their power to its outer limits.
The result heretofore has been that the courts ultimately slam the
door on the police-sometimes a bit too hard-and they are then
caught within strict restraints that are essentially of their own
429. Experience has shown, however, that such a reappraisal will not necessarily
result from recognition of the police power to stop for investigation. See Schwartz,
Stop and Frisk (A Case Study of Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8e
P.S. 433, 450-51 (1967).
430. See note 133 supra.
431. See, e.g., Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961) (vice squad
investigator observed man suspected of being a narcotics seller commit two minor
traffic violations-failure to signal for a tum and faulty lights-and obtained an
arrest warrant for these offenses; the suspect was then arrested and a search incident
to arrest uncovered narcotics); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960)
(officers assigned to gambling detail followed man suspected of being a policy "bagman" and arrested him for parking too close to a crosswalk; search of his person
incident to the arrest uncovered policy slips).
432. For example, it has been suggested that the common subterfuge of arresting
a suspicious person and then justifying it by finding a description of a wanted
criminal which comes close to fitting the suspect (see .ARREsr 296-97) could now be
more easily detected because the right to stop for investigation would call for the
officer to give the suspect an opportunity to identify himself. Younger, Stop and
Frisk: "Tell It Like It Is", 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8e P.S. 293, 295 (1966).
433. Some think it is unlikely that they will do so in the future. See Schwartz,
supra note 429, at 449.
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making. 434 The intentional ambiguity in Terry would make it quite
simple for the Supreme Court to give that decision a most narrow
interpretation should the facts of subsequent cases suggest such a
course; thus the warning of the President's Crime Commission still
rings true:
The continuation of field interrogation as a police investigative
technique depends upon a police willingness to develop policies
which carefully distinguish field interrogation from clearly illegal
street practices and to take administrative steps to demonstrate that
a proper field interrogation program can be carried out without it
leading also to indiscriminate stopping and searching of persons on
the street. As yet, police have failed to make this kind of demonstration, and thus today field interrogation as a police investigative technique remains in jeopardy:m

Fifth: Legislatures should also become involved in the entire
matter of police-citizen street confrontations. It is true, of course,
that the Court has made it clear that the fourth amendment is not
subject to "verbal manipulation," 436 and thus there is little to be
gained from enactment of a mere carbon copy of the New York stopand-frisk law. But there are other matters which are quite appropriate for legislation. For one thing, as to Terry-type seizures, there
are a number of issues which are unlikely to reach the courts and
which are even more unlikely to be resolved as a matter of constitutional law. Examples of these issues include whether force
may be used for such a temporary seizure; 437 whether a citizen
may resist an unlawful seizure of this kind; 438 and whether police
434. Courts are undoubtedly influenced by their assumptions as to how police
will respond to legal requirements. If there is confidence that the police will stay
well within defined limits, their powers may be stated broadly. Cf. P. DEVLIN, THE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 16 (1958): "We like to grant large powers so as
to prevent any legal quibble about their extent, but we expect the holders of them
to act fairly and reasonably and well within them." On the other hand, if it is
thought that the police will exceed the limits regularly, the tendency is to impose
severe and perhaps unrealistic limitations. "Among the opponents of the amendment
[broadening the powers of police in Japan] there seems to have been this feeling:
Allow the police seven miles and they will go nine miles; therefore, if we want to
keep them at seven miles, better give them six miles." Abe, Police Detention and
Arrest Privileges Under Foreign Law-Japan, 51 J. Cru:1r. L.C. 8.: P.S. 429, 433 (1960).
435. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 23 (1967). But, in PRESIDENT'S COM!IUSSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND AollllNISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
Soc1ETY 103 (1967), the Commission has praise for the efforts of the New York State
Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials in giving the police practical guidance on the implementation of the New York stop-and-frisk law.
436. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
437. Although occasions where force is needed are rare, see Pilcher, The Law and
Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8.: P.S. 465, 473 (1967), it is obvious
that the police deserve guidance on this point. For one view, see l\IoDEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNl\lENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1966).
438. This issue should probably be dealt with in the same terms as whether an
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should be permitted or required to maintain records on all temporary seizures.439 And perhaps even more important, legislation is
needed to deal with those street encounters which are unrelated to
a desire to prosecute for crime. In Terry there is the healthy admission that courts cannot effectively deter such actions because their
only weapon is the exclusionary rule,440 and this admission is accompanied by a plea for "the employment of other remedies than
the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may
prove inappropriate."441 Clearly, there is a need for laws which
create other means to control the police, new channels for citizen
complaints about police misconduct, and realistic remedies for individuals dealt with unfairly by the police.
Hopefully, Terry, Sibron, and Peters will give impetus to developments such as these. But it is clear that they will not just happen,
nor can the Supreme Court alone make them happen. What is
needed here, indeed, what is needed for the larger task of striking
a fair balance between all individual and societal interests, is
the high resolve of political officials, law-makers and law-implementers, to take affirmative steps to protect and enlarge the liberties
of those they govern .... [N]ow is the opportune time for congressmen and aldermen, and for cabinet members and mayors and police
commissioners ... to begin to view their official obligations in more
spacious terms. They must see it as their responsibility to exercise
the liberating, as well as the regulating, powers of the charters they
work under. Fidelity to the supreme law of the land requires no
less.442
unlawful arrest may be resisted. While some states take the position that such force
is privileged, e.g., City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 971, 14 S.2d 781 (1943), the better
view is that fourth amendment issues should not be fought out on the street and
that the individual illegally seized should submit and then resort to available legal
remedies. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04{2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
439. See DETECTION OF CRIME ch. 5, and note the ALI proposal, supra note 22.
The keeping of such records has been opposed by some as a threat to the reputations
of innocent persons, but insufficient attention has been given to the potential use
of such records as a means of control over the patrolman's actions. DETECTION OF
CRIME 80; Pilcher, supra note 3, at 478-79.
440. 392 U.S. at 13-14:
Doubtless some police "field interrogation" conduct violates the Fourth Amend•
ment. But a stem refusal by this Court to condone such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective
the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the
police, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forego
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.
441. 392 U.S. at 15.
442. Pollack, To Secure the Individual Rights of Many, in LAW IN A CHANGING
AMERICA 43, 55 (G. lIAzARD ed. 1968).

